1 00:00:00,140 --> 00:00:02,480 thank you very much Senator and let me 2 00:00:02,480 --> 00:00:04,647 recognize Senator Blackburn , please , 3 00:00:07,240 --> 00:00:10,430 german and thank you again to you all 4 00:00:10,440 --> 00:00:13,820 for being here . Uh general 5 00:00:13,820 --> 00:00:16,190 Walters . I know this isn't because of 6 00:00:16,200 --> 00:00:19,750 you . Unfortunately . I think you're on 7 00:00:19,750 --> 00:00:22,180 the receiving end of a lot of 8 00:00:22,180 --> 00:00:25,560 frustration from people because of the 9 00:00:25,560 --> 00:00:28,310 way we've received information 10 00:00:28,550 --> 00:00:32,420 regarding Ukraine and I 11 00:00:32,420 --> 00:00:36,200 know that we need to continue and 12 00:00:36,350 --> 00:00:39,170 to keep a lot of what is happening on 13 00:00:39,170 --> 00:00:42,540 the ground in Ukraine um in a 14 00:00:42,540 --> 00:00:45,960 classified space . But for the second 15 00:00:45,960 --> 00:00:48,160 time in less of a year , 16 00:00:49,440 --> 00:00:52,290 America is plunged into a military 17 00:00:52,290 --> 00:00:55,170 crisis for which our leadership seems 18 00:00:55,180 --> 00:00:59,080 unprepared and unaccountable . And 19 00:00:59,080 --> 00:01:01,180 I talked to a lot of veterans as you 20 00:01:01,180 --> 00:01:03,980 know , we've got Fort Campbell , we 21 00:01:03,980 --> 00:01:07,230 have Arnold engineering , we have the U . 22 00:01:07,230 --> 00:01:09,563 S . Naval station , we've got Oak Ridge . 23 00:01:09,563 --> 00:01:12,720 So a lot of military in our state . And 24 00:01:12,730 --> 00:01:15,610 I I think that people really want some 25 00:01:15,610 --> 00:01:18,370 transparency . They want some answers . 26 00:01:18,400 --> 00:01:20,950 They want some accountability . And 27 00:01:21,940 --> 00:01:25,680 interestingly enough , silence is a 28 00:01:25,680 --> 00:01:29,140 message . Silence is a very strong 29 00:01:29,500 --> 00:01:33,350 message and it's 30 00:01:33,350 --> 00:01:35,960 not a message of strength 31 00:01:36,540 --> 00:01:39,950 and I think that it does not 32 00:01:40,030 --> 00:01:42,790 work in concert with the principles on 33 00:01:42,790 --> 00:01:45,820 which this nation was founded . So I 34 00:01:45,820 --> 00:01:48,000 hope that in the near future that this 35 00:01:48,000 --> 00:01:50,530 committee is going to be able to have 36 00:01:50,540 --> 00:01:54,070 an open hearing on the issue of what is 37 00:01:54,080 --> 00:01:57,550 happening um in Ukraine . 38 00:01:57,560 --> 00:02:00,410 Now I want to go on to a long term 39 00:02:00,410 --> 00:02:02,860 concern that we've discussed and 40 00:02:02,870 --> 00:02:04,950 regardless of what is happening in 41 00:02:04,950 --> 00:02:07,330 Ukraine . I want us to look at what is 42 00:02:07,330 --> 00:02:10,730 happening with Beijing and 43 00:02:10,740 --> 00:02:13,760 maintaining china as the pacing 44 00:02:13,760 --> 00:02:17,030 challenge , Not just for D . O . D . 45 00:02:17,040 --> 00:02:20,660 But for each combatant command is of 46 00:02:20,660 --> 00:02:23,840 the utmost importance and it is 47 00:02:23,840 --> 00:02:27,350 something that this committee needs to 48 00:02:27,360 --> 00:02:30,600 assist D . O . D . With as well as to 49 00:02:30,600 --> 00:02:32,340 hold the different divisions 50 00:02:32,340 --> 00:02:36,080 accountable for so to each of you very 51 00:02:36,080 --> 00:02:38,870 quickly . What are the roles of your 52 00:02:38,870 --> 00:02:40,926 combatant commands in supporting the 53 00:02:40,926 --> 00:02:44,430 implementation Of the 2018 National 54 00:02:44,430 --> 00:02:47,450 Defense Strategy with regard to Chat to 55 00:02:47,450 --> 00:02:50,510 china and general Walters ? Do you 56 00:02:50,510 --> 00:02:52,850 first and then general venna vist 57 00:02:54,440 --> 00:02:56,329 senator . I have to do everything 58 00:02:56,329 --> 00:02:58,440 within my power . As the commander of 59 00:02:58,440 --> 00:03:00,440 us . You come to take a look at the 60 00:03:00,440 --> 00:03:02,607 coordinating authority activities that 61 00:03:02,607 --> 00:03:04,273 take place inside of of of my 62 00:03:04,273 --> 00:03:06,273 territorial boundaries and find the 63 00:03:06,273 --> 00:03:08,273 ones that have any potential impact 64 00:03:08,273 --> 00:03:10,440 with respect to china . And as Admiral 65 00:03:10,440 --> 00:03:13,330 Aquilino governs and manages his UCP , 66 00:03:13,340 --> 00:03:15,850 he needs to do the same with respect to 67 00:03:15,850 --> 00:03:18,710 Russia and and this is a process that's 68 00:03:18,710 --> 00:03:20,710 been in place for several years and 69 00:03:20,710 --> 00:03:22,432 it's improving but it can , it 70 00:03:22,432 --> 00:03:24,377 continues to require vigilance and 71 00:03:24,377 --> 00:03:26,543 scrutiny and iterations to ensure that 72 00:03:26,543 --> 00:03:29,200 we can rescue this as you look at what 73 00:03:29,200 --> 00:03:31,740 is happening with the CCP . What are 74 00:03:31,740 --> 00:03:34,350 the trends that are of greatest concern 75 00:03:34,350 --> 00:03:38,090 to you ? I would 76 00:03:38,090 --> 00:03:40,190 contend that it's the activities of 77 00:03:40,200 --> 00:03:43,100 allies and partners as they