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All right , thanks everybody . Uh , 

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good afternoon . And thank you for 

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joining us to talk about uh the state 

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of A I and the Department of Defense . 

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So earlier this week , President Biden 

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and Vice President Harris spoke 

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eloquently about the administration's 

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commitment to advancing the safe , 

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secure and trustworthy development and 

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use of artificial intelligence . And 

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the president signed an executive order 

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that lays out strong positive vision 

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for government wide responsible A I 

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adoption , setting a model for industry 

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and the world . As part of that , we 

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here in Dod , look forward to working 

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with the White House and other national 

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security agencies on a national 

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security memorandum on A I that we 

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expect will build on the responsible A 

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I work we've done here at Dod because 

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this is a topic we care a lot about a 

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dod and we've been working on it for 

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quite some time for not only is A I on 

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the minds of many Americans today , 

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it's a key part of the comprehensive 

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War fighter centric approach to 

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innovation that Secretary Austin and I 

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have been driving from day one after 

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all dod is hardly a newcomer to A I . 

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The Pentagon has been investing in A I 

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and fielding data and A I enabled 

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systems for over 60 years from DARPA 

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funding for the first academic research 

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hubs of A I at MIT Stanford and 

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Carnegie Mellon in the 19 sixties to 

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the Cold War era , Sage Air defense 

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system , which could ingest vast 

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amounts of data from multiple radars 

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process it in real time and produce 

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targeting information for intercepting 

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aircraft and missiles . Two , the 

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dynamic analysis and replanning tool 

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dart that Dod started using in the 

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early 19 nineties , saving millions of 

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dollars and logistical headaches in 

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moving forces to the Middle East for 

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operations . Desert shield and Desert 

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Storm . More recently , Apple's Siri 

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has roots not just in decades of dod 

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driven research on A I and voice 

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recognition , but also in a specific 

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DARPA project to create a virtual 

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assistant for military personnel . Of 

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course , increasingly over the last 

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dozen years , advances in machine 

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learning have heralded and accelerated 

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new generations of A I breakthroughs 

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with much of the innovation happening 

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outside Dod in government . And so our 

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task in dod is to adopt these 

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innovations wherever they can add the 

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most military value . That's why we've 

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been rapidly iterating and investing 

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over the past two plus years to develop 

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a more modernized data driven and A I 

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empowered military . Now in dod , we 

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always succeed through teamwork . And 

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here we're fortunate to work closely 

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with a strong network of partners in 

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national labs , universities , the 

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intelligence community , traditional 

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defense industry and also 

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nontraditional companies in Silicon 

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Valley and hubs of A I innovation all 

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across the country . In several of 

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those were physically present , 

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including through offices of the 

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Defense Innovation Unit which we 

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recently elevated to report directly to 

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the secretary as we focused on 

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integrating A I into our operations 

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responsibly and at speed . Our main 

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reason for doing so has been 

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straightforward because it improves our 

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decision advantage from the standpoint 

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of deterring and defending against 

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aggression . A I enabled systems can 

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help accelerate the speed of commanders 

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decisions and improve the quality , 

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quality and accuracy of those decisions 

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which can be decisive in deterring a 

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fight and in winning a fight and from 

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the standpoint of managing across the 

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world's largest enterprise , since our 

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vast scale can make it difficult for 

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dud to see itself clearly spot problems 

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and solve them leveraging data . And A 

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I can help leaders make choices that 

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are smarter faster and even lead to 

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better stewardship of taxpayer dollars . 

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Since the spring of 2021 we've 

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undertaken many foundational efforts to 

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enable all of this spanning data and 

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talent and procurement and governance . 

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For instance , we issued data decrees 

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to mandate all dod data be visible , 

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accessible , understandable linked , 

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trustworthy , interoperable and secure . 

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Our A a initiative deployed data 

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scientists to every combatant command 

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where they're integrating data across 

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applications systems and users . We 

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awarded joint war fighting cloud 

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capability contracts to four leading 

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edge commercial cloud providers , 

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ensuring we have computing storage , 

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network infrastructure and advanced 

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data analytics to scale on demand . We 

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stood up dod S Chief Digital and 

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Artificial Intelligence Office or CD A 

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O to accelerate adoption of data 

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analytics and A I from the boardroom to 

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the battlefield . The secretary and I 

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are ensuring CD A O is empowered to 

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lead change with urgency from the E 

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ring to the tactical edge . We've also 

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invested steadily and smartly in 

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accompanying talent and technology . 

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More than $1.8 billion in A I and 

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machine machine learning capabilities 

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alone over the coming fiscal year . And 

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today , we're releasing a new data 

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analytics and A I adoption strategy 

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which not only builds on dod s prior 

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your A I and data strategies but also 

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includes updates to account for recent 

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industry , advances in Federated 

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environments , decentralized data 

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management , generative A I and more . 

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I'm sure our CD A O . Doctor Craig 

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Martel will say more about that when 

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you all speak with him later this 

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afternoon , all this and more is 

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helping realize combined joint all 

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domain command and control CJD C two to 

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be clear , CJ AC two isn't a platform 

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or single system worth buying . It's a 

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whole set of concepts , technologies , 

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policies and talent that are advancing 

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a core us war fighting function , the 

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ability to command and control forces . 

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So we're integrating sensors and fusing 

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data across every domain while 

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leveraging cutting edge decision 

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support tools to enable high optempo 

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operations . It's making us even better 

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than we already are at joint operations 

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and combat integration . CJ C two is 

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not some futuristic dream based on 

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multiple global information dominance 

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experiments work in the combatant 

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commands like do Paycom and Centcom as 

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well as work in the military services . 

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It's clear these investments are 

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rapidly yielding returns . That's the 

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beauty of what software can do for hard 

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power delivery doesn't take several 

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years or a decade . Our investments in 

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data A I and compute are empowering war 

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fighters in the here and now in a 

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matter of months , weeks and even days , 

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we've worked tirelessly for over a 

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decade to be a global leader in the , 

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in the fast and responsible development 

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and use of A I technologies in the 

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military sphere , creating policies 

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appropriate for their specific use . 

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Safety is critical because unsafe 

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systems are ineffective systems . The 

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Pentagon first issued a responsible use 

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policy for autonomous systems in 2012 

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and we've maintained our commitment 

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since as technology has evolved , 

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adopting and affirming ethical 

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principles for using A I issuing a new 

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strategy and implementation pathway . 

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Last year , focused on responsible use 

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of A I technologies and updating that 

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original 2012 directive earlier this 

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year to ensure we we remain the global 

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leader of not just development and 

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deployment but also safety . As I said 

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before , our policy for autonomy and 

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weapons systems is clear and well 

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established . There is always a human 

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responsible for the use of force full 

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stop because even as we are 

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swiftly embedding A I in many aspects 

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of our mission from battle , space 

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awareness , cyber , and reconnaissance 

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to logistics for support and other back 

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office functions . We are mindful of A 

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I's potential dangers and determined to 

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avoid them . Unlike some of our 

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strategic competitors , we don't use A 

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I to censor constrain repress or 

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disempower people by putting our values 

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first and playing to our strengths . 

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The greatest of which is our people . 

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We've taken a responsible approach to A 

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I that will ensure America continues to 

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come out ahead . Meanwhile , as 

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commercial tech companies and others 

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continue to push forward the frontiers 

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of A I , we're making sure we stay at 

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the cutting edge with foresight , 

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responsibility and a deep understanding 

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of the broader implications for our 

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nation . For instance , mindful of the 

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potential risks and benefits offered by 

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large language models and other 

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generative A I tools . We stood up task 

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force , Lima to ensure dod responsibly 

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adapts implements and secures these 

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technologies candidly most 

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commercially available systems enabled 

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by large language models aren't yet 

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technically mature enough to comply 

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with our ethical A I principles which 

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is re required for responsible 

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operational use . But we have found 

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over 180 instances where such 

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generative A I tools could add value 

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for us with oversight , like helping to 

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debug and develop software faster , 

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speeding analysis of battle damage 

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assessments and verifiably summarizing 

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text from both open source and 

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classified data sets . Not all of these 

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use cases are notional . Some dod 

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components started exploring generative 

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A I tools before chat G BT and similar 

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products captured the world's attention . 

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A few even made their own models , 

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isolating foundational models fine 

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tuning them for a specific task with 

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clean , reliable , secure dod data and 

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taking the time to further test and 

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refine the tools . While we have much 

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more evaluating to do . It's possible 

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some might make fewer factual errors 

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than publicly available tools in part 

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because with effort , they can be 

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designed to cite their sources clearly 

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and proactively . Although it would be 

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premature to call most of them 

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operational . It's true that some are 

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actively being experimented with and 

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even used as part of people's regular 

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workflows . Of course , with 

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appropriate human supervision and 

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judgment , not just to validate but 

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also to continue improving them . We 

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are confident in the alignment of our 

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innovation goals with our responsible A 

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I principles . Our country's vibrant 

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innovation ecosystem is second to none 

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precisely because it's powered by a 

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free and open society committed to 

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responsible use values and ideals . We 

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are world leaders in the promotion of 

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the responsible use of A I and autonomy 

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with our allies and partners . One 

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example is the political declaration 

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that we launched back in February and 

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that Vice President Harris highlighted 

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in London this week which creates 

280
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strong norms for responsible behavior 

281
00:11:50,919 --> 00:11:53,729
as the vice president noted over 30 

282
00:11:53,739 --> 00:11:55,961
countries have endorsed the declaration 

283
00:11:56,010 --> 00:11:58,179
ranging from members of the G7 to 

284
00:11:58,190 --> 00:12:01,539
countries in the global South . Another 

285
00:12:01,549 --> 00:12:04,000
example is our A I partnership for 

286
00:12:04,010 --> 00:12:06,320
defense where we work with allies and 

287
00:12:06,330 --> 00:12:07,080
partners to 

288
00:12:16,059 --> 00:12:18,549
us , military have many capable allies 

289
00:12:18,559 --> 00:12:21,109
and partners around the world . And why 

290
00:12:21,119 --> 00:12:23,039
growing numbers of world leading 

291
00:12:23,049 --> 00:12:25,890
commercial tech innovators want to work 

292
00:12:25,900 --> 00:12:28,869
with us . Our strategic competitors 

293
00:12:28,880 --> 00:12:30,969
can't say that and we are better off 

294
00:12:30,979 --> 00:12:34,469
for it . Those nations take a different 

295
00:12:34,479 --> 00:12:36,840
approach . It's deeply concerning , for 

296
00:12:36,849 --> 00:12:39,016
instance , to see some countries using 

297
00:12:39,016 --> 00:12:40,905
generative A I for disinformation 

298
00:12:40,905 --> 00:12:43,400
campaigns against America as has been 

299
00:12:43,409 --> 00:12:45,353
reported by tech companies and the 

300
00:12:45,353 --> 00:12:48,489
press . But there is still time to work 

301
00:12:48,500 --> 00:12:50,556
toward more responsible approaches . 

302
00:12:51,369 --> 00:12:53,729
For example , in the 2022 Nuclear 

303
00:12:53,739 --> 00:12:56,020
Posture review , the United States made 

304
00:12:56,030 --> 00:12:58,380
clear that in all cases , we will 

305
00:12:58,390 --> 00:13:01,140
maintain a human in the loop for all 

306
00:13:01,150 --> 00:13:03,099
actions critical to informing and 

307
00:13:03,109 --> 00:13:05,489
executing decisions by the president to 

308
00:13:05,500 --> 00:13:08,159
initiate or terminate nuclear weapons . 

309
00:13:09,140 --> 00:13:11,760
Other nations have drawn similar bright 

310
00:13:11,770 --> 00:13:14,719
lines we call on and would welcome more 

311
00:13:14,729 --> 00:13:17,320
countries to do the same and we should 

312
00:13:17,330 --> 00:13:19,650
be able to sit down talk and try to 

313
00:13:19,659 --> 00:13:21,881
figure out how to make such commitments 

314
00:13:21,890 --> 00:13:24,260
credible . And we hope all nations 

315
00:13:24,270 --> 00:13:28,130
would agree . As we've said previously , 

316
00:13:28,260 --> 00:13:30,500
the United States does not seek an A I 

317
00:13:30,510 --> 00:13:33,119
arms race with any country including 

318
00:13:33,130 --> 00:13:35,549
the PR C just as we do not seek 

319
00:13:35,559 --> 00:13:38,320
conflict with A I and all our 

320
00:13:38,330 --> 00:13:40,739
capabilities . We seek only to deter 

321
00:13:40,750 --> 00:13:42,972
aggression and defend our country , our 

322
00:13:42,972 --> 00:13:45,194
allies and partners and our interests . 

323
00:13:45,549 --> 00:13:47,500
That's why we will continue to 

324
00:13:47,510 --> 00:13:49,566
encourage all countries to commit to 

325
00:13:49,566 --> 00:13:51,732
responsible norms of military use of A 

326
00:13:51,732 --> 00:13:54,390
I and we will continue to ensure our 

327
00:13:54,400 --> 00:13:56,511
own actions , clearly live up to that 

328
00:13:56,511 --> 00:13:59,119
commitment from here at the Pentagon 

329
00:13:59,130 --> 00:14:01,280
and across all our commands and bases 

330
00:14:01,289 --> 00:14:03,919
worldwide to the flotilla of un crude 

331
00:14:03,929 --> 00:14:06,096
ships that recently steamed across the 

332
00:14:06,096 --> 00:14:08,619
entire Pacific to the thousands of all 

333
00:14:08,630 --> 00:14:10,809
domain attrit autonomous systems . We 

334
00:14:10,820 --> 00:14:12,764
aim to field in the next two years 

335
00:14:12,764 --> 00:14:14,598
through Dod S recently announced 

336
00:14:14,598 --> 00:14:18,070
replicator initiative . The S uh state 

337
00:14:18,080 --> 00:14:21,289
of A I in dod is not a short story nor 

338
00:14:21,299 --> 00:14:24,099
is it static . We must keep doing more 

339
00:14:24,109 --> 00:14:26,669
safely and swiftly given the nature of 

340
00:14:26,679 --> 00:14:29,530
strategic competition with the PR C are 

341
00:14:29,539 --> 00:14:32,099
facing challenge . At the same time , 

342
00:14:32,109 --> 00:14:34,340
we benefit from a national position of 

343
00:14:34,349 --> 00:14:37,179
strength and our own uses grow stronger 

344
00:14:37,190 --> 00:14:39,500
every day and we will be keeping up the 

345
00:14:39,510 --> 00:14:41,780
momentum ensuring we make the best 

346
00:14:41,789 --> 00:14:43,820
possible use of A I technology 

347
00:14:43,830 --> 00:14:46,770
responsibly and at speed with that , 

348
00:14:46,780 --> 00:14:49,030
I'll take your questions . OK . We're 

349
00:14:49,039 --> 00:14:52,309
gonna start with Tara Kapa A P . Hi , 

350
00:14:52,320 --> 00:14:54,770
thanks for doing this . Um One question 

351
00:14:54,780 --> 00:14:56,947
on some current events and then I have 

352
00:14:56,947 --> 00:14:59,113
a couple of A I questions for you . Um 

353
00:14:59,113 --> 00:15:01,179
on the holds Senator Tuberville has 

354
00:15:01,190 --> 00:15:03,150
said that his holds do not affect 

355
00:15:03,159 --> 00:15:05,326
military readiness . He said that they 

356
00:15:05,326 --> 00:15:07,381
don't add stress to the officers who 

357
00:15:07,381 --> 00:15:10,210
have had to do two jobs at once . And I 

358
00:15:10,219 --> 00:15:12,369
just wanted to ask from your point of 

359
00:15:12,380 --> 00:15:14,547
view when you walk the halls , is that 

360
00:15:14,547 --> 00:15:16,324
your experience , does this not 

361
00:15:16,324 --> 00:15:18,491
affected readiness ? Have the officers 

362
00:15:18,491 --> 00:15:18,489
been just fine filling two roles at the 

363
00:15:18,500 --> 00:15:22,250
same time ? So we've said um many 

364
00:15:22,260 --> 00:15:24,427
times in the last six plus months that 

365
00:15:24,427 --> 00:15:25,927
the whole is unnecessary , 

366
00:15:25,927 --> 00:15:28,093
unprecedented and unsafe and that it's 

367
00:15:28,099 --> 00:15:30,321
bad for our military . It's bad for our 

368
00:15:30,321 --> 00:15:32,377
military families . It's bad for the 

369
00:15:32,377 --> 00:15:34,849
country . Um We have seen tragic 

370
00:15:34,859 --> 00:15:37,179
effects of that stress , but in a day 

371
00:15:37,190 --> 00:15:39,210
to day sense , we've also seen the 

372
00:15:39,219 --> 00:15:41,969
stress at the individual human level . 