apply to 78 00:03:43,100 --> 00:03:45,156 those nations being able to get what 79 00:03:45,156 --> 00:03:47,378 they want or what , what they shouldn't 80 00:03:47,378 --> 00:03:49,960 get . Okay , General Vance Harvest , 81 00:03:50,540 --> 00:03:52,670 thank you Senator with respect to 82 00:03:52,670 --> 00:03:54,170 trends that I look at as a 83 00:03:54,170 --> 00:03:56,270 transportation command commander , I 84 00:03:56,270 --> 00:03:58,870 monitor their ability to project power 85 00:03:58,870 --> 00:04:01,380 around the globe because that is our 86 00:04:01,380 --> 00:04:04,170 operating area . Uh and I'm monitoring 87 00:04:04,170 --> 00:04:07,000 their investments into ports and their 88 00:04:07,010 --> 00:04:09,066 their impact of these investments on 89 00:04:09,066 --> 00:04:11,010 our ability to maneuver around the 90 00:04:11,010 --> 00:04:13,460 world . Their ability to disrupt and 91 00:04:13,460 --> 00:04:15,640 degrade our ability to project and 92 00:04:15,640 --> 00:04:19,010 sustain a force . That's a trend that 93 00:04:19,020 --> 00:04:21,180 concerns you most , you know take 94 00:04:21,180 --> 00:04:24,580 Djibouti . So their 95 00:04:24,590 --> 00:04:27,180 work in areas like that where they go 96 00:04:27,180 --> 00:04:30,510 in under belt and road . But then they 97 00:04:30,520 --> 00:04:34,370 couple that with their military 98 00:04:34,380 --> 00:04:37,830 is that kind of at the top of your list 99 00:04:37,830 --> 00:04:40,480 of concerns . And the top of the list 100 00:04:40,480 --> 00:04:43,010 of my concern is the kinetic and non 101 00:04:43,010 --> 00:04:45,950 kinetic threats in the region . But 102 00:04:45,950 --> 00:04:48,270 they're secondarily as I look to them 103 00:04:48,280 --> 00:04:50,113 maneuvering around the globe and 104 00:04:50,113 --> 00:04:52,760 influencing other nations decisions . 105 00:04:52,760 --> 00:04:54,927 This is about allies and partners . So 106 00:04:54,927 --> 00:04:56,982 the second main thing we're doing is 107 00:04:56,982 --> 00:04:56,720 we're trying to thicken our 108 00:04:56,720 --> 00:04:58,831 relationship with allies and partners 109 00:04:58,831 --> 00:05:01,730 around the world to robust them against 110 00:05:01,730 --> 00:05:04,490 these threats . The certainly for our 111 00:05:04,500 --> 00:05:06,880 perspective , the military threats but 112 00:05:06,880 --> 00:05:08,713 also the diplomatic and economic 113 00:05:08,713 --> 00:05:11,020 threats that they face from china on a 114 00:05:11,020 --> 00:05:13,520 day to day basis . So you consider 115 00:05:13,520 --> 00:05:16,650 those in total and not separately . I 116 00:05:16,650 --> 00:05:18,817 do I do a whole of government approach 117 00:05:18,817 --> 00:05:21,039 for all of these allies and partners to 118 00:05:21,039 --> 00:05:23,039 be able to robust them . And I will 119 00:05:23,039 --> 00:05:24,817 take it a step further . We are 120 00:05:24,817 --> 00:05:26,706 inextricably linked to commercial 121 00:05:26,706 --> 00:05:28,539 industry . So our our commercial 122 00:05:28,539 --> 00:05:30,650 industry networks that are around the 123 00:05:30,650 --> 00:05:32,872 world right now , we're also working on 124 00:05:32,872 --> 00:05:35,039 thickening and protecting them because 125 00:05:35,039 --> 00:05:37,150 they are working in these regions day 126 00:05:37,150 --> 00:05:39,206 in and day out delivering around the 127 00:05:39,206 --> 00:05:41,206 world and we rely on them as well . 128 00:05:41,340 --> 00:05:43,890 Thank you . I have some questions . I 129 00:05:43,890 --> 00:05:47,430 will submit to you all and um thank you 130 00:05:47,430 --> 00:05:50,070 very much for your time today . Thank 131 00:05:50,070 --> 00:05:52,292 you . Mr Chairman , thank you . Senator 132 00:05:52,292 --> 00:05:54,348 Blackburn . Let me recognize Senator 133 00:05:54,348 --> 00:05:56,181 King , please . Thank you . Mr . 134 00:05:56,181 --> 00:05:58,660 Chairman , General Walters . The Putin 135 00:05:58,660 --> 00:06:00,716 has been talking for years about his 136 00:06:01,040 --> 00:06:04,750 ostensible claims to Ukraine and uh the 137 00:06:04,760 --> 00:06:06,871 part of Russia and all those kinds of 138 00:06:06,871 --> 00:06:08,649 things and one of his principal 139 00:06:08,649 --> 00:06:10,593 strategic goals seems to be a land 140 00:06:10,593 --> 00:06:12,950 bridge between Russia and and Crimea . 141 00:06:13,540 --> 00:06:15,596 Are they making similar noises about 142 00:06:15,596 --> 00:06:17,762 Kaliningrad ? And is this something we 143 00:06:17,762 --> 00:06:19,873 need to be concerned about or do they 144 00:06:19,873 --> 00:06:22,040 accept that Kaliningrad is essentially 145 00:06:22,040 --> 00:06:24,360 landlocked from the from the east 146 00:06:25,940 --> 00:06:27,996 Sir , with respect to Clinton grad , 147 00:06:27,996 --> 00:06:29,940 it's something we should always be 148 00:06:29,940 --> 00:06:32,051 concerned about . But over the course 149 00:06:32,051 --> 00:06:34,162 of the last 4-5 months , that has not 150 00:06:34,162 --> 00:06:36,273 been an issue with respect to Russian 151 00:06:36,273 --> 00:06:38,496 activity . Thank you . Quick question , 152 00:06:38,496 --> 00:06:40,800 speed of shipments from the time the 153 00:06:40,800 --> 00:06:42,660 order is given in Washington to 154 00:06:42,660 --> 00:06:46,620 authorize equipment to Ukraine . How 155 00:06:46,620 --> 00:06:48,787 long does it take to get to the polish 156 00:06:48,787 --> 00:06:52,600 Ukrainian border Senator . It 157 00:06:52,600 --> 00:06:54,790 depends , uh , we've we've been 158 00:06:54,800 --> 00:06:57,120 iterating on this . It's improving it 159 00:06:57,120 --> 00:06:59,530 and we've seen cases , for example with 160 00:06:59,540 --> 00:07:01,970 a large armored brigade combat team 161 00:07:01,970 --> 00:07:04,430 that we've been able to transact that 162 00:07:04,440 --> 00:07:08,080 in weeks as opposed to months . So 163 00:07:08,270 --> 00:07:10,910 we're that's improving and it's , it's 164 00:07:10,910 --> 00:07:13,188 a , these , these are timely shipments . 165 00:07:13,188 --> 00:07:15,132 The Ukrainians need this equipment 166 00:07:15,840 --> 00:07:19,360 right now , not a month from now . It's 167 00:07:19,370 --> 00:07:21,537 it's improving . We we have cases with 168 00:07:21,537 --> 00:07:23,648 smaller force elements where it would 169 00:07:23,648 --> 00:07:25,870 take 28 to 30 days and in many of those 170 00:07:25,870 --> 00:07:28,520 cases were down to single digit days 171 00:07:28,530 --> 00:07:30,530 and less than I'm not talking about 172 00:07:30,530 --> 00:07:32,697 necessarily force elements , but , but 173 00:07:32,697 --> 00:07:35,220 material weapons that , that falls into 174 00:07:35,220 --> 00:07:38,990 the same category category . Um , We 175 00:07:38,990 --> 00:07:41,157 heard at the beginning of the invasion 176 00:07:41,157 --> 00:07:43,323 that there were something like 200,000 177 00:07:43,323 --> 00:07:45,560 Russian troops in Belarus and in Russia 178 00:07:46,040 --> 00:07:48,207 they've committed many , if not all of 179 00:07:48,207 --> 00:07:51,100 those . What reserves do the Russians 180 00:07:51,100 --> 00:07:52,933 now have ? In other words , what 181 00:07:52,933 --> 00:07:56,700 portion of their entire military force 182 00:07:56,800 --> 00:07:59,450 in terms of people have been committed 183 00:07:59,450 --> 00:08:02,520 to Ukraine at this point . And what 184 00:08:02,530 --> 00:08:04,697 level of reserves do they have to call 185 00:08:04,697 --> 00:08:07,000 upon ? So , in a different setting , I 186 00:08:07,000 --> 00:08:10,260 can give you a precise number , but in 187 00:08:10,260 --> 00:08:13,670 the 70-75% category , are are devoted 188 00:08:13,670 --> 00:08:15,892 to this from the Russian perspective at 189 00:08:15,892 --> 00:08:18,250 this time , so very substantial 190 00:08:18,250 --> 00:08:20,083 proportion of their total forces 191 00:08:20,083 --> 00:08:22,550 committed in , in Ukraine . Um , 192 00:08:24,640 --> 00:08:27,100 can the Ukrainians succeed in the east 193 00:08:27,110 --> 00:08:30,270 as they have around Kiev by they're 194 00:08:30,270 --> 00:08:33,100 going to redeploy in that direction too , 195 00:08:33,100 --> 00:08:35,590 I presume since the Russians are doing 196 00:08:35,590 --> 00:08:37,590 so to the tactics that they've been 197 00:08:37,590 --> 00:08:40,980 able to use in the north and 198 00:08:40,990 --> 00:08:44,610 Northeast succeed in installing the 199 00:08:44,610 --> 00:08:46,820 Russians or perhaps even pushing them 200 00:08:46,820 --> 00:08:50,510 back . Senator . I certainly believe 201 00:08:50,510 --> 00:08:52,566 that they can succeed installing the 202 00:08:52,566 --> 00:08:53,566 Russians . 203 00:08:57,140 --> 00:09:00,370 Okay . I understand 204 00:09:00,380 --> 00:09:03,800 the comment . But but they have the 205 00:09:03,800 --> 00:09:06,730 Ukrainians improved over the course of 206 00:09:06,730 --> 00:09:08,952 the past month in their terms of use of 207 00:09:08,952 --> 00:09:11,400 the weapons and tactics , they seem to 208 00:09:11,400 --> 00:09:13,511 have shown significant success in the 209 00:09:13,511 --> 00:09:16,110 last week or two . Absolutely . Senator , 210 00:09:16,120 --> 00:09:18,287 the Ukrainian armed forces show a very 211 00:09:18,287 --> 00:09:20,430 very positive learning curve and some 212 00:09:20,430 --> 00:09:22,486 optimistic about being able to force 213 00:09:22,486 --> 00:09:24,541 additional stalling on behalf of the 214 00:09:24,541 --> 00:09:26,770 Russians . Let me change the subject 215 00:09:26,770 --> 00:09:28,881 for a minute . I'm concerned that the 216 00:09:28,881 --> 00:09:31,770 Russia falls into a number of different 217 00:09:31,770 --> 00:09:35,230 co coms . And I'm sorry Russia the 218 00:09:35,230 --> 00:09:37,510 arctic and I'm concerned about 219 00:09:37,510 --> 00:09:39,810 coordination between the various co 220 00:09:39,810 --> 00:09:41,866 coms that have a piece of the arctic 221 00:09:41,866 --> 00:09:43,866 defense because Russia is certainly 222 00:09:43,866 --> 00:09:45,810 militarizing on their shore of the 223 00:09:45,810 --> 00:09:49,100 arctic . Um What steps are there or do 224 00:09:49,100 --> 00:09:50,989 you feel that there is sufficient 225 00:09:50,989 --> 00:09:53,580 coordination to the whole idea of a 226 00:09:53,580 --> 00:09:56,120 cocom is somebody's in charge . And if 227 00:09:56,120 --> 00:09:59,070 you've got 33 cokes , I think it's 228 00:09:59,070 --> 00:10:01,292 three coconuts that have a piece of the 229 00:10:01,292 --> 00:10:03,459 arctic jurisdiction . Do you feel it's 230 00:10:03,459 --> 00:10:05,292 sufficiently well coordinated to 231 00:10:05,292 --> 00:10:07,237 respond to a Russian action in the 232 00:10:07,237 --> 00:10:10,460 arctic . As you're well aware Senator 233 00:10:10,470 --> 00:10:13,020 in 2019 we established north calm as 234 00:10:13,020 --> 00:10:15,242 the capability advocate for D . O . D . 