373
00:15:41,979 --> 00:15:43,799
Um And I think that's been well 

374
00:15:43,809 --> 00:15:45,865
communicated on Capitol Hill . We're 

375
00:15:45,865 --> 00:15:47,587
pleased to see today , Admiral 

376
00:15:47,587 --> 00:15:49,698
Franchetti and General Alvin , having 

377
00:15:49,698 --> 00:15:51,865
already been confirmed , we understand 

378
00:15:51,865 --> 00:15:54,031
General Mahoney will be confirmed . We 

379
00:15:54,031 --> 00:15:56,198
very much hope by the end of the day . 

380
00:15:56,198 --> 00:15:58,309
But even then you have 370 I think is 

381
00:15:58,309 --> 00:16:00,469
the number , um you know , officers 

382
00:16:00,479 --> 00:16:03,409
who've dedicated their lives to service 

383
00:16:03,419 --> 00:16:05,780
to the nation . It's just , it's wrong . 

384
00:16:05,919 --> 00:16:07,590
Um And it is unsafe and it is 

385
00:16:07,599 --> 00:16:09,659
absolutely hurting readiness just a 

386
00:16:09,669 --> 00:16:11,780
quick follow up . And then the A I um 

387
00:16:11,780 --> 00:16:13,909
just you say you've seen the tragic 

388
00:16:13,919 --> 00:16:16,940
effects . Do you think that uh this 

389
00:16:16,950 --> 00:16:18,894
added stress and workload may have 

390
00:16:18,894 --> 00:16:20,783
contributed to General Smith's uh 

391
00:16:20,783 --> 00:16:22,950
illness ? Yeah , I'm not gonna comment 

392
00:16:22,950 --> 00:16:25,061
on my personal views on that . I will 

393
00:16:25,061 --> 00:16:26,839
only say that General Smith has 

394
00:16:26,839 --> 00:16:28,950
indicated that you know , he's trying 

395
00:16:28,950 --> 00:16:31,172
to work two jobs that he's working from 

396
00:16:31,172 --> 00:16:33,339
6 a.m. to 11 at night . Iiii , I think 

397
00:16:33,339 --> 00:16:36,710
it speaks for itself . You on A I , um , 

398
00:16:36,719 --> 00:16:38,830
you touched on this in your remarks , 

399
00:16:38,830 --> 00:16:41,219
but for the international norms for 

400
00:16:41,229 --> 00:16:43,429
responsible use , are there red lines 

401
00:16:43,440 --> 00:16:45,440
for which the member countries that 

402
00:16:45,440 --> 00:16:47,820
want to sign on will and will not use A 

403
00:16:47,830 --> 00:16:50,539
I for , I , I'm not sure how to answer 

404
00:16:50,549 --> 00:16:52,716
that . I think what I would say is the 

405
00:16:52,716 --> 00:16:54,827
United States position of making sure 

406
00:16:54,827 --> 00:16:56,780
that there's always um a human um 

407
00:16:56,789 --> 00:16:59,380
that's in control is vital for kinetic 

408
00:16:59,390 --> 00:17:01,723
effects . And we're gonna stand by that . 

409
00:17:01,723 --> 00:17:03,946
It's , that's where we're coming from . 

410
00:17:03,946 --> 00:17:06,057
And we think we have a lot of nations 

411
00:17:06,057 --> 00:17:05,900
to join us with this . We would invite 

412
00:17:05,910 --> 00:17:07,910
all nations to join that . OK . And 

413
00:17:07,910 --> 00:17:10,132
then two on the replicator . Um can you 

414
00:17:10,132 --> 00:17:12,354
give us a ballpark cost of what it will 

415
00:17:12,354 --> 00:17:15,280
cost to fulfill replicator ? Did you 

416
00:17:15,290 --> 00:17:17,512
want to ask the second and I'll do them 

417
00:17:17,512 --> 00:17:19,679
together ? Um And then is it is mostly 

418
00:17:19,679 --> 00:17:21,790
going to be UAVS ? Is it sea drones ? 

419
00:17:21,790 --> 00:17:24,699
What's kind of the product ? Sure . So 

420
00:17:24,709 --> 00:17:27,042
cost is the wrong way to think about it . 

421
00:17:27,042 --> 00:17:29,265
I'm sure when all is said and done , we 

422
00:17:29,265 --> 00:17:31,376
would be able to retrospectively tell 

423
00:17:31,376 --> 00:17:31,280
you everything that goes through 

424
00:17:31,290 --> 00:17:33,457
replicator , kind of what the value is 

425
00:17:33,457 --> 00:17:35,679
much as I talked about the $1.8 billion 

426
00:17:35,679 --> 00:17:37,901
value , for instance of our A I machine 

427
00:17:37,901 --> 00:17:40,068
learning programs . But the reality is 

428
00:17:40,068 --> 00:17:42,123
replicator is removing kinks and the 

429
00:17:42,123 --> 00:17:44,234
hose of the system that is innovation 

430
00:17:44,234 --> 00:17:46,179
and dod , there are a multitude of 

431
00:17:46,179 --> 00:17:48,123
programs that already exist in the 

432
00:17:48,123 --> 00:17:50,599
department , um , that need help to get 

433
00:17:50,609 --> 00:17:53,280
from where they are uh to delivery at 

434
00:17:53,290 --> 00:17:55,780
scale . That is where replicator is 

435
00:17:55,790 --> 00:17:57,920
focused . So again , I think we could 

436
00:17:57,930 --> 00:18:00,097
be able to go back and retrospectively 

437
00:18:00,097 --> 00:18:02,550
capture the cost of that . Um But I 

438
00:18:02,560 --> 00:18:04,782
think it's the wrong way to think about 

439
00:18:04,782 --> 00:18:07,116
program . It's not , it's not a program , 

440
00:18:07,116 --> 00:18:09,227
it's a , it's a uh it's a process for 

441
00:18:09,227 --> 00:18:11,393
improving our ability to scale . So as 

442
00:18:11,393 --> 00:18:13,560
to the types of systems , as I've said 

443
00:18:13,560 --> 00:18:15,671
before , you know , I'm , what I will 

444
00:18:15,671 --> 00:18:17,838
say at this point is uh we are looking 

445
00:18:17,838 --> 00:18:20,004
across multiple domains , domains , we 

446
00:18:20,004 --> 00:18:21,838
are seeing systems that fit that 

447
00:18:21,838 --> 00:18:23,949
definition I just gave you , which is 

448
00:18:23,949 --> 00:18:26,171
um you know , on the delivery pathway , 

449
00:18:26,171 --> 00:18:28,530
but facing some challenges delivering 

450
00:18:28,540 --> 00:18:31,199
at scale in all of the domains and 

451
00:18:31,209 --> 00:18:33,431
that's what we're gonna be focused on . 

452
00:18:33,540 --> 00:18:35,707
OK . Thank you . Uh Next , we'll go to 

453
00:18:35,707 --> 00:18:37,984
Brandy Vincent from Feds . Thanks Eric , 

454
00:18:37,984 --> 00:18:40,207
thank you for doing this . Um Two lines 

455
00:18:40,207 --> 00:18:42,429
of questions for you . First , top tech 

456
00:18:42,429 --> 00:18:45,130
experts have warned that dod must be A 

457
00:18:45,140 --> 00:18:48,479
I ready by 2025 . What does that really 

458
00:18:48,489 --> 00:18:50,711
mean to you ? And what will it take for 

459
00:18:50,711 --> 00:18:52,822
the department to meet that aim ? Can 

460
00:18:52,822 --> 00:18:54,878
you speak to any tangible actions in 

461
00:18:54,878 --> 00:18:57,045
this new strategy from the CD A O that 

462
00:18:57,045 --> 00:18:59,267
will really ensure that the US military 

463
00:18:59,267 --> 00:19:01,385
reaches near term I readiness goals . 

464
00:19:01,395 --> 00:19:03,506
Sure . I think the number one thing I 

465
00:19:03,506 --> 00:19:05,515
would say we need is uh on time 

466
00:19:05,526 --> 00:19:07,956
appropriations and predictable 

467
00:19:08,176 --> 00:19:10,235
resourcing to the plans that we've 

468
00:19:10,245 --> 00:19:13,446
already put out our 2024 budget request . 

469
00:19:13,456 --> 00:19:15,765
Has this really healthy focused 

470
00:19:15,776 --> 00:19:18,446
investment on A I . For example , I 

471
00:19:18,456 --> 00:19:21,026
think that's a major plus up once we 

472
00:19:21,036 --> 00:19:23,258
can get those appropriations to getting 

473
00:19:23,258 --> 00:19:25,036
to those goals , but absent any 

474
00:19:25,036 --> 00:19:27,258
predictability in our funding stream is 

475
00:19:27,258 --> 00:19:29,258
very difficult for us to be able to 

476
00:19:29,258 --> 00:19:31,482
project with accuracy . Um What we can 

477
00:19:31,491 --> 00:19:33,658
and will deliver , what I can tell you 

478
00:19:33,658 --> 00:19:36,692
is we are making strides every single 

479
00:19:36,702 --> 00:19:38,982
day and our experimental approach , the 

480
00:19:38,991 --> 00:19:41,121
strategy you'll hear from Craig uh 

481
00:19:41,131 --> 00:19:43,491
later today , really building out that 

482
00:19:43,501 --> 00:19:45,972
iterative um learning as we go and 

483
00:19:45,982 --> 00:19:49,241
improving as we go is great . Um And I 

484
00:19:49,251 --> 00:19:51,418
think that's a key piece of how we get 

485
00:19:51,418 --> 00:19:53,140
there . The other key pieces I 

486
00:19:53,140 --> 00:19:54,862
mentioned in my remarks is the 

487
00:19:54,862 --> 00:19:57,300
partnerships we have uh you know , 

488
00:19:57,310 --> 00:20:00,020
leading edge uh companies , researchers 

489
00:20:00,030 --> 00:20:01,974
ready and willing to work with the 

490
00:20:01,974 --> 00:20:03,919
United States . They see the value 

491
00:20:03,919 --> 00:20:06,030
proposition , they see the challenges 

492
00:20:06,030 --> 00:20:07,863
um that authoritarian states are 

493
00:20:07,863 --> 00:20:10,030
putting forward with their approach to 

494
00:20:10,030 --> 00:20:11,919
A I and they wanna work with us . 

495
00:20:11,919 --> 00:20:14,086
That's really what's gonna help propel 

496
00:20:14,086 --> 00:20:16,252
us as well . And then can you speak to 

497
00:20:16,252 --> 00:20:18,308
how the CD A O ? Um And Dod has been 

498
00:20:18,308 --> 00:20:20,197
advising and supporting Ukraine's 

499
00:20:20,197 --> 00:20:22,363
experimentation and application of A I 

500
00:20:22,363 --> 00:20:24,599
in this conflict . Um Is the team at CD 

501
00:20:24,609 --> 00:20:27,060
A O providing algorithms or other 

502
00:20:27,069 --> 00:20:29,291
capabilities to Ukraine ? Sure . What I 

503
00:20:29,291 --> 00:20:31,458
would say is CD O is part of our whole 

504
00:20:31,458 --> 00:20:33,569
team effort here in the department to 

505
00:20:33,569 --> 00:20:37,069
provide um assistance and support um to 

506
00:20:37,079 --> 00:20:39,349
Ukrainian partners . So they are part 

507
00:20:39,359 --> 00:20:41,619
of the team . I think what we've seen 

508
00:20:41,630 --> 00:20:44,579
play out in Ukraine is instructive for 

509
00:20:44,589 --> 00:20:46,533
where the department in general is 

510
00:20:46,533 --> 00:20:48,533
going , which you gotta have really 

511
00:20:48,533 --> 00:20:50,700
good quality data . And then you gotta 

512
00:20:50,700 --> 00:20:52,811
take that decision , quality data and 

513
00:20:52,811 --> 00:20:55,229
move it to the either operator logistic 

514
00:20:55,239 --> 00:20:57,489
decision maker . And that's what we're 

515
00:20:57,500 --> 00:21:00,760
doing here at Dod . Thank you . Uh Tony 

516
00:21:00,770 --> 00:21:03,420
Cappuccio Bloomberg replicator . I want , 

517
00:21:03,430 --> 00:21:05,939
can you segue replicator and A I where 

518
00:21:05,949 --> 00:21:08,930
does A I fit into the program ? You're 

519
00:21:08,939 --> 00:21:10,883
envisioning masses of thousands of 

520
00:21:10,883 --> 00:21:13,010
autonomous and tradable . Kamikaze 

521
00:21:13,020 --> 00:21:15,530
drones basically . Where would A I fit 

522
00:21:15,540 --> 00:21:18,010
in uh targeting , providing , targeting 

523
00:21:18,020 --> 00:21:20,140
information or a command and control 

524
00:21:20,150 --> 00:21:22,810
architecture or ? Yeah , let me say 

525
00:21:22,819 --> 00:21:25,209
first , I don't think Kamikaze drone is 

526
00:21:25,219 --> 00:21:27,330
the right way to think about it . You 

527
00:21:27,330 --> 00:21:29,441
need to think again , well beyond the 

528
00:21:29,441 --> 00:21:31,552
kinetic side of this into the ability 

529
00:21:31,552 --> 00:21:33,497
to deliver logistics , command and 

530
00:21:33,497 --> 00:21:35,497
control ISR if you will and again , 

531
00:21:35,497 --> 00:21:37,497
multiple domains . So , so , so the 

532
00:21:37,500 --> 00:21:39,667
idea that this is all about uh sort of 

533
00:21:39,667 --> 00:21:41,667
kinetic swarms I think is , is very 

534
00:21:41,667 --> 00:21:44,349
misleading . Um But I do think back to 

535
00:21:44,359 --> 00:21:46,469
my example on Ukraine again and 

536
00:21:46,479 --> 00:21:48,479
everything that we're already doing 

537
00:21:48,479 --> 00:21:50,423
today in dod , it is really in the 

538
00:21:50,423 --> 00:21:52,646
command and control the ability to take 

539
00:21:52,646 --> 00:21:54,868
information , fuse it together whatever 

540
00:21:54,868 --> 00:21:56,923
the purpose of it is and use that to 

541
00:21:56,923 --> 00:21:59,146
create decision advantage . Uh And that 

542
00:21:59,146 --> 00:22:01,090
replicator is gonna help with that 

543
00:22:01,090 --> 00:22:02,868
regardless of which domain it's 

544
00:22:02,868 --> 00:22:04,923
operating . And that's where the A I 

545
00:22:04,923 --> 00:22:06,812
would intersect with the autonomy 

546
00:22:06,812 --> 00:22:08,868
sending in on mission or programming 

547
00:22:08,868 --> 00:22:11,035
missions into the various drones . And 

548
00:22:11,035 --> 00:22:13,257
it would be the planning of the overall 

549
00:22:13,257 --> 00:22:15,479
use of them . It , it could be either . 