235 00:10:15,242 --> 00:10:17,560 And and in his responsibility today . 236 00:10:17,940 --> 00:10:20,107 General Van Herk is doing a tremendous 237 00:10:20,107 --> 00:10:22,430 job of orchestrating the supported and 238 00:10:22,430 --> 00:10:24,597 supported relationships with the other 239 00:10:24,597 --> 00:10:26,652 co coms to the point where all of us 240 00:10:26,652 --> 00:10:28,708 have plans for the arctic being held 241 00:10:28,708 --> 00:10:30,819 accountable to support those plans so 242 00:10:30,819 --> 00:10:33,041 that we can improve our indications and 243 00:10:33,041 --> 00:10:35,152 mornings on our command and control . 244 00:10:35,910 --> 00:10:38,077 Nor com is the capability advocate for 245 00:10:38,077 --> 00:10:40,299 D . O . D . For the arctic . I've never 246 00:10:40,299 --> 00:10:42,354 heard the term capability advocate . 247 00:10:42,354 --> 00:10:45,310 Does that mean they're in charge in so 248 00:10:45,310 --> 00:10:47,532 many areas ? It does especially when it 249 00:10:47,532 --> 00:10:49,699 comes to capabilities which is ever so 250 00:10:49,699 --> 00:10:51,699 important for us in the military to 251 00:10:51,699 --> 00:10:53,810 deliver the appropriate effect in the 252 00:10:53,810 --> 00:10:55,699 environment . General I have some 253 00:10:55,699 --> 00:10:58,032 questions for the record on on Transcom . 254 00:10:58,032 --> 00:10:59,754 The two specifically are cyber 255 00:10:59,754 --> 00:11:01,699 resiliency which you've cited as a 256 00:11:01,699 --> 00:11:03,754 potential problem or not a potential 257 00:11:03,754 --> 00:11:06,220 but a serious problem . And also what 258 00:11:06,220 --> 00:11:08,331 lessons Transcom has learned from the 259 00:11:08,331 --> 00:11:09,942 Ukraine experience a kind of 260 00:11:09,942 --> 00:11:11,998 preliminary after action review . If 261 00:11:11,998 --> 00:11:14,053 you will , I'll submit those for the 262 00:11:14,053 --> 00:11:16,109 record . Thank you very much . Thank 263 00:11:16,109 --> 00:11:17,998 you . Senator King Senator Cotton 264 00:11:17,998 --> 00:11:20,220 please . Okay , thank you both for your 265 00:11:20,220 --> 00:11:22,276 appearance today and your service to 266 00:11:22,276 --> 00:11:24,498 our nation . General Walters . I'm sure 267 00:11:24,498 --> 00:11:26,498 you deeply regret this will be your 268 00:11:26,498 --> 00:11:26,440 last appearance in front of this 269 00:11:26,440 --> 00:11:28,920 committee as the combatant commander in 270 00:11:28,920 --> 00:11:32,330 europe . I'm A couple of weeks ago . 271 00:11:32,340 --> 00:11:34,507 Russia shot missiles that landed about 272 00:11:34,507 --> 00:11:37,490 10 miles from Poland's border . You are 273 00:11:37,490 --> 00:11:40,000 the combatant commander for american 274 00:11:40,000 --> 00:11:42,111 forces in europe . You're the Supreme 275 00:11:42,111 --> 00:11:45,350 allied commander for NATO forces . What 276 00:11:45,420 --> 00:11:47,420 direction or authorization have you 277 00:11:47,420 --> 00:11:49,642 received from the president or from the 278 00:11:49,642 --> 00:11:51,950 NATO council about the immediate action 279 00:11:51,950 --> 00:11:54,140 you should take if a missile were to 280 00:11:54,140 --> 00:11:55,650 hit polish territory , 281 00:11:58,640 --> 00:12:00,473 continue to fortify the security 282 00:12:00,473 --> 00:12:02,800 disposition from a military perspective 283 00:12:02,810 --> 00:12:04,921 in air , land , sea , space and cyber 284 00:12:04,921 --> 00:12:07,810 on the eastern portion of europe . Are 285 00:12:07,810 --> 00:12:09,866 you authorized to immediately strike 286 00:12:09,866 --> 00:12:12,088 back at that aircraft that launched the 287 00:12:12,088 --> 00:12:14,310 missile or a missile battery that fired 288 00:12:14,310 --> 00:12:17,300 it ? No , I am not . By the time you 289 00:12:17,300 --> 00:12:19,244 received that authorization , that 290 00:12:19,244 --> 00:12:21,133 aircraft and that missile battery 291 00:12:21,133 --> 00:12:23,356 probably would have moved and no longer 292 00:12:23,356 --> 00:12:23,060 be susceptible to immediate strike . Is 293 00:12:23,060 --> 00:12:25,210 that correct ? That's correct . And 294 00:12:25,210 --> 00:12:27,266 again , this all applies to activity 295 00:12:27,266 --> 00:12:29,432 that occurs in Ukraine with respect to 296 00:12:29,432 --> 00:12:31,266 Russia , not on NATO territory , 297 00:12:31,340 --> 00:12:33,340 disappointed to hear that you don't 298 00:12:33,340 --> 00:12:35,396 have that authorization general . Um 299 00:12:36,340 --> 00:12:38,284 the President said while he was in 300 00:12:38,284 --> 00:12:40,396 europe that we are training Ukrainian 301 00:12:40,396 --> 00:12:42,396 forces in Poland . Is that accurate 302 00:12:46,040 --> 00:12:49,100 at this time ? Is was is that the time 303 00:12:49,100 --> 00:12:51,660 setting of the statement ? That's what 304 00:12:51,660 --> 00:12:53,993 the President said , Jake Sullivan said , 305 00:12:53,993 --> 00:12:56,160 we are not , I'm just trying to figure 306 00:12:56,160 --> 00:12:58,680 out if we are or are not . I do not 307 00:12:58,680 --> 00:13:00,791 believe that we are in the process of 308 00:13:00,791 --> 00:13:04,640 currently training military forces from 309 00:13:04,640 --> 00:13:07,590 Ukraine and Poland . There are liaisons 310 00:13:07,590 --> 00:13:09,590 that are there that are being given 311 00:13:09,590 --> 00:13:11,812 advice and that's different than than I 312 00:13:11,812 --> 00:13:13,979 think you're referring to with respect 313 00:13:13,979 --> 00:13:16,980 to training . Um , a few weeks ago , uh 314 00:13:16,990 --> 00:13:19,160 President Zelensky asked for the 315 00:13:19,160 --> 00:13:22,240 transfer of MIG 29 aircraft from Poland . 316 00:13:22,250 --> 00:13:24,250 The Secretary of State said that we 317 00:13:24,250 --> 00:13:26,250 gave a green light to that two days 318 00:13:26,250 --> 00:13:28,083 later , the pentagon said it was 319 00:13:28,083 --> 00:13:30,306 untenable because they were afraid that 320 00:13:30,306 --> 00:13:32,560 it would be escalatory . Were you asked 321 00:13:32,560 --> 00:13:34,570 for your best military advice about 322 00:13:34,570 --> 00:13:36,903 this decision ? And if so , what was it ? 323 00:13:37,740 --> 00:13:39,990 I was and I provided that best military 324 00:13:39,990 --> 00:13:42,157 advice to the Secretary of Defense and 325 00:13:42,157 --> 00:13:44,379 if Secretary Austin would like to share 326 00:13:44,379 --> 00:13:46,490 that with you , I know that he will , 327 00:13:46,490 --> 00:13:48,712 can you help me understand how it would 328 00:13:48,712 --> 00:13:50,934 be escalatory to provide these aircraft 329 00:13:50,934 --> 00:13:52,990 to Poland if they came from us , but 330 00:13:52,990 --> 00:13:55,330 not if they came from Poland , I think 331 00:13:55,330 --> 00:13:57,497 that nations have to make the decision 332 00:13:57,497 --> 00:13:59,719 independently about whether or not they 333 00:13:59,719 --> 00:14:01,886 want to give aircraft to the Ukraine . 334 00:14:01,886 --> 00:14:03,997 And , and , and that is certainly the 335 00:14:03,997 --> 00:14:06,052 case with respect to Poland's choice 336 00:14:06,052 --> 00:14:08,052 with , with respect to what we do . 337 00:14:08,052 --> 00:14:10,108 Part of the decision from the United 338 00:14:10,108 --> 00:14:12,274 States perspective was metered through 339 00:14:12,274 --> 00:14:14,108 the return on investment for the 340 00:14:14,108 --> 00:14:16,163 capability of those platforms versus 341 00:14:16,163 --> 00:14:18,219 potential escalation . And when that 342 00:14:18,219 --> 00:14:20,274 balance was looked at , the decision 343 00:14:20,274 --> 00:14:22,497 was made not to advocate giving migs to 344 00:14:22,497 --> 00:14:24,497 play . Yeah , I mean , I understand 345 00:14:24,497 --> 00:14:26,663 that some people think that these migs 346 00:14:26,663 --> 00:14:28,719 would not be that useful for Ukraine 347 00:14:28,719 --> 00:14:30,608 and I don't believe there'll be a 348 00:14:30,608 --> 00:14:32,774 silver bullet , but President Zelensky 349 00:14:32,774 --> 00:14:34,886 and the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense 350 00:14:34,886 --> 00:14:36,886 has asked for them and I think this 351 00:14:36,886 --> 00:14:39,108 should be a case where we respect their 352 00:14:39,108 --> 00:14:41,219 judgments even they just use them for 353 00:14:41,219 --> 00:14:43,386 spare parts for the aircraft . I think 354 00:14:43,386 --> 00:14:45,552 they've earned that right . Um , and I 355 00:14:45,552 --> 00:14:47,774 don't think if you're a Russian pilot , 356 00:14:47,774 --> 00:14:49,941 you do old migs as any more escalatory 357 00:14:49,941 --> 00:14:51,997 than modern stingers . If you're the 358 00:14:51,997 --> 00:14:54,108 one being shot in the sky , I suspect 359 00:14:54,108 --> 00:14:56,163 you wouldn't either general . Are we 360 00:14:56,163 --> 00:14:58,060 still making distinctions between 361 00:14:58,440 --> 00:15:00,770 offensive and defensive weapons that we 362 00:15:00,770 --> 00:15:04,510 provide to Ukraine Senator ? I would 363 00:15:04,510 --> 00:15:06,566 expect that we're examining each and 364 00:15:06,566 --> 00:15:08,566 every one of the weapons and making 365 00:15:08,566 --> 00:15:10,788 sure that on a case by case basis we're 366 00:15:10,788 --> 00:15:12,732 taking into account the escalatory 367 00:15:12,732 --> 00:15:15,420 potential that they present . I just 368 00:15:15,420 --> 00:15:17,640 think that Russia invaded Ukraine . 369 00:15:17,640 --> 00:15:20,010 Ukraine is defending its soil by 370 00:15:20,010 --> 00:15:22,160 definition every weapon it has its 371 00:15:22,160 --> 00:15:24,740 defensive . Two weeks ago the president 372 00:15:24,900 --> 00:15:27,011 announced the delivery of the package 373 00:15:27,011 --> 00:15:29,290 of arms to include switchblade drones . 