550
00:22:15,479 --> 00:22:14,655
Yeah , both , both of those are 

551
00:22:14,665 --> 00:22:17,584
perfectly , um , routine ways to think 

552
00:22:17,594 --> 00:22:20,535
about the use of A I as you push it out 

553
00:22:20,545 --> 00:22:22,656
through systems , whether those are a 

554
00:22:22,656 --> 00:22:24,601
trad systems , in the case of this 

555
00:22:24,601 --> 00:22:26,601
replicator first tranche that we're 

556
00:22:26,601 --> 00:22:28,489
doing or any other kind of , uh , 

557
00:22:28,489 --> 00:22:30,545
military application . Yeah , ladies 

558
00:22:30,545 --> 00:22:32,712
and gentlemen . Uh , I'd like to thank 

559
00:22:32,712 --> 00:22:34,878
the deputy secretary . Unfortunately , 

560
00:22:34,878 --> 00:22:36,934
we're out of time today . Uh , we're 

561
00:22:36,934 --> 00:22:39,045
gonna take one second to reset as the 

562
00:22:39,045 --> 00:22:38,900
deputy secretary steps out and then 

563
00:22:38,910 --> 00:22:41,021
Brigadier General Ryder is gonna come 

564
00:22:41,021 --> 00:22:43,243
up in brief news of the day . Thank you 

565
00:22:43,243 --> 00:22:42,329
very much . 

566
00:22:59,020 --> 00:23:01,310
All right , good afternoon , everyone . 

567
00:23:02,579 --> 00:23:04,801
Thank you , sir . All right . Uh , just 

568
00:23:04,801 --> 00:23:06,801
a few things to pass along and then 

569
00:23:06,801 --> 00:23:09,135
we'll get , get right to your questions . 

570
00:23:09,135 --> 00:23:11,246
Uh , I cognizant of your time today . 

571
00:23:11,246 --> 00:23:11,180
So , uh , first of all , the Department 

572
00:23:11,189 --> 00:23:13,411
of Defense continues to closely monitor 

573
00:23:13,411 --> 00:23:15,467
the situation in the Middle East and 

574
00:23:15,467 --> 00:23:17,689
maintain a steady focus on our critical 

575
00:23:17,689 --> 00:23:19,689
lines of effort . As you've heard , 

576
00:23:19,689 --> 00:23:21,911
Secretary Austin reinforce earlier this 

577
00:23:21,911 --> 00:23:24,022
week . Foremost , we will continue to 

578
00:23:24,022 --> 00:23:25,800
pro protect American forces and 

579
00:23:25,800 --> 00:23:27,856
citizens in the region . Second , we 

580
00:23:27,856 --> 00:23:29,800
continue to flow critical security 

581
00:23:29,800 --> 00:23:31,800
assistance to Israel as they defend 

582
00:23:31,800 --> 00:23:33,633
themselves against further Hamas 

583
00:23:33,633 --> 00:23:35,522
terrorist attacks . Third , we're 

584
00:23:35,522 --> 00:23:37,689
coordinating closely with the Israelis 

585
00:23:37,689 --> 00:23:39,856
to help secure the release of hostages 

586
00:23:39,856 --> 00:23:41,689
held by Hamas including American 

587
00:23:41,689 --> 00:23:43,356
citizens . And fourth , we've 

588
00:23:43,356 --> 00:23:45,467
strengthened our force posture across 

589
00:23:45,467 --> 00:23:47,522
the region to deter any state or non 

590
00:23:47,522 --> 00:23:49,411
state actors from escalating this 

591
00:23:49,411 --> 00:23:52,319
crisis . Beyond Gaza , Secretary Austin 

592
00:23:52,329 --> 00:23:54,551
and dod leaders are actively engaged in 

593
00:23:54,551 --> 00:23:56,329
frequent communication with our 

594
00:23:56,329 --> 00:23:58,440
partners in the region to discuss the 

595
00:23:58,440 --> 00:24:00,496
situation as we work to prevent this 

596
00:24:00,496 --> 00:24:02,662
from broadening into a larger regional 

597
00:24:02,662 --> 00:24:04,773
conflict . And in those discussions , 

598
00:24:04,773 --> 00:24:06,885
the secretary has also reaffirmed the 

599
00:24:06,885 --> 00:24:08,718
us emphasis on the protection of 

600
00:24:08,718 --> 00:24:10,940
civilians and unfettered access for the 

601
00:24:10,940 --> 00:24:12,773
delivery of humanitarian aid for 

602
00:24:12,773 --> 00:24:15,150
civilians in Gaza . Separately , next 

603
00:24:15,160 --> 00:24:17,327
week , Secretary Austin will travel to 

604
00:24:17,327 --> 00:24:19,216
India , the Republic of Korea and 

605
00:24:19,216 --> 00:24:20,993
Indonesia for several important 

606
00:24:20,993 --> 00:24:22,938
engagements to further bolster our 

607
00:24:22,938 --> 00:24:24,771
strong relationships in the Indo 

608
00:24:24,771 --> 00:24:27,000
Pacific region . The Secretary and 

609
00:24:27,010 --> 00:24:28,677
India's Defense Minister will 

610
00:24:28,677 --> 00:24:31,339
participate in the fifth two plus two 

611
00:24:31,349 --> 00:24:33,071
ministerial dialogue alongside 

612
00:24:33,071 --> 00:24:35,238
Secretary of State Lincoln and India's 

613
00:24:35,238 --> 00:24:38,339
Minister of External Affairs Secretary 

614
00:24:38,349 --> 00:24:40,880
Austin will then travel to the rok for 

615
00:24:40,890 --> 00:24:42,779
meetings with the ROK Minister of 

616
00:24:42,779 --> 00:24:45,001
National Defense which include the 55th 

617
00:24:45,001 --> 00:24:47,057
annual Security Consultative Meeting 

618
00:24:47,057 --> 00:24:49,112
and the inaugural rok United Nations 

619
00:24:49,112 --> 00:24:50,910
Command member states Defense 

620
00:24:50,920 --> 00:24:53,030
Ministerial meeting . Finally , 

621
00:24:53,040 --> 00:24:55,560
Secretary Austin uh will participate in 

622
00:24:55,569 --> 00:24:57,560
the 10th ASEAN defense Ministers 

623
00:24:57,569 --> 00:25:00,849
meeting uh plus or AD MM plus in 

624
00:25:00,859 --> 00:25:03,026
Jakarta , Indonesia . This will be the 

625
00:25:03,026 --> 00:25:05,026
secretary's fourth trip to the Indo 

626
00:25:05,026 --> 00:25:07,192
Pacific region this year and his ninth 

627
00:25:07,192 --> 00:25:09,303
since becoming Secretary of Defense . 

628
00:25:09,540 --> 00:25:11,540
The trip comes as the United States 

629
00:25:11,540 --> 00:25:13,429
along with us allies and partners 

630
00:25:13,429 --> 00:25:15,484
across the Indo Pacific continues to 

631
00:25:15,484 --> 00:25:17,439
deliver historic momentum toward a 

632
00:25:17,449 --> 00:25:19,560
shared regional , regional vision for 

633
00:25:19,560 --> 00:25:21,505
peace , stability and prosperity . 

634
00:25:22,010 --> 00:25:24,066
Finally , I know there has been some 

635
00:25:24,066 --> 00:25:26,121
interest in whether Secretary Austin 

636
00:25:26,121 --> 00:25:28,177
has had the opportunity to meet with 

637
00:25:28,177 --> 00:25:30,399
the new Speaker of the House . Yet . Uh 

638
00:25:30,399 --> 00:25:32,454
as an update , both Secretary Austin 

639
00:25:32,454 --> 00:25:34,454
and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

640
00:25:34,454 --> 00:25:36,454
Staff General Brown had a chance to 

641
00:25:36,454 --> 00:25:38,566
meet with Speaker Johnson yesterday . 

642
00:25:38,566 --> 00:25:40,454
As always , the secretary and the 

643
00:25:40,454 --> 00:25:39,859
department look forward to working 

644
00:25:39,869 --> 00:25:41,702
closely with the speaker and the 

645
00:25:41,702 --> 00:25:43,925
Congress to ensure that the US military 

646
00:25:43,925 --> 00:25:45,869
has what it needs to carry out our 

647
00:25:45,869 --> 00:25:47,813
important mission of defending our 

648
00:25:47,813 --> 00:25:49,925
nation . And with that , I'd be happy 

649
00:25:49,925 --> 00:25:52,036
to take your questions . Go to a PT A 

650
00:25:52,036 --> 00:25:55,989
cup . Uh Thanks General Ryder . So you , 

651
00:25:56,119 --> 00:25:58,260
we've begun to see both from uh 

652
00:25:58,270 --> 00:26:00,381
President Biden and from some members 

653
00:26:00,381 --> 00:26:03,079
of Congress that there is interest in a 

654
00:26:03,089 --> 00:26:06,829
cease fire or a pause in operations uh 

655
00:26:07,260 --> 00:26:09,427
in Gaza to allow some humanitarian aid 

656
00:26:09,427 --> 00:26:12,119
to get through . Does the secretary 

657
00:26:12,130 --> 00:26:14,300
think that a cease fire or a pause 

658
00:26:14,310 --> 00:26:16,588
would also be beneficial at this point ? 

659
00:26:16,588 --> 00:26:18,588
And is he communicating that to his 

660
00:26:18,588 --> 00:26:20,532
Israeli counterparts . Yeah . So a 

661
00:26:20,532 --> 00:26:22,754
couple of things there uh as it relates 

662
00:26:22,754 --> 00:26:24,977
to a cease fire , I , I think uh you've 

663
00:26:24,977 --> 00:26:27,143
heard the White House speak to this as 

664
00:26:27,143 --> 00:26:29,088
well . Um We , we do not support a 

665
00:26:29,088 --> 00:26:31,199
cease fire and that , that gives time 

666
00:26:31,199 --> 00:26:33,819
for Hamas to regroup uh which is uh 

667
00:26:33,849 --> 00:26:35,849
something that again would put uh 

668
00:26:35,859 --> 00:26:38,760
Israeli citizens and others in danger . 

669
00:26:39,040 --> 00:26:40,929
Um You have heard , however , the 

670
00:26:40,929 --> 00:26:43,319
president say uh that uh the US 

671
00:26:43,329 --> 00:26:45,390
government does support humanitarian 

672
00:26:45,400 --> 00:26:48,069
pauses to enable humanitarian aid to 

673
00:26:48,079 --> 00:26:51,569
get in for hostage uh hostages , to get 

674
00:26:51,579 --> 00:26:53,819
out uh as well as other citizens . So , 

675
00:26:54,069 --> 00:26:56,250
uh in the secretary's discussion with 

676
00:26:56,260 --> 00:26:59,099
his counterparts , uh as I mentioned at 

677
00:26:59,109 --> 00:27:00,998
the top , the , the discussion of 

678
00:27:00,998 --> 00:27:03,109
ensuring that Palestinian civilians , 

679
00:27:03,109 --> 00:27:05,770
Gazans , innocent civilians in Gaza are 

680
00:27:05,780 --> 00:27:07,891
able to get humanitarian assistance , 

681
00:27:07,891 --> 00:27:09,947
whether that be water , fuel medical 

682
00:27:09,947 --> 00:27:12,290
aid , uh that continues to be something 

683
00:27:12,300 --> 00:27:14,522
that we continue to emphasize , right ? 

684
00:27:15,270 --> 00:27:17,250
So the secretary is advocating for 

685
00:27:17,260 --> 00:27:19,859
potentially a humanitarian pause as the 

686
00:27:19,869 --> 00:27:23,229
White House is just so . So again , uh 

687
00:27:23,560 --> 00:27:25,560
I'd refer you to the White House to 

688
00:27:25,560 --> 00:27:27,910
talk broadly . The dod focus again , 

689
00:27:27,920 --> 00:27:29,809
our focus is on the things that I 

690
00:27:29,809 --> 00:27:31,753
highlighted at the top which is uh 

691
00:27:31,753 --> 00:27:34,709
deterring a broader conflict , ensuring 

692
00:27:34,719 --> 00:27:36,941
force protection and also ensuring that 

693
00:27:36,941 --> 00:27:38,886
Israel has what it needs to defend 

694
00:27:38,886 --> 00:27:41,619
itself . Thank you very much Idris . Um 

695
00:27:41,839 --> 00:27:44,006
Two quick questions . Firstly , on the 

696
00:27:44,006 --> 00:27:45,895
um I think it was last week , the 

697
00:27:45,895 --> 00:27:47,839
intercepts by the Carney of the uh 

698
00:27:47,839 --> 00:27:49,950
missiles from Yemen . Now that you've 

699
00:27:49,950 --> 00:27:51,895
had some time to study it , do you 

700
00:27:51,895 --> 00:27:54,061
definitively believe that the missiles 

701
00:27:54,061 --> 00:27:56,228
were heading to Israel and the US that 

702
00:27:56,228 --> 00:27:58,869
the warship was not a target ? Again , 

703
00:27:58,880 --> 00:28:02,380
we , we know uh that the houthis have 

704
00:28:02,390 --> 00:28:05,150
the ability uh by virtue of the , the , 

705
00:28:05,260 --> 00:28:07,427
the missiles that they're employing to 

706
00:28:07,427 --> 00:28:10,310
range targets in Israel as it relates 

707
00:28:10,319 --> 00:28:13,390
to the US S Carney . Uh again , uh what 

708
00:28:13,400 --> 00:28:15,567
we know is that those missiles were in 

709
00:28:15,567 --> 00:28:17,567
the vicinity of the Carney . And so 

710
00:28:17,567 --> 00:28:19,789
they took appropriate action uh to take 

711
00:28:19,789 --> 00:28:22,040
those missiles down . But the broader 

712
00:28:22,050 --> 00:28:24,280
point here is again , uh we know that 

713
00:28:24,290 --> 00:28:26,900
they have this capability that missiles 

714
00:28:26,910 --> 00:28:29,077
that can reach targets in Israel . And 

715
00:28:29,077 --> 00:28:30,966
as you saw earlier this week , uh 

716
00:28:30,966 --> 00:28:33,077
Israel did take one of those missiles 

717
00:28:33,077 --> 00:28:35,077
down , but as it relates to Israeli 

718
00:28:35,077 --> 00:28:37,188
missile defense and air defense , I'd 

719
00:28:37,188 --> 00:28:36,989
refer you to them to talk about that . 