374 00:15:29,290 --> 00:15:31,020 One week ago , the pentagon 375 00:15:31,020 --> 00:15:32,964 acknowledged they had not yet been 376 00:15:32,964 --> 00:15:34,909 delivered . Have those drones been 377 00:15:34,909 --> 00:15:36,964 delivered yet to Ukraine ? They have 378 00:15:36,964 --> 00:15:39,131 not yet landed in Ukraine . They're in 379 00:15:39,131 --> 00:15:41,187 the process . Do we , do we know why 380 00:15:41,187 --> 00:15:43,353 it's taking so long . I do not at this 381 00:15:43,353 --> 00:15:47,120 time . Senator . One final 382 00:15:47,120 --> 00:15:49,176 question I have here . This is about 383 00:15:49,176 --> 00:15:51,453 your placement on the disposition of U . 384 00:15:51,453 --> 00:15:53,650 S . Forces . Um we have 40,000 troops 385 00:15:53,650 --> 00:15:57,010 in Germany that's Four times the next 386 00:15:57,010 --> 00:15:59,121 largest troop presence almost and 40% 387 00:15:59,121 --> 00:16:01,010 of our total enhanced presence in 388 00:16:01,010 --> 00:16:03,010 Europe . Now , is there a strategic 389 00:16:03,010 --> 00:16:04,843 reason to have so many troops in 390 00:16:04,843 --> 00:16:06,788 Germany or is that just a historic 391 00:16:06,788 --> 00:16:08,899 artifact that it used to be the front 392 00:16:08,899 --> 00:16:11,120 lines of the east west conflict . It 393 00:16:11,120 --> 00:16:13,500 has to do with mostly the United States 394 00:16:13,500 --> 00:16:15,611 Army and the availability of training 395 00:16:15,611 --> 00:16:17,722 ranges . So when those force elements 396 00:16:17,722 --> 00:16:19,833 come over , they can practice shoot , 397 00:16:19,833 --> 00:16:22,000 move and communicating and when called 398 00:16:22,000 --> 00:16:24,000 to go forward , you'll have a ready 399 00:16:24,000 --> 00:16:26,111 force and that's because of the , the 400 00:16:26,111 --> 00:16:28,278 long tradition that you've experienced 401 00:16:28,278 --> 00:16:30,333 in your army career of landfills and 402 00:16:30,333 --> 00:16:32,333 graph in fear . Can you tell me how 403 00:16:32,333 --> 00:16:34,333 many of those 40,000 troops that we 404 00:16:34,333 --> 00:16:36,444 have in Germany have have the primary 405 00:16:36,740 --> 00:16:39,850 job of shooting a weapon 406 00:16:40,440 --> 00:16:42,662 driving a vehicle or flying an aircraft 407 00:16:42,662 --> 00:16:46,570 that can kill a bad guy ? Well over 70% . 408 00:16:46,940 --> 00:16:50,090 So over 70% of those 40,000 troops have 409 00:16:50,090 --> 00:16:53,070 a military occupational specialty or 410 00:16:53,140 --> 00:16:55,480 rescue that is about killing bad guys 411 00:16:55,480 --> 00:16:57,510 not supporting frontline troops . 412 00:16:58,040 --> 00:17:00,200 That's correct . They're the teeth of 413 00:17:00,200 --> 00:17:02,256 the military formation . Thank you . 414 00:17:02,840 --> 00:17:05,007 Thank you . Senator Cotton center rows 415 00:17:05,007 --> 00:17:08,370 in place . Thank you . Chairman , read 416 00:17:08,370 --> 00:17:10,037 for holding this critical and 417 00:17:10,037 --> 00:17:12,203 critically important hearing . General 418 00:17:12,203 --> 00:17:14,730 Walters . I'm sure you understand more 419 00:17:14,730 --> 00:17:17,220 than most that the world is watching 420 00:17:17,230 --> 00:17:19,230 the United States as we support our 421 00:17:19,230 --> 00:17:21,174 NATO allies and help the Ukrainian 422 00:17:21,174 --> 00:17:23,008 people defend their country from 423 00:17:23,008 --> 00:17:26,140 Vladimir Putin's violent , unprovoked 424 00:17:26,140 --> 00:17:28,770 war on their democratic way of life . 425 00:17:28,780 --> 00:17:30,780 So with this in mind , earlier this 426 00:17:30,780 --> 00:17:32,613 month , I traveled to Poland and 427 00:17:32,613 --> 00:17:34,780 Germany as part of a bipartisan code l 428 00:17:34,780 --> 00:17:36,502 to reinforce to the world that 429 00:17:36,502 --> 00:17:38,613 americans stand united in our support 430 00:17:38,613 --> 00:17:40,669 for Ukraine and the Ukrainian people 431 00:17:40,669 --> 00:17:42,780 throughout the trip . We did have the 432 00:17:42,780 --> 00:17:44,502 privilege of meeting us forces 433 00:17:44,502 --> 00:17:46,391 supporting the Yukon mission . We 434 00:17:46,391 --> 00:17:48,502 received briefings from commanders on 435 00:17:48,502 --> 00:17:50,669 the situation on the ground in Ukraine 436 00:17:50,669 --> 00:17:52,558 and we saw firsthand the security 437 00:17:52,558 --> 00:17:54,336 assistance and training NATO is 438 00:17:54,336 --> 00:17:56,610 providing this trip , underscored for 439 00:17:56,610 --> 00:17:59,110 me that we can and we must do more 440 00:17:59,120 --> 00:18:01,176 taking additional actions to support 441 00:18:01,176 --> 00:18:03,342 Ukraine helping them to defeat Putin's 442 00:18:03,342 --> 00:18:05,800 forces . And so I want to just turn to 443 00:18:05,810 --> 00:18:09,190 um a little bit of uh talking about 444 00:18:09,200 --> 00:18:11,422 humanitarian aid because in Poland , we 445 00:18:11,422 --> 00:18:13,144 visited a refugee center where 446 00:18:13,144 --> 00:18:15,144 displaced displaced Ukrainians were 447 00:18:15,144 --> 