720
00:28:38,550 --> 00:28:40,161
Yeah , I , I don't have that 

721
00:28:40,161 --> 00:28:43,319
information to pass along . Um sort of 

722
00:28:43,329 --> 00:28:45,273
a simple question . Do you believe 

723
00:28:45,273 --> 00:28:47,162
Israel's response so far has been 

724
00:28:47,162 --> 00:28:49,107
proportionate ? I'm look , I'm not 

725
00:28:49,109 --> 00:28:51,331
gonna speak about Israel's operations . 

726
00:28:51,331 --> 00:28:54,520
You've heard us say that we continue to 

727
00:28:54,530 --> 00:28:56,697
talk with them about the importance of 

728
00:28:56,697 --> 00:28:58,697
applying uh the laws of war , which 

729
00:28:58,697 --> 00:29:00,530
includes proportionality , which 

730
00:29:00,530 --> 00:29:02,959
includes taking into account civilians 

731
00:29:02,969 --> 00:29:05,510
on the ground . Um But you've also 

732
00:29:05,520 --> 00:29:08,199
heard us talk about uh the challenging 

733
00:29:08,209 --> 00:29:10,760
situation that they're in as it relates 

734
00:29:10,770 --> 00:29:14,530
to Hamas uh and their extensive network 

735
00:29:14,540 --> 00:29:16,484
of command and control operational 

736
00:29:16,484 --> 00:29:18,719
nodes , rockets , uh all and , and oh , 

737
00:29:18,729 --> 00:29:20,989
by the way , tunnels deeply embedded uh 

738
00:29:21,000 --> 00:29:24,869
underneath Gaza , uh all wrapped around 

739
00:29:25,069 --> 00:29:27,469
uh innocent civilians . And so again , 

740
00:29:27,479 --> 00:29:29,535
I don't think any of us can question 

741
00:29:29,535 --> 00:29:31,535
the complexity of the urban warfare 

742
00:29:31,535 --> 00:29:34,589
that is taking place in Gaza . Um But 

743
00:29:34,599 --> 00:29:36,770
we will continue and we do expect our 

744
00:29:36,780 --> 00:29:39,650
Israeli partners to abide by and take 

745
00:29:39,660 --> 00:29:41,716
into account the laws of war as they 

746
00:29:41,716 --> 00:29:43,882
conduct their operations . Let me move 

747
00:29:43,882 --> 00:29:45,993
over to will uh two questions first , 

748
00:29:45,993 --> 00:29:48,160
uh in terms of us , end use monitoring 

749
00:29:48,160 --> 00:29:49,993
of , of military supplies or aid 

750
00:29:49,993 --> 00:29:52,049
supplied to Israel . Have there been 

751
00:29:52,049 --> 00:29:54,160
any instances of , of concern or that 

752
00:29:54,160 --> 00:29:56,271
um that raise concerns on the US side 

753
00:29:56,271 --> 00:29:58,382
in terms of civilian casualties ? And 

754
00:29:58,382 --> 00:29:58,280
uh second , we can get an update on the 

755
00:29:58,290 --> 00:30:00,401
number of attacks on us forces in the 

756
00:30:00,401 --> 00:30:02,319
region . Sure . Um So whenever we 

757
00:30:02,329 --> 00:30:04,662
provide military assistance to partners , 

758
00:30:04,780 --> 00:30:06,947
uh including Israel , you know , we do 

759
00:30:06,947 --> 00:30:09,069
make clear that that support must be 

760
00:30:09,079 --> 00:30:11,246
used consistent with international law 

761
00:30:11,246 --> 00:30:13,050
to include the law of war and 

762
00:30:13,060 --> 00:30:14,949
obligations related to protecting 

763
00:30:14,949 --> 00:30:17,339
civilians . So , uh that is standard uh 

764
00:30:17,349 --> 00:30:19,460
with any partner uh that we provide . 

765
00:30:19,460 --> 00:30:21,238
And again , this is part of the 

766
00:30:21,238 --> 00:30:23,349
conversation that we continue to have 

767
00:30:23,349 --> 00:30:25,071
with our Israeli partners . Uh 

768
00:30:25,071 --> 00:30:26,905
recognizing that they do have an 

769
00:30:26,905 --> 00:30:28,960
inherent right and a duty to protect 

770
00:30:28,960 --> 00:30:30,905
their citizens uh as it relates to 

771
00:30:30,905 --> 00:30:33,920
attacks . Uh since October 26 . Uh 

772
00:30:33,930 --> 00:30:37,119
There have been eight attacks three in 

773
00:30:37,130 --> 00:30:39,352
Syria or excuse me , three in Iraq five 

774
00:30:39,359 --> 00:30:42,530
in Syria . Um , and I would say , uh 

775
00:30:42,540 --> 00:30:45,199
just one , the last one was on October 

776
00:30:45,209 --> 00:30:48,359
31st . Uh and that was one attack uh in 

777
00:30:48,369 --> 00:30:51,670
Syria . What , what's the total now in 

778
00:30:51,680 --> 00:30:54,439
light of those 2828 total ? Ok . 

779
00:30:56,199 --> 00:30:58,849
Since October 17th , correct ? Eastern 

780
00:30:58,859 --> 00:31:01,910
time , Chris . Thanks Pat . Uh two 

781
00:31:01,920 --> 00:31:04,087
questions , one on the attacks and one 

782
00:31:04,087 --> 00:31:06,087
on the crane training . Uh I'd just 

783
00:31:06,087 --> 00:31:09,140
like to clarify what an attack on us 

784
00:31:09,150 --> 00:31:11,359
forces is just so we're all speaking 

785
00:31:11,369 --> 00:31:15,280
the same language . Are you counting um , 

786
00:31:15,329 --> 00:31:18,359
attempted attacks that may fail it on ? 

787
00:31:18,880 --> 00:31:22,810
And um is your assessment of an attack 

788
00:31:22,819 --> 00:31:24,760
um consistent with how you've 

789
00:31:24,770 --> 00:31:27,160
categorized these incidents in the past ? 

790
00:31:27,790 --> 00:31:30,012
Yeah , so it's a great point and thanks 

791
00:31:30,012 --> 00:31:32,068
for bringing it up . Um And so I , I 

792
00:31:32,068 --> 00:31:35,079
think part of the challenge here , uh 

793
00:31:35,089 --> 00:31:37,145
and I know that you all wrestle with 

794
00:31:37,145 --> 00:31:41,109
this as well is defining an attack and 

795
00:31:41,119 --> 00:31:43,175
for those of you that have spent any 

796
00:31:43,175 --> 00:31:45,230
significant time in places like Iraq 

797
00:31:45,230 --> 00:31:47,230
and Syria , particularly during the 

798
00:31:47,230 --> 00:31:49,341
height of combat operations , whether 

799
00:31:49,341 --> 00:31:51,175
it be oif or uh the counter ISIS 

800
00:31:51,175 --> 00:31:53,619
campaign . Um You know , it's not , it 

801
00:31:53,630 --> 00:31:56,400
was not unusual um back in the day , so 

802
00:31:56,410 --> 00:31:58,800
to speak , to have uh indirect fire on 

803
00:31:58,810 --> 00:32:00,754
a daily basis , sometimes multiple 

804
00:32:00,754 --> 00:32:02,532
times a day . You know , my own 

805
00:32:02,532 --> 00:32:04,754
experience setting in Baghdad the first 

806
00:32:04,754 --> 00:32:06,977
couple weeks of the deployment , it was 

807
00:32:06,977 --> 00:32:08,921
a significant select psychological 

808
00:32:08,921 --> 00:32:10,977
event by the end of the deployment , 

809
00:32:10,977 --> 00:32:10,880
you know , you , it barely registered 

810
00:32:10,890 --> 00:32:13,709
an eyebrow raise that said it's 

811
00:32:13,719 --> 00:32:15,663
dangerous , right ? And so in some 

812
00:32:15,663 --> 00:32:17,959
cases , you have a couple of rockets 

813
00:32:17,969 --> 00:32:19,949
maybe impacting somewhere near the 

814
00:32:19,959 --> 00:32:22,070
fence line or inside the fence line . 

815
00:32:22,239 --> 00:32:24,589
In other cases , you have drones that , 

816
00:32:24,599 --> 00:32:27,260
that may impact a facility . Uh , you 

817
00:32:27,270 --> 00:32:29,381
know , as you saw on the , on October 

818
00:32:29,381 --> 00:32:31,603
17th and 18th , uh , we had some , uh , 

819
00:32:31,603 --> 00:32:34,089
folks that , uh experienced some 

820
00:32:34,099 --> 00:32:36,729
injuries , um , since then , you know , 

821
00:32:36,739 --> 00:32:39,689
no injuries of us personnel , um to my 

822
00:32:39,699 --> 00:32:42,010
knowledge , but again , it doesn't uh 

823
00:32:42,020 --> 00:32:45,479
minimize the , the potential risk and 

824
00:32:45,489 --> 00:32:47,729
the danger of these . And so as we , uh 

825
00:32:47,739 --> 00:32:50,050
put these lists together that these 

826
00:32:50,060 --> 00:32:52,579
numbers together , we're working with 

827
00:32:52,589 --> 00:32:56,390
CJ tfoir us Central command to try to 

828
00:32:56,400 --> 00:32:58,800
be as conservative and po as possible 

829
00:32:59,140 --> 00:33:02,650
to identify , uh , if , if us 

830
00:33:02,660 --> 00:33:05,250
forces in Iraq and Syria were um 

831
00:33:05,260 --> 00:33:07,427
threatened . Um But again , it's gonna 

832
00:33:07,427 --> 00:33:09,538
be an art , not a science and for the 

833
00:33:09,538 --> 00:33:11,649
sake of transparency trying to ensure 

834
00:33:11,649 --> 00:33:13,649
that we're providing what we can as 

835
00:33:13,649 --> 00:33:15,704
quickly as we can . Uh And so I just 

836
00:33:15,704 --> 00:33:18,038
leave it there . What is the definition ? 

837
00:33:18,038 --> 00:33:20,310
Is there a distance it has to be or is 

838
00:33:20,319 --> 00:33:22,430
it now again , like I said , you know 

839
00:33:22,430 --> 00:33:25,020
what , it , it's us forces essentially 

840
00:33:25,030 --> 00:33:27,640
being threatened . Um But again , um , 

841
00:33:27,650 --> 00:33:29,594
it's gonna be more of an art and a 

842
00:33:29,594 --> 00:33:31,483
science depending on the , on the 

843
00:33:31,483 --> 00:33:33,372
situation . All right . My second 

844
00:33:33,372 --> 00:33:35,594
question . Um on Tuesday , you said the 

845
00:33:35,594 --> 00:33:37,483
uh timeline for uh training , the 

846
00:33:37,483 --> 00:33:39,706
cranium pilots on F-16 would be roughly 

847
00:33:39,706 --> 00:33:41,959
uh 5 to 9 months . Is that a pre 

848
00:33:41,969 --> 00:33:45,050
existing dod estimate or is that an 

849
00:33:45,060 --> 00:33:47,369
assessment that came after the pilots 

850
00:33:47,380 --> 00:33:49,436
got to uh Arizona ? That , that's an 

851
00:33:49,436 --> 00:33:51,547
assessment that , that essentially is 

852
00:33:51,547 --> 00:33:53,769
tailored to the current situation based 

853
00:33:53,769 --> 00:33:55,658
on our conversations with the Air 

854
00:33:55,658 --> 00:33:57,713
National Guard . And again , uh very 

855
00:33:57,713 --> 00:33:59,824
much predicated on the skill level of 

856
00:33:59,824 --> 00:34:01,880
the individual pilots that are going 

857
00:34:01,880 --> 00:34:04,650
through that training just last 

858
00:34:05,150 --> 00:34:07,372
question , just to clarify , not an air 

859
00:34:07,372 --> 00:34:10,379
force briefing man , although I do 

860
00:34:10,389 --> 00:34:13,520
appreciate it , I do appreciate it . Um 

861
00:34:13,850 --> 00:34:16,149
So again , was that before they got to 

862
00:34:16,159 --> 00:34:18,326
the US or a conversation that happened 

863
00:34:18,326 --> 00:34:20,381
once the pilots were assessed in the 

864
00:34:20,381 --> 00:34:21,992
United States ? Yeah , so my 

865
00:34:21,992 --> 00:34:24,215
understanding is Ukraine identifies the 

866
00:34:24,219 --> 00:34:26,386
pilots that they're going to send . Uh 

867
00:34:26,386 --> 00:34:28,429
they come to the US . Part of that 

868
00:34:28,439 --> 00:34:30,800
initial discussion is evaluating their , 

869
00:34:30,810 --> 00:34:33,149
their skill level uh where they stand 

870
00:34:33,159 --> 00:34:35,270
in terms of English language skills , 

871
00:34:35,270 --> 00:34:37,326
pilot skills . Uh And so it would be 

872
00:34:37,326 --> 00:34:39,719
tailored to the individual pilot . Uh 

873
00:34:39,729 --> 00:34:41,951
And so there can be some variance there 

874
00:34:41,951 --> 00:34:44,173
in terms of one pilot may finish sooner 

875
00:34:44,173 --> 00:34:46,451
than another pilot if that makes sense . 