00:18:17,367 seeking shelter and refuge from Putin's 448 00:18:17,367 --> 00:18:19,144 brutality . And I saw women and 449 00:18:19,144 --> 00:18:21,089 Children who fled to all women and 450 00:18:21,089 --> 00:18:23,033 Children primarily they fled their 451 00:18:23,033 --> 00:18:25,200 homes and the lives they've built , we 452 00:18:25,200 --> 00:18:27,422 heard on the ground , people in Ukraine 453 00:18:27,422 --> 00:18:29,311 are running out of food , water , 454 00:18:29,311 --> 00:18:31,367 medical supplies . So general , what 455 00:18:31,367 --> 00:18:33,589 role is you come playing and supporting 456 00:18:33,589 --> 00:18:35,650 the U . S . Military's humanitarian 457 00:18:35,660 --> 00:18:37,493 mission in the Ukraine ? And how 458 00:18:37,493 --> 00:18:39,327 concerned are you that potential 459 00:18:39,327 --> 00:18:41,327 Russian gains might complicate your 460 00:18:41,327 --> 00:18:43,382 efforts to provide both the military 461 00:18:43,382 --> 00:18:45,493 and humanitarian assistance that they 462 00:18:45,493 --> 00:18:49,320 need . Senator . We're very concerned . 463 00:18:49,450 --> 00:18:51,240 And you calm is assisting with 464 00:18:51,250 --> 00:18:54,110 inventories , transactions back and 465 00:18:54,110 --> 00:18:56,470 forth with security assistance as well 466 00:18:56,470 --> 00:18:58,581 as humanitarian assistance to to make 467 00:18:58,581 --> 00:19:00,526 sure that from a supply and demand 468 00:19:00,526 --> 00:19:02,748 standpoint uh that the right stuff goes 469 00:19:02,748 --> 00:19:04,692 in at the right time with the best 470 00:19:04,692 --> 00:19:06,810 possible force protection and and we 471 00:19:06,810 --> 00:19:09,590 will vary as necessary based off trends 472 00:19:09,590 --> 00:19:11,812 that exist in the environment to ensure 473 00:19:11,812 --> 00:19:14,160 that we can , as best we can safely get 474 00:19:14,170 --> 00:19:16,337 the right goods to the right people at 475 00:19:16,337 --> 00:19:18,448 the right time ? Both from a security 476 00:19:18,448 --> 00:19:20,559 assistance standpoint and both from a 477 00:19:20,559 --> 00:19:22,781 humanitarian assistance standpoint as a 478 00:19:22,781 --> 00:19:24,726 military organization . What we're 479 00:19:24,726 --> 00:19:26,726 obviously working side by side with 480 00:19:26,726 --> 00:19:28,781 with many of our government partners 481 00:19:28,781 --> 00:19:30,948 outside of the Department of Defense , 482 00:19:30,948 --> 00:19:32,892 as well as those that represent uh 483 00:19:32,892 --> 00:19:35,003 departments outside of the Department 484 00:19:35,003 --> 00:19:37,280 of Defense in the countries where these 485 00:19:37,280 --> 00:19:39,830 transactions are taking place , Poland 486 00:19:39,840 --> 00:19:42,830 and others . Thank you . I want to move 487 00:19:42,830 --> 00:19:45,300 on to cyber threats because obviously , 488 00:19:45,310 --> 00:19:47,600 um , you've alluded to a General von 489 00:19:47,600 --> 00:19:49,378 Harvest and uh and of course my 490 00:19:49,378 --> 00:19:51,544 colleagues as well . And but I want to 491 00:19:51,544 --> 00:19:53,700 turn to Russian gray zone tactics , 492 00:19:53,710 --> 00:19:56,580 Russia has launched malicious cyber 493 00:19:56,580 --> 00:19:58,136 attacks to target Ukraine's 494 00:19:58,136 --> 00:19:59,969 infrastructure , It's government 495 00:19:59,969 --> 00:20:02,191 networks while utilizing disinformation 496 00:20:02,191 --> 00:20:04,920 to falsely paint Ukraine of course . 497 00:20:04,920 --> 00:20:06,976 And I'm going to quote here , a nazi 498 00:20:06,976 --> 00:20:09,142 regime , so general Walters . I have a 499 00:20:09,142 --> 00:20:11,309 three part question for you on Russian 500 00:20:11,309 --> 00:20:14,190 hybrid warfare threats . First , have 501 00:20:14,190 --> 00:20:16,023 Russian cyberattacks compromised 502 00:20:16,023 --> 00:20:18,700 Ukrainian command and control . Second , 503 00:20:18,710 --> 00:20:20,654 do we have adequate strategies for 504 00:20:20,654 --> 00:20:22,432 countering Russia's information 505 00:20:22,432 --> 00:20:25,390 operations in eastern Ukraine . And 506 00:20:25,390 --> 00:20:28,390 third , Given that NATO in 2014 507 00:20:28,400 --> 00:20:31,260 declared that a cyber attack could lead 508 00:20:31,270 --> 00:20:33,750 to the invocation of Article five In 509 00:20:33,750 --> 00:20:36,110 your view , what should be the 510 00:20:36,110 --> 00:20:38,290 threshold for a Russian cyber attack 511 00:20:38,300 --> 00:20:40,580 that could lead to invoking article 512 00:20:40,590 --> 00:20:41,160 five 513 00:20:48,540 --> 00:20:50,651 senator . The first question that has 514 00:20:50,651 --> 00:20:52,873 to do with Ukrainian C2 as I think most 515 00:20:52,873 --> 00:20:56,340 of us have seen in In the public domain . 