876
00:34:46,451 --> 00:34:48,659
Ok , Laura , um one quick question and 

877
00:34:48,669 --> 00:34:50,780
then a follow up um does dod have any 

878
00:34:50,780 --> 00:34:52,649
role in making sure that aid can 

879
00:34:52,659 --> 00:34:55,510
continue to flow into Gaza does is dod 

880
00:34:55,520 --> 00:34:57,742
actually doing anything to do that . So 

881
00:34:57,742 --> 00:34:59,853
right now , the Department of Defense 

882
00:34:59,853 --> 00:35:01,742
is not uh physically part of that 

883
00:35:01,742 --> 00:35:03,798
process , but again , as part of the 

884
00:35:03,798 --> 00:35:05,631
broader us government , and as I 

885
00:35:05,631 --> 00:35:07,631
mentioned , uh this is a discussion 

886
00:35:07,631 --> 00:35:09,742
that the secretary does have with his 

887
00:35:09,742 --> 00:35:09,520
counterparts in terms of uh you know , 

888
00:35:09,530 --> 00:35:12,550
particularly uh encouraging Israel uh 

889
00:35:12,560 --> 00:35:15,649
to ensure that uh that aid can get in . 

890
00:35:16,010 --> 00:35:18,510
And then my follow up is does um what 

891
00:35:18,520 --> 00:35:21,250
is Dod S assessment um as to whether 

892
00:35:21,260 --> 00:35:23,620
the ID F has taken the advice that us 

893
00:35:23,629 --> 00:35:25,740
special operators offered in terms of 

894
00:35:25,740 --> 00:35:28,260
uh targeting uh innocent civilians and 

895
00:35:28,270 --> 00:35:30,459
that type of thing . Um But what you 

896
00:35:30,469 --> 00:35:32,525
mentioned special operators , what , 

897
00:35:32,525 --> 00:35:34,747
what do you mean the special operations 

898
00:35:34,747 --> 00:35:36,858
team that was in Israel giving advice 

899
00:35:36,858 --> 00:35:39,025
on targeting and civilian casualties ? 

900
00:35:39,025 --> 00:35:41,247
What is Dod S assessment of whether the 

901
00:35:41,247 --> 00:35:43,080
DF has actually uh put that into 

902
00:35:43,080 --> 00:35:45,247
practice ? Yeah , so just to clarify , 

903
00:35:45,247 --> 00:35:47,469
you know , the , the Special Operations 

904
00:35:47,469 --> 00:35:49,691
Forces uh that you're talking about are 

905
00:35:49,691 --> 00:35:52,800
those individuals that shortly after 

906
00:35:52,810 --> 00:35:55,360
the October 7th attacks uh are helping 

907
00:35:55,370 --> 00:35:57,639
to advise on hostage recovery ? They , 

908
00:35:57,649 --> 00:36:00,439
they are not participating in . We , we , 

909
00:36:00,449 --> 00:36:02,879
we the US military are not 

910
00:36:02,889 --> 00:36:06,620
participating in um ID F target 

911
00:36:06,629 --> 00:36:08,685
development , helping them run their 

912
00:36:08,685 --> 00:36:10,919
campaign . Um You know , just to be 

913
00:36:10,929 --> 00:36:12,651
crystal clear that it is their 

914
00:36:12,651 --> 00:36:14,540
operation , they're running their 

915
00:36:14,540 --> 00:36:17,550
operation . So that , that uh planning 

916
00:36:17,560 --> 00:36:19,699
element is providing planning and 

917
00:36:19,709 --> 00:36:21,820
intelligence support as it relates to 

918
00:36:21,820 --> 00:36:23,659
hostage recovery . So is it not 

919
00:36:23,669 --> 00:36:25,780
accurate . Then I know that I've seen 

920
00:36:25,780 --> 00:36:28,002
some reports that though that group was 

921
00:36:28,002 --> 00:36:30,310
advising on , uh , urban , urban combat 

922
00:36:30,320 --> 00:36:32,653
and lessons learned from , I think , uh , 

923
00:36:32,653 --> 00:36:35,030
Lieutenant General Glenn , uh , you 

924
00:36:35,040 --> 00:36:37,580
know , as , as an expert in , uh , 

925
00:36:37,590 --> 00:36:40,310
urban warfare , uh , had been advising , 

926
00:36:40,389 --> 00:36:42,699
uh , you know , it is part of , take 

927
00:36:42,709 --> 00:36:44,931
things to take into account in terms of 

928
00:36:44,931 --> 00:36:48,070
operational planning , uh , you know , 

929
00:36:48,080 --> 00:36:50,024
uh , in terms of 2nd and 3rd order 

930
00:36:50,024 --> 00:36:52,199
effects , uh as well as civilian harm 

931
00:36:52,209 --> 00:36:54,431
mitigation as part of that process . My 

932
00:36:54,431 --> 00:36:56,653
question was , does Dod SS the ID F has 

933
00:36:56,653 --> 00:36:58,765
actually taken that advice and put it 

934
00:36:58,765 --> 00:37:00,931
into practice . I , I think they are . 

935
00:37:00,931 --> 00:37:03,153
Um , and , and again , I'm not going to 

936
00:37:03,153 --> 00:37:05,376
speak to their individual operations or 

937
00:37:05,376 --> 00:37:07,542
individual sprite uh um strikes . Um , 

938
00:37:07,542 --> 00:37:09,542
but we do know in our conversations 

939
00:37:09,542 --> 00:37:11,765
with them , uh that they , that they do 

940
00:37:11,765 --> 00:37:14,010
take law of war into account and that 

941
00:37:14,020 --> 00:37:16,629
they do take this uh into consideration 

942
00:37:16,639 --> 00:37:18,750
into their operational planning . But 

943
00:37:18,750 --> 00:37:20,750
again , as far as far as individual 

944
00:37:20,750 --> 00:37:22,972
operations go , I'd refer you to them , 

945
00:37:22,972 --> 00:37:24,972
sir . Uh General , thanks . Um , we 

946
00:37:24,972 --> 00:37:27,083
talked a couple of days ago about how 

947
00:37:27,083 --> 00:37:29,306
the department views the attacks on the 

948
00:37:29,306 --> 00:37:31,528
positions in Iraq and Syria as separate 

949
00:37:31,528 --> 00:37:33,840
from what's ongoing in , in and around 

950
00:37:33,850 --> 00:37:35,939
Gaza . Um , but so much of the 

951
00:37:35,949 --> 00:37:37,949
accounting , I mean , these attacks 

952
00:37:37,949 --> 00:37:40,060
have been going on for years , but so 

953
00:37:40,060 --> 00:37:42,171
much of the recent bump in accounting 

954
00:37:42,171 --> 00:37:44,171
starts October 17th , um , when the 

955
00:37:44,171 --> 00:37:46,116
hospital bombing played out in the 

956
00:37:46,116 --> 00:37:48,338
accusations against Israel and then the 

957
00:37:48,338 --> 00:37:50,560
assessment that came afterwards showing 

958
00:37:50,560 --> 00:37:52,616
it came from within Gaza . Um , does 

959
00:37:52,616 --> 00:37:54,393
the department assess that that 

960
00:37:54,393 --> 00:37:56,909
hospital bombing had anything to do 

961
00:37:56,919 --> 00:37:59,229
with inspiring more attacks against 

962
00:37:59,239 --> 00:38:01,461
American positions ? Yeah , I can't , I 

963
00:38:01,461 --> 00:38:03,295
can't necessarily corroborate or 

964
00:38:03,300 --> 00:38:06,949
connect dots between why one terrorist 

965
00:38:06,959 --> 00:38:09,126
organization would do one thing versus 

966
00:38:09,126 --> 00:38:12,810
another . Um , I think that we , we are 

967
00:38:12,820 --> 00:38:14,876
all sensitive to the fact that there 

968
00:38:14,876 --> 00:38:16,987
are tensions in the region . And as I 

969
00:38:16,987 --> 00:38:19,629
mentioned earlier , uh a major uh focus 

970
00:38:19,639 --> 00:38:21,639
for the Department of Defense is to 

971
00:38:21,639 --> 00:38:23,879
deter a broader regional conflict . And 

972
00:38:23,889 --> 00:38:26,600
so you , you will , you are seeing and 

973
00:38:26,610 --> 00:38:28,832
we probably will continue to see groups 

974
00:38:28,832 --> 00:38:30,943
that may try to exploit the situation 

975
00:38:30,943 --> 00:38:34,020
to benefit their own interests uh to 

976
00:38:34,030 --> 00:38:36,820
include Iranian proxy groups . And so 

977
00:38:36,830 --> 00:38:39,330
our point in all of this is our forces 

978
00:38:39,340 --> 00:38:41,396
that are in Iraq and Syria are there 

979
00:38:41,396 --> 00:38:43,340
for one reason only and that's the 

980
00:38:43,340 --> 00:38:45,562
enduring defeat of ISIS and that's what 

981
00:38:45,562 --> 00:38:47,784
they will continue to stay focused on . 

982
00:38:47,784 --> 00:38:50,007
But if those forces are threatened , we 

983
00:38:50,007 --> 00:38:52,118
will not hesitate to take appropriate 

984
00:38:52,118 --> 00:38:51,370
action at a time and place of our 

985
00:38:51,379 --> 00:38:53,959
choosing to protect those forces . And 

986
00:38:53,969 --> 00:38:55,969
so again , within the context , the 

987
00:38:55,969 --> 00:38:58,191
broader strategic context of everything 

988
00:38:58,191 --> 00:39:00,413
that's happening in the Middle East and 

989
00:39:00,413 --> 00:39:02,469
in the broader region , we will make 

990
00:39:02,469 --> 00:39:04,469
those decisions very deliberately , 

991
00:39:04,469 --> 00:39:06,525
very thoughtfully , again , with the 

992
00:39:06,525 --> 00:39:06,409
broader objectives in mind of 

993
00:39:06,419 --> 00:39:08,600
protecting our forces and making sure 

994
00:39:08,610 --> 00:39:11,000
that this does not spin out of control 

995
00:39:11,010 --> 00:39:13,750
into a broader regional conflict . Is 

996
00:39:13,770 --> 00:39:15,714
maybe perhaps some of these groups 

997
00:39:15,714 --> 00:39:17,620
acting in isolation are using the 

998
00:39:17,629 --> 00:39:20,570
situation in and around Gaza uh as 

999
00:39:20,580 --> 00:39:23,489
leverage or as justification or just as 

1000
00:39:23,500 --> 00:39:25,810
a broader threat environment to conduct 

1001
00:39:25,820 --> 00:39:28,489
these attacks . That's correct . Um And 

1002
00:39:28,500 --> 00:39:30,556
we've known for a long time that I , 

1003
00:39:30,560 --> 00:39:32,979
one of Iran's broader strategic goals 

1004
00:39:32,989 --> 00:39:35,889
is uh you know , forcing the United 

1005
00:39:35,899 --> 00:39:38,439
States out of the region . Uh And , and 

1006
00:39:38,449 --> 00:39:40,449
they've employed these proxy groups 

1007
00:39:40,449 --> 00:39:42,580
through multiple means in the past to 

1008
00:39:42,590 --> 00:39:44,701
do this , right . So they want us out 

1009
00:39:44,701 --> 00:39:46,701
of Iraq , they want us out of Syria 

1010
00:39:46,701 --> 00:39:49,034
because it doesn't suit their interests . 

1011
00:39:49,034 --> 00:39:51,879
Uh And we're still there and oh , by 

1012
00:39:51,889 --> 00:39:54,111
the way , we're there at the invitation 

1013
00:39:54,111 --> 00:39:56,333
of the government of Iraq to help their 

1014
00:39:56,333 --> 00:39:58,667
security forces . And , oh , by the way , 

1015
00:39:58,667 --> 00:40:00,722
it wasn't that long ago , although I 

1016
00:40:00,722 --> 00:40:02,889
guess it , you know , relative uh that 

1017
00:40:02,889 --> 00:40:04,778
ISIS was 24 kilometers outside of 

1018
00:40:04,778 --> 00:40:06,833
Baghdad . And so no one wants to see 

1019
00:40:06,833 --> 00:40:08,945
those days come back . So we're gonna 

1020
00:40:08,945 --> 00:40:10,889
continue to make sure that doesn't 

1021
00:40:10,889 --> 00:40:10,810
happen in the meantime , though , if 

1022
00:40:10,820 --> 00:40:14,100
those forces are threatened , um track 

1023
00:40:14,110 --> 00:40:16,629
record proves we will take deliberate 

1024
00:40:16,639 --> 00:40:18,861
decisive action to protect those forces 

1025
00:40:19,750 --> 00:40:21,750
on a different issue . Um The , the 

1026
00:40:21,750 --> 00:40:23,972
journal has a report that uh the Wagner 

1027
00:40:23,972 --> 00:40:25,750
group may supply air defense to 

1028
00:40:25,750 --> 00:40:27,861
Hezbollah . Uh I was wondering if you 

1029
00:40:27,861 --> 00:40:30,028
had a reading on that and any sense of 

1030
00:40:30,028 --> 00:40:32,250
how Russia's interest in the region may 

1031
00:40:32,250 --> 00:40:34,583
have evolved over the past month . Yeah , 

1032
00:40:34,583 --> 00:40:36,639
I've seen those reports . Um I don't 

1033
00:40:36,639 --> 00:40:38,750
have anything specifically on it . Uh 

1034
00:40:38,750 --> 00:40:41,083
if true , very concerning . Um you know , 

1035
00:40:41,083 --> 00:40:44,110
you know , what we have seen here is uh 

1036
00:40:44,120 --> 00:40:48,080
Russia not condemn the attacks by 

1037
00:40:48,090 --> 00:40:50,449
Hamas , uh which , you know , again , I 

1038
00:40:50,459 --> 00:40:53,709
think is uh true to brand here in terms 

1039
00:40:53,719 --> 00:40:55,775
of the kinds of activity we see them 

1040
00:40:55,775 --> 00:40:57,886
doing in , in Ukraine . Uh but that's 

1041
00:40:57,886 --> 00:41:00,219
something that will continue to monitor , 

1042
00:41:00,219 --> 00:41:01,886
but I don't have any specific 

1043
00:41:01,886 --> 00:41:03,941
information on that Fadi if you have 

1044
00:41:03,941 --> 00:41:03,860
two questions , one on Gaza and one on 

1045
00:41:03,870 --> 00:41:05,870
Yemen , I want to start with , with 

1046
00:41:05,870 --> 00:41:07,814
Yemen . I saw the readout from the 

1047
00:41:07,814 --> 00:41:09,926
meeting between the Secretary and the 

1048
00:41:09,926 --> 00:41:12,037
Minister of Defense of Saudi Arabia . 

1049
00:41:12,037 --> 00:41:14,259
Is there any uh been any discussion and 

1050
00:41:14,259 --> 00:41:16,259
request by the US for the Saudis to 

1051
00:41:16,259 --> 00:41:18,481
intercept missiles , potential missiles 

1052
00:41:18,481 --> 00:41:21,959
and drones out of Yemen ? Um um as part 

1053
00:41:21,969 --> 00:41:24,025
of the integrated missile defense in 

1054
00:41:24,025 --> 00:41:26,510
the region . Yeah , thanks . Um So in 

1055
00:41:26,520 --> 00:41:28,742
terms of their discussion , uh it was a 

1056
00:41:28,742 --> 00:41:30,742
very good discussion you saw in the 

1057
00:41:30,742 --> 00:41:32,853
readout . Um We talked about uh our , 

1058
00:41:32,853 --> 00:41:35,820
our mutual uh cooper operation and , 

1059
00:41:35,830 --> 00:41:38,270
and defense efforts . I don't have 

1060
00:41:38,280 --> 00:41:40,391
anything specifically to talk about . 

1061
00:41:40,391 --> 00:41:42,502
Um beyond that read out other than to 

1062
00:41:42,502 --> 00:41:44,724
say , you know , that the United States 

1063
00:41:44,724 --> 00:41:46,947
will work very closely with partners in 

1064
00:41:46,947 --> 00:41:48,780
the region to ensure that we can 

1065
00:41:48,780 --> 00:41:50,669
continue to preserve security and 

1066
00:41:50,669 --> 00:41:52,919
stability throughout the region . On 

1067
00:41:52,929 --> 00:41:55,560
Gaza you maintain that the Israelis are 

1068
00:41:55,570 --> 00:41:57,348
following your advice , they're 

1069
00:41:57,348 --> 00:41:59,360
adhering to the laws of war and 

1070
00:41:59,370 --> 00:42:01,620
international law , but you don't want 

1071
00:42:01,629 --> 00:42:05,409
to discuss any specific incidents 

1072
00:42:05,419 --> 00:42:08,179
or effects . However , you're not not 

1073
00:42:08,189 --> 00:42:10,022
gonna be able to maintain this , 

1074
00:42:10,022 --> 00:42:12,245
especially when you have stark examples 

1075
00:42:12,245 --> 00:42:15,280
like the strike on Jabalia refugee 

1076
00:42:15,290 --> 00:42:17,360
camps , the biggest in , in Gaza , 

1077
00:42:17,500 --> 00:42:20,050
Israel admitted it , it took that 

1078
00:42:20,060 --> 00:42:22,282
decision knowingly knowing that there's 

1079
00:42:22,282 --> 00:42:24,510
gonna be civilians but went after a 

1080
00:42:24,520 --> 00:42:26,520
Hamas leader according to their own 

1081
00:42:26,520 --> 00:42:29,560
statements on TV . So how can you 

1082
00:42:29,570 --> 00:42:31,737
maintain , they are following the laws 

1083
00:42:31,737 --> 00:42:34,110
of war and international humanitarian 

1084
00:42:34,120 --> 00:42:36,340
law when they're admitting something 

1085
00:42:36,350 --> 00:42:38,572
like this ? Yeah . What , what I said f 

1086
00:42:38,572 --> 00:42:40,683
is uh that we're having conversations 

1087
00:42:40,683 --> 00:42:42,572
with them about the importance of 

1088
00:42:42,572 --> 00:42:44,794
taking the law of war into account . Uh 

1089
00:42:44,794 --> 00:42:47,017
and that they , in our discussions with 

1090
00:42:47,017 --> 00:42:48,961
them , uh We believe that they are 

1091
00:42:48,961 --> 00:42:51,017
taking it into account , but again , 

1092
00:42:51,017 --> 00:42:53,017
I'm not gonna get into individual , 

1093
00:42:53,017 --> 00:42:55,183
specific strikes , individual specific 

1094
00:42:55,183 --> 00:42:56,961
actions and , and look as we've 

1095
00:42:56,961 --> 00:42:58,906
discussed before and as it relates 

1096
00:42:58,906 --> 00:43:01,128
particularly uh to what we're seeing on 

1097
00:43:01,128 --> 00:43:04,600
TV . I in the um in Gaza , you know , 

1098
00:43:04,610 --> 00:43:06,777
it's heartbreaking that any civilian , 

1099
00:43:06,777 --> 00:43:08,888
any innocent civilian is being killed 

1100
00:43:08,888 --> 00:43:10,832
again , whether it's Palestinian , 

1101
00:43:10,832 --> 00:43:12,832
whether it's Israeli , whether it's 

1102
00:43:12,832 --> 00:43:14,777
anyone from any nation . Um And so 

1103
00:43:15,020 --> 00:43:17,760
while I'm not going to comment on 

1104
00:43:17,770 --> 00:43:20,479
specific individual strikes , um you 

1105
00:43:20,489 --> 00:43:22,711
know , it's not my intent to provide an 

1106
00:43:22,711 --> 00:43:24,933
operational briefing from up here . Let 

1107
00:43:24,933 --> 00:43:27,100
me just talk a little bit about what I 

1108
00:43:27,100 --> 00:43:29,909
do know . Um you know , as we talked 

1109
00:43:29,919 --> 00:43:31,975
about a little bit earlier , we know 

1110
00:43:31,975 --> 00:43:33,641
that Hamas is integrating its 

1111
00:43:33,641 --> 00:43:35,752
operations , whether it's command and 

1112
00:43:35,752 --> 00:43:37,975
control operational centers , uh combat 

1113
00:43:37,975 --> 00:43:41,550
forces , putting rockets in Gaza um to 

1114
00:43:41,560 --> 00:43:43,504
include this complex and sprawling 

1115
00:43:43,504 --> 00:43:45,020
tunnel network underneath 

1116
00:43:45,159 --> 00:43:48,239
infrastructure throughout Gaza in 

1117
00:43:48,250 --> 00:43:50,979
effect again , using civilians as human 

1118
00:43:50,989 --> 00:43:53,290
shields . We know that Israel has an 

1119
00:43:53,300 --> 00:43:56,590
inherent right to defend itself . They 

1120
00:43:56,600 --> 00:43:58,711
were brutally attacked on the seventh 

1121
00:43:58,711 --> 00:44:01,449
of October , 1400 people killed over 

1122
00:44:01,459 --> 00:44:03,659
200 hostages , not only Israelis , but 

1123
00:44:03,669 --> 00:44:05,891
citizens from around the world that are 

1124
00:44:05,891 --> 00:44:08,310
being kept uh and used again as 

1125
00:44:08,320 --> 00:44:10,909
bargaining chips . And oh , by the way , 

1126
00:44:10,919 --> 00:44:13,409
Hamas has said repeatedly repeatedly 

1127
00:44:13,429 --> 00:44:15,429
that they will continue to do these 

1128
00:44:15,429 --> 00:44:17,596
type of October 7 attacks until Israel 

1129
00:44:17,596 --> 00:44:20,169
is eliminated . And so as I mentioned , 

1130
00:44:20,179 --> 00:44:22,939
there's no question at the complexity 

1131
00:44:23,199 --> 00:44:25,255
of the challenge that is confronting 

1132
00:44:25,255 --> 00:44:27,199
the Israeli forces as they conduct 

1133
00:44:27,199 --> 00:44:29,780
operations in this urban environment . 

1134
00:44:30,750 --> 00:44:33,629
We also expect Israel to take into 

1135
00:44:33,639 --> 00:44:36,909
account the laws of war as they plan 

1136
00:44:36,919 --> 00:44:39,090
and conduct their operations and we 

1137
00:44:39,100 --> 00:44:40,933
want them to distinguish between 

1138
00:44:40,933 --> 00:44:43,156
terrorists and civilians . And so we'll 

1139
00:44:43,156 --> 00:44:45,322
continue to have those conversations , 

1140
00:44:45,322 --> 00:44:45,010
but at the end of the day , this is 

1141
00:44:45,020 --> 00:44:47,187
their operation , this is their effort 

1142
00:44:47,187 --> 00:44:50,239
to protect their citizens . Thank you 

1143
00:44:50,260 --> 00:44:52,879
for the answer . I respect you . You 

1144
00:44:52,889 --> 00:44:56,179
don't wanna discuss uh like specific 

1145
00:44:56,189 --> 00:44:58,949
incident from the podium . Are you 

1146
00:44:58,959 --> 00:45:02,129
raising specific incidents with your 

1147
00:45:02,139 --> 00:45:04,409
counterparts in Israel ? Like the 

1148
00:45:04,750 --> 00:45:08,370
Jabalia strike ? Look Fadi uh we are 

1149
00:45:08,379 --> 00:45:11,120
again , uh the secretary and other dod 

1150
00:45:11,129 --> 00:45:13,350
officials are daily having 

1151
00:45:13,360 --> 00:45:15,850
conversations uh with our Israeli 

1152
00:45:15,860 --> 00:45:17,860
counterparts about the situation in 

1153
00:45:17,860 --> 00:45:20,560
Israel . And again , the importance of 

1154
00:45:20,570 --> 00:45:23,040
protecting innocent lives and taking uh 

1155
00:45:23,050 --> 00:45:26,889
Palestinians uh and , and others into 

1156
00:45:26,899 --> 00:45:28,679
account as they conduct their 

1157
00:45:28,689 --> 00:45:30,800
operations . And again , you know , 

1158
00:45:30,810 --> 00:45:33,350
like I , I know I'm probably belaboring 

1159
00:45:33,360 --> 00:45:36,189
the point here , but we truly want a 

1160
00:45:36,199 --> 00:45:38,800
scenario here where both innocent 

1161
00:45:38,810 --> 00:45:42,199
Palestinians and innocent Israelis can 

1162
00:45:42,209 --> 00:45:44,949
live together peacefully securely . Uh 

1163
00:45:44,959 --> 00:45:46,959
And as I mentioned on Tuesday , you 

1164
00:45:46,969 --> 00:45:48,858
know , unfortunately , the common 

1165
00:45:48,858 --> 00:45:50,913
denominator here is Hamas , which is 

1166
00:45:50,913 --> 00:45:53,025
putting both of these peoples uh in a 

1167
00:45:53,025 --> 00:45:54,858
very challenging and unfortunate 

1168
00:45:54,858 --> 00:45:56,969
situation . So for our part , we will 

1169
00:45:56,969 --> 00:45:59,080
continue to work very hard , not only 

1170
00:45:59,080 --> 00:46:01,247
to support Israel , but also to ensure 

1171
00:46:01,247 --> 00:46:04,330
that uh Gazans uh are able to get 

1172
00:46:04,340 --> 00:46:06,870
humanitarian assistance and the support 

1173
00:46:06,879 --> 00:46:10,659
they need . Thank you . OK , Nancy . Um 

1174
00:46:10,669 --> 00:46:12,560
I had a couple of questions just 

1175
00:46:12,570 --> 00:46:14,689
seeking clarification . Um Earlier in 

1176
00:46:14,699 --> 00:46:17,032
this briefing , you said that you , you , 

1177
00:46:17,032 --> 00:46:19,310
the US have made clear to the Israelis 

1178
00:46:19,320 --> 00:46:21,320
that there that any support must be 

1179
00:46:21,320 --> 00:46:23,431
consistent with international law who 

1180
00:46:23,431 --> 00:46:25,542
within the US , government determines 

1181
00:46:25,542 --> 00:46:27,860
whether the Israelis are um applying 

1182
00:46:27,870 --> 00:46:30,148
international law appropriately . Yeah . 

1183
00:46:30,148 --> 00:46:32,203
So , so Nancy , I'm , you know , I , 

1184
00:46:32,203 --> 00:46:35,580
I'm not a lawyer . Um Again , we'll 

1185
00:46:35,590 --> 00:46:37,757
continue to have those conversations . 

1186
00:46:37,929 --> 00:46:40,290
I'm not , again , not in a position 

1187
00:46:40,300 --> 00:46:42,244
right now to talk about individual 

1188
00:46:42,250 --> 00:46:44,719
actions , activities or assess and 

1189
00:46:44,729 --> 00:46:46,919
provide a play by play assessment of 

1190
00:46:46,929 --> 00:46:50,800
Israeli operations . Um Again , we 

1191
00:46:50,810 --> 00:46:52,977
are where we are at this point in time 

1192
00:46:52,977 --> 00:46:54,921
and I'll just leave it at that . I 

1193
00:46:54,921 --> 00:46:56,977
appreciate that about looking for um 

1194
00:46:56,977 --> 00:46:59,143
incident by incident . I'm looking for 

1195
00:46:59,143 --> 00:47:01,254
bureaucratically . How does the , how 

1196
00:47:01,254 --> 00:47:00,830
do those assessments happen ? Is there 

1197
00:47:00,840 --> 00:47:03,007
a way to consider taking that question 

1198
00:47:03,007 --> 00:47:05,118
so that we can understand the process 

1199
00:47:05,118 --> 00:47:06,562
by which the US makes its 

1200
00:47:06,562 --> 00:47:08,784
determinations in terms of which aspect 

1201
00:47:08,939 --> 00:47:11,239
the , the US as I heard , if I heard 

1202
00:47:11,250 --> 00:47:13,570
you correctly , us support is , is with 

1203
00:47:13,580 --> 00:47:15,802
the expectation that the Israelis abide 

1204
00:47:15,802 --> 00:47:18,189
by the international law rules around 

1205
00:47:18,370 --> 00:47:20,719
the conduct of war , who decides 

1206
00:47:20,729 --> 00:47:22,507
whether the Israelis are indeed 

1207
00:47:22,520 --> 00:47:24,631
applying those laws or if they are in 

1208
00:47:24,631 --> 00:47:26,409
violation of them within the US 

1209
00:47:26,409 --> 00:47:26,320
government . I'm not looking for any 

1210
00:47:26,330 --> 00:47:28,274
specific case . I'm just trying to 

1211
00:47:28,274 --> 00:47:30,108
understand process wise how that 

1212
00:47:30,108 --> 00:47:32,330
determination is made . So , you know , 

1213
00:47:32,330 --> 00:47:34,229
without necessarily getting into 

1214
00:47:34,239 --> 00:47:36,350
hypotheticals , certainly there is an 

1215
00:47:36,429 --> 00:47:38,959
interagency process um by which we 

1216
00:47:38,969 --> 00:47:42,909
evaluate uh the use of us assistance by 

1217
00:47:42,919 --> 00:47:45,310
any of our partners . Uh And , and 

1218
00:47:45,320 --> 00:47:48,110
again , recognizing the complex nature 

1219
00:47:48,120 --> 00:47:50,989
of the situation on the ground in Gaza 

1220
00:47:51,000 --> 00:47:53,000
right now and what the Israelis are 

1221
00:47:53,000 --> 00:47:55,056
confronting in terms of an adversary 

1222
00:47:55,056 --> 00:47:57,111
who stated objective is to eliminate 

1223
00:47:57,111 --> 00:48:00,870
Israel as a state . Um And um 00 , by 

1224
00:48:00,879 --> 00:48:02,935
the way , you know , the laws of war 

1225
00:48:02,935 --> 00:48:06,489
that do highlight that if a um non 

1226
00:48:06,500 --> 00:48:09,500
military facility is now employed by 

1227
00:48:09,550 --> 00:48:12,179
military forces , uh it does become a 

1228
00:48:12,189 --> 00:48:14,919
legitimate target . Uh And so , uh 

1229
00:48:14,929 --> 00:48:17,139
again , you know , there will be uh 

1230
00:48:17,149 --> 00:48:20,129
constant discussions . Um I think again , 

1231
00:48:20,139 --> 00:48:22,361
the focus right now is on ensuring that 

1232
00:48:22,361 --> 00:48:24,528
Israel has what it needs to defend its 

1233
00:48:24,528 --> 00:48:26,695
people while at the same time ensuring 

1234
00:48:26,695 --> 00:48:28,750
that um we can continue to make sure 

1235
00:48:28,750 --> 00:48:30,917
that innocent civilians in Gaza um can 

1236
00:48:30,917 --> 00:48:33,110
get the aid that they need . So , and 

1237
00:48:33,120 --> 00:48:36,780
then , um the secretary hasn't been in 

1238
00:48:36,790 --> 00:48:39,310
this briefing room uh doing a press 

1239
00:48:39,320 --> 00:48:41,542
conference with his , with the chairman 

1240
00:48:41,542 --> 00:48:43,542
since January of 2022 . In terms of 

1241
00:48:43,542 --> 00:48:45,709
answering broad questions , given that 

1242
00:48:45,709 --> 00:48:47,709
the US has now deployed 1200 troops 

1243
00:48:47,709 --> 00:48:50,310
approximately sent air defenses sent to 

1244
00:48:50,320 --> 00:48:52,679
aircraft carry groups into the region . 

1245
00:48:52,689 --> 00:48:54,810
Can we expect to hear from him ? Um 

1246
00:48:54,820 --> 00:48:56,931
directly , does he feel that he has a 

1247
00:48:56,931 --> 00:48:59,098
responsibility to talk to the American 

1248
00:48:59,098 --> 00:49:01,153
people directly and answer questions 

1249
00:49:01,153 --> 00:49:03,320
directly ? Um Given the seriousness of 

1250
00:49:03,320 --> 00:49:05,542
the situation that we're in ? Yeah , he 

1251
00:49:05,542 --> 00:49:07,542
does . And as you know , uh he , he 

1252
00:49:07,542 --> 00:49:09,709
does engage the media on , on multiple 

1253
00:49:09,709 --> 00:49:11,931
occasions , especially uh when we're on 

1254
00:49:11,931 --> 00:49:14,098
travel . I know that uh right now , um 

1255
00:49:14,098 --> 00:49:16,264
you know , we've got a , uh you know , 

1256
00:49:16,264 --> 00:49:18,098
whether it's the Ukraine defense 

1257
00:49:18,098 --> 00:49:20,209
contact groups uh when we're overseas 

1258
00:49:20,209 --> 00:49:22,479
uh in India , uh Korea and um in 

1259
00:49:22,489 --> 00:49:24,679
Indonesia , uh he will be conducting 

1260
00:49:24,689 --> 00:49:26,780
press engagements there as well . Uh 

1261
00:49:26,790 --> 00:49:29,879
And so again , um the secretary fully 

1262
00:49:29,889 --> 00:49:31,945
understands the importance of making 

1263
00:49:31,945 --> 00:49:33,611
sure that the American public 

1264
00:49:33,611 --> 00:49:35,722
understands the , what the department 

1265
00:49:35,722 --> 00:49:37,833
is doing , uh , and we'll continue to 

1266
00:49:37,833 --> 00:49:37,810
endeavor to make sure that information 

1267
00:49:37,919 --> 00:49:39,808
I , I participated in those and I 

1268
00:49:39,808 --> 00:49:41,919
appreciate them , but they tend to be 

1269
00:49:41,919 --> 00:49:43,919
limited the number of questions and 

1270
00:49:43,919 --> 00:49:45,975
sometimes on topic and , uh , almost 

1271
00:49:45,975 --> 00:49:48,449
two years is pretty , uh , pretty long 

1272
00:49:48,459 --> 00:49:50,681
period for Secretary of Defense and the 

1273
00:49:50,681 --> 00:49:52,681
chairman to not come to this , um , 

1274
00:49:52,681 --> 00:49:54,681
room and answer questions on a wide 

1275
00:49:54,681 --> 00:49:56,792
variety of topics more than a handful 

1276
00:49:56,792 --> 00:49:58,792
of times . So I would just make the 

1277
00:49:58,792 --> 00:50:00,903
plea that given the news events , the 

1278
00:50:00,903 --> 00:50:03,181
the level view of his involvement that , 

1279
00:50:03,181 --> 00:50:05,403
that he treat this as an opportunity to 

1280
00:50:05,403 --> 00:50:05,340
engage with the pressure . Thanks for 

1281
00:50:05,350 --> 00:50:07,406
that , Nancy , appreciate it . I was 

1282
00:50:07,406 --> 00:50:09,350
wondering if you could say broadly 

1283
00:50:09,350 --> 00:50:11,572
speaking , does the US think Israel has 

1284
00:50:11,572 --> 00:50:13,628
been effective in targeting Hamas in 

1285
00:50:13,628 --> 00:50:15,572
Gaza ? And does the US believe the 

1286
00:50:15,572 --> 00:50:17,572
campaign has significantly degraded 

1287
00:50:17,572 --> 00:50:19,739
Hamas ? Yeah , thanks or so . Uh It it 

1288
00:50:19,739 --> 00:50:21,628
really be inappropriate for me to 

1289
00:50:21,628 --> 00:50:23,850
provide a battle damage assessment from 

1290
00:50:23,850 --> 00:50:25,739
the podium . This is a uh Israeli 

1291
00:50:25,739 --> 00:50:27,794
operation . I'd refer you to them to 

1292
00:50:27,794 --> 00:50:29,794
talk about that . Um And again , we 

1293
00:50:29,794 --> 00:50:31,794
know that they have a tough task at 

1294
00:50:31,794 --> 00:50:34,449
hand , uh which is uh fighting an enemy 

1295
00:50:34,459 --> 00:50:36,530
that has warned to defeat them and 

1296
00:50:36,540 --> 00:50:39,929
destroy the state of Israel . And so , 

1297
00:50:39,939 --> 00:50:41,969
um and we do know that they are um 

1298
00:50:41,979 --> 00:50:44,189
actively going after Hamas leaders , 

1299
00:50:44,199 --> 00:50:46,255
but again , I'd refer you to them to 

1300
00:50:46,255 --> 00:50:48,366
talk about that one more , very quick 

1301
00:50:48,366 --> 00:50:50,532
one the US has or is about to have two 

1302
00:50:50,532 --> 00:50:52,588
carriers in the Eastern Med . Will a 

1303
00:50:52,588 --> 00:50:54,755
media embark be allowed ? If not , why 

1304
00:50:54,755 --> 00:50:56,699
not ? Uh , Oren , look , we , uh , 

1305
00:50:56,699 --> 00:50:58,866
fully understand the request . Uh , we 

1306
00:50:58,866 --> 00:51:01,088
will take it under advisement and if an 

1307
00:51:01,088 --> 00:51:03,088
opportunity presents itself , we'll 

1308
00:51:03,088 --> 00:51:05,199
certainly make that available . Thank 

1309
00:51:05,199 --> 00:51:04,409
you very much time for a few more to go 

1310
00:51:04,419 --> 00:51:06,752
to Ashley and then I'll go to the phone . 

1311
00:51:06,752 --> 00:51:08,641
I wanted to ask about the weapons 

1312
00:51:08,641 --> 00:51:10,419
deliveries to Israel . Have any 

1313
00:51:10,419 --> 00:51:12,641
constraints been placed on how they use 

1314
00:51:12,641 --> 00:51:15,320
the weapons . Uh Look , uh you know , 

1315
00:51:15,330 --> 00:51:18,040
beyond uh broadly speaking , what I've 

1316
00:51:18,050 --> 00:51:20,106
talked about , uh we are not putting 

1317
00:51:20,106 --> 00:51:22,217
constraints on Israel in terms of how 

1318
00:51:22,217 --> 00:51:24,272
they conduct their operations . They 

1319
00:51:24,272 --> 00:51:26,217
are professional , military , well 

1320
00:51:26,217 --> 00:51:28,328
trained , well led . And so , um I'll 

1321
00:51:28,328 --> 00:51:30,550
just leave it at that . And then I also 

1322
00:51:30,550 --> 00:51:32,661
wanted to ask the Treasury Department 

1323
00:51:32,661 --> 00:51:35,314
unveiled like 130 new sanctions placed 

1324
00:51:35,324 --> 00:51:37,213
on entities and people related to 

1325
00:51:37,213 --> 00:51:39,380
Russia and the defense industry base . 

1326
00:51:39,380 --> 00:51:41,635
Could you broadly speak of observations 

1327
00:51:41,645 --> 00:51:43,589
of the defense industry base there 

1328
00:51:43,589 --> 00:51:45,534
right now ? And what you're seeing 

1329
00:51:45,534 --> 00:51:47,665
their ability to regenerate um to get 

1330
00:51:47,675 --> 00:51:49,564
new equipment , whether it's like 

1331
00:51:49,564 --> 00:51:51,731
pulling from Turkey , the UAE or other 

1332
00:51:51,731 --> 00:51:53,842
countries or just internal ? Sure , I 

1333
00:51:53,842 --> 00:51:57,415
mean , broadly speaking , um the um 

1334
00:51:57,574 --> 00:51:59,630
energizing of the defense industrial 

1335
00:51:59,630 --> 00:52:01,979
base has been a key priority for 

1336
00:52:01,989 --> 00:52:04,156
Secretary Austin , particularly coming 

1337
00:52:04,156 --> 00:52:05,878
out of out of COVID . But most 

1338
00:52:05,878 --> 00:52:08,870
importantly , uh as we continue to look 

1339
00:52:08,879 --> 00:52:11,629
to support Ukraine , uh and now Israel 

1340
00:52:11,639 --> 00:52:13,472
as well as our other commitments 

1341
00:52:13,472 --> 00:52:15,830
internationally . And so , uh our 

1342
00:52:15,840 --> 00:52:18,580
acquisitions and sustainment team um 

1343
00:52:18,969 --> 00:52:22,270
has been very , very active uh in terms 

1344
00:52:22,280 --> 00:52:24,629
of meeting with our international 

1345
00:52:24,639 --> 00:52:27,500
allies and partners . Uh Most notably , 

1346
00:52:27,570 --> 00:52:29,739
uh the National Armaments Directors 

1347
00:52:29,750 --> 00:52:32,360
have met pretty much every single month 

1348
00:52:32,370 --> 00:52:34,481
following the Ukraine defense contact 

1349
00:52:34,481 --> 00:52:36,370
group to look at ways that we can 

1350
00:52:36,370 --> 00:52:38,537
capitalize on one another's industrial 

1351
00:52:38,537 --> 00:52:40,703
base to ramp up production of , of key 

1352
00:52:40,703 --> 00:52:42,814
requirements as it relates , not only 

1353
00:52:42,814 --> 00:52:45,320
to supporting our uh partners like 

1354
00:52:45,330 --> 00:52:48,239
Ukraine , um but also replenishing our 

1355
00:52:48,250 --> 00:52:50,729
own stocks . Uh And so , uh that will 

1356
00:52:50,739 --> 00:52:52,795
continue to be a area of significant 

1357
00:52:52,795 --> 00:52:54,795
focus , but we're , we're confident 

1358
00:52:54,795 --> 00:52:56,906
that we will be able to , to meet all 

1359
00:52:56,906 --> 00:52:59,072
of those needs . Thank you very much . 

1360
00:52:59,072 --> 00:53:00,906
Ok , sir . All right . Thank you 

1361
00:53:00,906 --> 00:53:03,072
General . I just wanna go to the phone 

1362
00:53:03,072 --> 00:53:05,295
just to follow up on an answer you gave 

1363
00:53:05,295 --> 00:53:07,461
to Nancy's line of question . You said 

1364
00:53:07,461 --> 00:53:09,683
that the determination um about whether 

1365
00:53:09,683 --> 00:53:11,795
international law and the , the rules 

1366
00:53:11,795 --> 00:53:13,739
of war are being followed is uh an 

1367
00:53:13,739 --> 00:53:16,250
interagency process . So this is , 

1368
00:53:16,625 --> 00:53:18,625
there are , there is no , it sounds 

1369
00:53:18,625 --> 00:53:20,736
like what you're saying is no outside 

1370
00:53:20,736 --> 00:53:22,903
agency . What she asked what I thought 

1371
00:53:22,903 --> 00:53:25,415
I heard was , how do , how do we within 

1372
00:53:25,425 --> 00:53:27,625
the US government ? How would we 

1373
00:53:27,635 --> 00:53:30,594
conceivably make a determination like 

1374
00:53:30,604 --> 00:53:32,985
that ? Right . So my , my response was , 

1375
00:53:33,195 --> 00:53:35,306
is part of an interagency process and 

1376
00:53:35,306 --> 00:53:38,024
review . Uh that could conceivably be a 

1377
00:53:38,034 --> 00:53:40,256
question that's , that's answered . I'm 

1378
00:53:40,256 --> 00:53:42,256
not gonna speak for any independent 

1379
00:53:42,256 --> 00:53:44,367
group or , or folks outside of the US 

1380
00:53:44,367 --> 00:53:46,478
government that may come to their own 

1381
00:53:46,478 --> 00:53:48,590
conclusions . Uh , well . Right . And 

1382
00:53:48,590 --> 00:53:50,812
so I guess my question is , would those 

1383
00:53:50,812 --> 00:53:53,100
conclusions be play any role in the US 

1384
00:53:53,110 --> 00:53:55,332
government's determinations ? Yeah . So 

1385
00:53:55,332 --> 00:53:57,554
I , again , I appreciate the question . 

1386
00:53:57,554 --> 00:53:59,332
I just don't want to get in the 

1387
00:53:59,332 --> 00:54:01,554
hypothetical scenarios right now . Ok . 

1388
00:54:01,554 --> 00:54:03,777
Um , I'll come to you , Mike . Uh , let 

1389
00:54:03,777 --> 00:54:05,777
me go to Jeff task and purpose . Uh 

1390
00:54:05,777 --> 00:54:07,832
Thank you . The recent airstrikes in 

1391
00:54:07,832 --> 00:54:10,166
Syria were meant to deter attacks on us , 

1392
00:54:10,166 --> 00:54:12,277
troops in Iraq and Syria , given that 

1393
00:54:12,277 --> 00:54:14,610
there have been more attacks since then . 

1394
00:54:14,610 --> 00:54:16,388
Is it accurate to say that in a 

1395
00:54:16,388 --> 00:54:18,721
strategic sense , the airstrikes failed ? 

1396
00:54:19,449 --> 00:54:21,909
Uh So first of all , uh again , Jeff , 

1397
00:54:21,919 --> 00:54:24,510
um we will continue to do whatever we 

1398
00:54:24,520 --> 00:54:26,687
need to do to protect our troops . I'm 

1399
00:54:26,687 --> 00:54:28,909
not gonna get into telegraphing how and 

1400
00:54:28,909 --> 00:54:31,750
when and if uh we may respond other 

1401
00:54:31,760 --> 00:54:33,760
than to say , you know , again , we 

1402
00:54:33,760 --> 00:54:36,038
would do so at a time and place of our , 

1403
00:54:36,038 --> 00:54:38,429
our choosing . And if you're , uh you 

1404
00:54:38,439 --> 00:54:40,495
know , these Iranian proxy groups uh 

1405
00:54:40,495 --> 00:54:42,830
which have been endeavoring to try to 

1406
00:54:43,080 --> 00:54:46,459
uh expel the United States from uh the 

1407
00:54:46,469 --> 00:54:49,699
region , um you know , then you failed . 

1408
00:54:49,709 --> 00:54:51,876
Uh And so , and then , you know , more 

1409
00:54:51,876 --> 00:54:53,931
broadly speaking , again , our , our 

1410
00:54:53,931 --> 00:54:56,098
broader , more strategic focus here is 

1411
00:54:56,098 --> 00:54:58,098
again preventing a wider conflict . 

1412
00:54:58,098 --> 00:55:01,389
Thank you like to uh get back to 

1413
00:55:01,399 --> 00:55:03,399
General Glenn's information . I , I 

1414
00:55:03,399 --> 00:55:05,530
wanna confirm he was there to provide 

1415
00:55:05,540 --> 00:55:08,479
his experience or not , you know , 

1416
00:55:08,620 --> 00:55:11,149
hence , or help to Israel because of 

1417
00:55:11,159 --> 00:55:14,790
his experience over the broad , the 

1418
00:55:14,800 --> 00:55:18,209
breadth of urban warfare , how to apply 

1419
00:55:18,219 --> 00:55:20,163
fire and maneuver and that kind of 

1420
00:55:20,250 --> 00:55:22,472
environment , he wasn't there simply to 

1421
00:55:22,472 --> 00:55:26,379
push them to follow the rule . So if , 

1422
00:55:26,389 --> 00:55:28,550
if you're Israel on October 8th , you 

1423
00:55:28,560 --> 00:55:31,030
find yourself , uh , in a very dire 

1424
00:55:31,040 --> 00:55:34,399
situation where a significant number of 

1425
00:55:34,409 --> 00:55:36,909
your civilians have just been executed 

1426
00:55:37,169 --> 00:55:40,530
uh by Hamas and 200 hostages , um 

1427
00:55:40,979 --> 00:55:43,201
lying before you is , oh , by the way , 

1428
00:55:43,201 --> 00:55:45,489
where did these uh terrorists come from 

1429
00:55:45,500 --> 00:55:49,010
out of Gaza ? So uh as you 

1430
00:55:49,020 --> 00:55:52,929
contemplate having to go into Gaza , um 

1431
00:55:52,939 --> 00:55:55,161
having someone , you know , and again , 

1432
00:55:55,161 --> 00:55:57,217
we have a long standing relationship 

1433
00:55:57,217 --> 00:55:59,790
with Israel exercises , um you know , 

1434
00:55:59,800 --> 00:56:02,000
sharing of information . So it's that 

1435
00:56:02,010 --> 00:56:04,121
and of itself is not unusual , but by 

1436
00:56:04,121 --> 00:56:06,343
being able to say , hey , here , here's 

1437
00:56:06,343 --> 00:56:08,232
a guy on our team that has a deep 

1438
00:56:08,232 --> 00:56:10,399
understanding of how to do these kinds 

1439
00:56:10,399 --> 00:56:12,066
of operations . And so as you 

1440
00:56:12,066 --> 00:56:14,288
contemplate doing it , recognizing that 

1441
00:56:14,288 --> 00:56:14,189
it's gonna be a tough fight , but also 

1442
00:56:14,199 --> 00:56:17,270
recognizing that we learned a lot on 

1443
00:56:17,280 --> 00:56:19,502
what these operations entail and how to 

1444
00:56:19,502 --> 00:56:21,729
do them successfully to include things 

1445
00:56:21,739 --> 00:56:23,850
like accounting for civilians , which 

1446
00:56:23,929 --> 00:56:27,689
you have to take as a strategic uh uh 

1447
00:56:27,699 --> 00:56:30,370
aspect in conducting these things . 

1448
00:56:30,379 --> 00:56:32,268
There , there is no such thing as 

1449
00:56:32,268 --> 00:56:34,669
conducting these in isolation . So we 

1450
00:56:34,679 --> 00:56:36,735
want you to have the benefit of that 

1451
00:56:36,735 --> 00:56:38,846
expertise he provides , you know , uh 

1452
00:56:38,846 --> 00:56:41,068
be able to ask those tough questions as 

1453
00:56:41,068 --> 00:56:43,235
they , you know , kind of the Socratic 

1454
00:56:43,235 --> 00:56:46,149
method . Uh And then , you know , he uh 

1455
00:56:46,530 --> 00:56:48,808
it was always intended to be temporary . 

1456
00:56:48,808 --> 00:56:51,080
And so he's home , how was his mission 

1457
00:56:51,090 --> 00:56:54,120
there received by Israel ? Did , did , 

1458
00:56:54,129 --> 00:56:56,129
does the Pentagon think it was well 

1459
00:56:56,129 --> 00:56:58,351
received by them ? That they , I mean , 

1460
00:56:58,351 --> 00:57:00,573
I don't wanna , I don't wanna speak for 

1461
00:57:00,573 --> 00:57:02,796
Israel , I will just say largely , uh , 

1462
00:57:02,796 --> 00:57:05,020
broadly speaking rather . Um , I think 

1463
00:57:05,030 --> 00:57:06,919
Israel has been very appreciative 

1464
00:57:06,919 --> 00:57:08,974
across the board of the support that 

1465
00:57:08,974 --> 00:57:10,919
the United States has provided and 

1466
00:57:10,919 --> 00:57:13,260
particularly how quickly , uh , we came 

1467
00:57:13,270 --> 00:57:15,159
to their aid in the wake of these 

1468
00:57:15,159 --> 00:57:17,381
terrorist attacks . And now that Israel 

1469
00:57:17,381 --> 00:57:19,860
is actually moving into Gaza City . Now , 

1470
00:57:19,870 --> 00:57:22,080
does the US still have these urban 

1471
00:57:22,090 --> 00:57:24,257
warfare subject matter experts there ? 

1472
00:57:24,257 --> 00:57:26,590
They've departed , they've all departed . 

1473
00:57:26,590 --> 00:57:28,646
They've all departed . Ok . We go to 

1474
00:57:28,646 --> 00:57:30,923
Liam and then , uh , we'll do one more . 

1475
00:57:30,923 --> 00:57:33,146
Um , this is a quick one on the Jabalia 

1476
00:57:33,146 --> 00:57:35,201
strike did after that happened . The 

1477
00:57:35,201 --> 00:57:37,201
Israeli government said they have , 

1478
00:57:37,201 --> 00:57:36,850
we're targeting a Hamas commander who 

1479
00:57:36,860 --> 00:57:38,971
was hiding out there . Hamas has said 

1480
00:57:38,971 --> 00:57:41,304
there was no commander , such commander . 

1481
00:57:41,304 --> 00:57:43,527
Does the dod know whether which side is 

1482
00:57:43,527 --> 00:57:45,582
true there ? Uh So I don't , I don't 

1483
00:57:45,582 --> 00:57:47,638
have , uh , any intelligence to pass 

1484
00:57:47,638 --> 00:57:49,527
along . I'm not going to get into 

1485
00:57:49,527 --> 00:57:51,582
intelligence again . Uh We , we know 

1486
00:57:51,582 --> 00:57:54,209
that Israel is going after , uh , the 

1487
00:57:54,219 --> 00:57:56,459
leadership , uh , and the forces of 

1488
00:57:56,469 --> 00:57:59,229
Hamas uh and I'll just leave it at that . 

1489
00:57:59,479 --> 00:58:01,860
Ok , thank you . Yes , sir . And I'll 

1490
00:58:01,870 --> 00:58:04,092
come to you , Tony . Then you'll be the 

1491
00:58:04,092 --> 00:58:06,203
last question question , please . One 

1492
00:58:06,203 --> 00:58:08,370
as far as Secretary of Defense and the 

1493
00:58:08,370 --> 00:58:10,537
Secretary of State's visit to India is 

1494
00:58:10,537 --> 00:58:12,610
concerned . And as far as a IE when 

1495
00:58:12,860 --> 00:58:14,979
Prime Minister Modi was here in the 

1496
00:58:14,989 --> 00:58:17,600
White House in June , uh President 

1497
00:58:17,610 --> 00:58:20,260
Biden and Prime Minister Modi both 

1498
00:58:20,270 --> 00:58:23,929
discussed A I in a detailed , even A 

1499
00:58:23,939 --> 00:58:26,689
t-shirt was presented to Prime Minister 

1500
00:58:26,699 --> 00:58:30,020
Modi by President Biden . My question 

1501
00:58:30,030 --> 00:58:33,270
is now in the middle of two wars , 

1502
00:58:33,280 --> 00:58:35,560
Russia's war against Israel , I mean 

1503
00:58:35,570 --> 00:58:38,760
against Ukraine , sorry and Israel's 

1504
00:58:38,770 --> 00:58:41,300
war against Hamas , the terrorist 

1505
00:58:41,310 --> 00:58:43,870
organization , this is the meeting of 

1506
00:58:43,879 --> 00:58:47,810
four tutu in India . So you think A I 

1507
00:58:47,820 --> 00:58:50,120
and this war , these wars will be 

1508
00:58:50,129 --> 00:58:52,073
discussed there and what , what we 

1509
00:58:52,073 --> 00:58:54,820
expect as far as A I concerned for 

1510
00:58:54,830 --> 00:58:58,699
common people ? Yeah , sure . Um So 

1511
00:58:58,709 --> 00:59:01,260
as it relates to the secretary's uh 

1512
00:59:01,270 --> 00:59:03,429
meetings in India will certainly have 

1513
00:59:03,439 --> 00:59:05,909
much more to say in the days ahead . Uh 

1514
00:59:05,919 --> 00:59:08,530
broadly speaking , you know , uh uh it 

1515
00:59:08,540 --> 00:59:10,510
will be focused on looking and 

1516
00:59:10,520 --> 00:59:12,742
exploring areas where our two countries 

1517
00:59:12,742 --> 00:59:15,709
can continue to work together uh to 

1518
00:59:15,719 --> 00:59:18,040
further bolster security in the region 

1519
00:59:18,199 --> 00:59:20,550
and capitalize on the , the unique 

1520
00:59:20,560 --> 00:59:22,616
aspects that both of our nations can 

1521
00:59:22,616 --> 00:59:25,070
bring together uh it toward that end 

1522
00:59:25,080 --> 00:59:27,469
and , and ensuring a free and open Indo 

1523
00:59:27,530 --> 00:59:29,600
Pacific . Um as it relates to A I I 

1524
00:59:29,610 --> 00:59:31,832
don't have anything to pass along . But 

1525
00:59:31,832 --> 00:59:33,666
again , uh much more to follow . 

1526
00:59:33,666 --> 00:59:35,832
Another question is thank you , Indian 

1527
00:59:35,832 --> 00:59:37,943
American community is protesting that 

1528
00:59:37,943 --> 00:59:41,479
Qatar who has no human rights , no 

1529
00:59:41,489 --> 00:59:43,545
freedom of press and all that . They 

1530
00:59:43,545 --> 00:59:47,479
have falsely accused without any 

1531
00:59:47,580 --> 00:59:50,489
charges or without any hearings . A 

1532
00:59:51,239 --> 00:59:54,580
veteran Indian Navy people and straight 

1533
00:59:54,590 --> 00:59:57,989
to death penalties because of India's 

1534
00:59:58,330 --> 01:00:02,169
support for Israel and condemning uh 

1535
01:00:02,179 --> 01:00:04,649
Hamas . And what do you think about , 

1536
01:00:04,659 --> 01:00:07,639
what about this ? Uh no rule of law . 

1537
01:00:07,649 --> 01:00:10,709
And uh these are eight navy veteran 

1538
01:00:10,719 --> 01:00:13,870
navy Indian officials . And I , I 

1539
01:00:13,879 --> 01:00:15,990
appreciate the question . I it really 

1540
01:00:15,990 --> 01:00:18,101
be inappropriate for me to get into , 

1541
01:00:18,101 --> 01:00:20,323
you know , the domestic affairs in , in 

1542
01:00:20,323 --> 01:00:22,101
India . So I'd refer you to the 

1543
01:00:22,101 --> 01:00:24,268
government of India . All right . Last 

1544
01:00:24,268 --> 01:00:25,990
question , Tony , you lost 300 

1545
01:00:25,990 --> 01:00:27,879
additional US troops going to the 

1546
01:00:27,879 --> 01:00:30,479
region . Are any other uh prepare to 

1547
01:00:30,489 --> 01:00:32,711
deploy orders being converted to deploy 

1548
01:00:32,711 --> 01:00:34,489
orders ? I don't , I don't have 

1549
01:00:34,489 --> 01:00:36,322
anything new to announce in , in 

1550
01:00:36,322 --> 01:00:38,433
regards to deployments at this time . 

1551
01:00:38,433 --> 01:00:40,889
Uh Israel Hamas , supplemental question 

1552
01:00:41,020 --> 01:00:43,469
buried in the $108 billion supplemental 

1553
01:00:43,479 --> 01:00:47,459
is $3.4 billion for the US industrial 

1554
01:00:47,469 --> 01:00:49,979
base , submarine industrial base tied 

1555
01:00:49,989 --> 01:00:52,100
to August . There is a submarine 

1556
01:00:52,110 --> 01:00:54,560
industrial based report that the 

1557
01:00:54,570 --> 01:00:56,879
Pentagon will not give to members of 

1558
01:00:56,889 --> 01:00:59,120
Congress . They've classified it or 

1559
01:00:59,129 --> 01:01:02,050
whether CU I it or whatever do you have 

1560
01:01:02,060 --> 01:01:04,679
anything on why they can't dod cannot 

1561
01:01:04,689 --> 01:01:07,080
give the report to Congress and release 

1562
01:01:07,090 --> 01:01:09,399
an unclassified summary given you're 

1563
01:01:09,409 --> 01:01:11,889
asking for 3.4 million dollars for the 

1564
01:01:11,899 --> 01:01:15,030
US industrial base . Thanks Tony . I , 

1565
01:01:15,040 --> 01:01:17,207
I don't have any information on that . 

1566
01:01:17,207 --> 01:01:19,373
We'll take that question and we'll get 

1567
01:01:19,373 --> 01:01:21,850
back to you to see wide . What plans do 

1568
01:01:21,860 --> 01:01:24,027
you have to send it up to the hill and 

1569
01:01:24,027 --> 01:01:26,027
disseminate it publicly ? Given the 

1570
01:01:26,027 --> 01:01:28,082
amount of money you're asking ? Ok . 

1571
01:01:28,082 --> 01:01:30,193
Yeah , I just don't know . So we take 

1572
01:01:30,193 --> 01:01:29,250
that . All right . Thank you very much . 

1573
01:01:29,260 --> 01:01:30,120
Everyone . Appreciate it .