516 00:20:56,350 --> 00:20:59,110 Uh , Ukrainian C2 is currently in place 517 00:20:59,120 --> 00:21:01,287 from a whole of government perspective 518 00:21:01,287 --> 00:21:03,398 on Ukraine's park all the way down to 519 00:21:03,398 --> 00:21:05,564 the military . So I would contend that 520 00:21:05,564 --> 00:21:07,787 Russia has been very challenged in that 521 00:21:07,787 --> 00:21:09,953 area and Ukraine has been continued to 522 00:21:09,953 --> 00:21:12,600 be successful . I think the strategic 523 00:21:12,600 --> 00:21:15,340 implications are profound and I believe 524 00:21:15,340 --> 00:21:17,340 that when we examine what has taken 525 00:21:17,340 --> 00:21:19,460 place up to this point and and and 526 00:21:19,460 --> 00:21:21,516 write books about it in the future , 527 00:21:21,516 --> 00:21:23,460 will look back and conclude and be 528 00:21:23,460 --> 00:21:25,627 comfortable with the fact that we have 529 00:21:25,627 --> 00:21:27,793 dramatically from a US perspective and 530 00:21:27,793 --> 00:21:29,904 NATO perspective improved our tactics 531 00:21:29,904 --> 00:21:31,793 techniques and procedures as they 532 00:21:31,793 --> 00:21:34,016 contribute to a campaign in the area of 533 00:21:34,016 --> 00:21:36,238 offensive cyber and defensive cyber and 534 00:21:36,238 --> 00:21:39,020 as well as the manipulation of of how 535 00:21:39,020 --> 00:21:41,076 information comes out and how we can 536 00:21:41,076 --> 00:21:43,298 ensure that the truth still gets to the 537 00:21:43,298 --> 00:21:47,180 appropriate point . And I I 538 00:21:47,180 --> 00:21:50,120 would just say that when it comes to 539 00:21:50,130 --> 00:21:52,550 what NATO does to declare an article 540 00:21:52,550 --> 00:21:55,090 five as a military commander , what I'm 541 00:21:55,090 --> 00:21:57,460 responsible for is ensuring that we 542 00:21:57,460 --> 00:21:59,960 have all of the facts and as you will 543 00:21:59,960 --> 00:22:02,080 know , senator , we typically wind up 544 00:22:02,080 --> 00:22:04,210 in situations to where the next day 545 00:22:04,210 --> 00:22:06,210 after we quickly discovered that we 546 00:22:06,210 --> 00:22:08,266 didn't have all the facts and what I 547 00:22:08,266 --> 00:22:10,488 would owe the North atlantic council in 548 00:22:10,488 --> 00:22:12,210 NATO so that they can make the 549 00:22:12,210 --> 00:22:14,432 appropriate decision is to give as many 550 00:22:14,432 --> 00:22:16,599 of those facts as I can and provide my 551 00:22:16,599 --> 00:22:18,488 best military advice to the North 552 00:22:18,488 --> 00:22:20,210 atlantic council that would be 553 00:22:20,210 --> 00:22:22,377 responsible for making that decision . 554 00:22:22,377 --> 00:22:24,543 All 30 nations about whether or not to 555 00:22:24,543 --> 00:22:26,599 enact article five and in situations 556 00:22:26,599 --> 00:22:28,710 like this when it comes to cyber it's 557 00:22:28,710 --> 00:22:30,932 uh it's very difficult to get the facts 558 00:22:30,932 --> 00:22:33,099 and you have to work hard to make sure 559 00:22:33,099 --> 00:22:32,510 that you get those . And that would be 560 00:22:32,510 --> 00:22:34,960 my responsibility at the time when that 561 00:22:34,960 --> 00:22:37,450 would occur . Thank you . I see my time 562 00:22:37,450 --> 00:22:39,561 is up but General Van Aalst I'll take 563 00:22:39,561 --> 00:22:41,728 this for the record about investing in 564 00:22:41,728 --> 00:22:43,894 the right cyber talent and modernizing 565 00:22:43,894 --> 00:22:45,728 I . T . Capabilities in order to 566 00:22:45,728 --> 00:22:47,894 support all of this . Thank you . Mr . 567 00:22:47,894 --> 00:22:49,894 Chair . Thank you . Senator Rosen . 568 00:22:49,894 --> 00:22:51,950 Senator Corman please Thank you . Mr 569 00:22:51,950 --> 00:22:54,061 Chairman thanks to both both generals 570 00:22:54,061 --> 00:22:56,228 for being here and for your incredible 571 00:22:56,228 --> 00:22:58,450 service . Um General Walters . I want I 572 00:22:58,450 --> 00:23:00,450 want to begin with You go back to a 573 00:23:00,450 --> 00:23:02,339 conversation you had with Senator 574 00:23:02,339 --> 00:23:04,130 Wicker specifically about the 575 00:23:04,140 --> 00:23:06,450 distinction of permanent assigned 576 00:23:06,450 --> 00:23:09,090 forces as we obviously see this 577 00:23:09,100 --> 00:23:12,520 increase now in force and as I 578 00:23:12,520 --> 00:23:14,850 understand um maybe I'll drive down a 579 00:23:14,850 --> 00:23:17,260 little more . He he was asking about 580 00:23:17,260 --> 00:23:19,482 permanent assigned forces . I think the 581 00:23:19,482 --> 00:23:21,427 bottom line was you said we should 582 00:23:21,427 --> 00:23:23,649 probably grow them . What I'm wondering 583 00:23:23,649 --> 00:23:25,780 is over the last several years as as 584 00:23:25,790 --> 00:23:28,060 we've been drawing down your com 585 00:23:28,070 --> 00:23:30,850 centcom or you're a common centcom to 586 00:23:30,850 --> 00:23:33,880 prepare more forces for other places . 587 00:23:33,890 --> 00:23:37,230 Specifically the pacific uh and you've 588 00:23:37,230 --> 00:23:39,460 talked a little bit with Senator Hirono 589 00:23:39,460 --> 00:23:43,330 about the global issue . Um how do 590 00:23:43,330 --> 00:23:45,497 you , how do we reconcile the need for 591 00:23:45,497 --> 00:23:47,497 more forces everywhere ? Do we just 592 00:23:47,497 --> 00:23:49,663 grow the force or does this management 593 00:23:49,663 --> 00:23:52,210 of personnel become much more , much 594 00:23:52,210 --> 00:23:54,900 more difficult ? And by the way , I 595 00:23:54,900 --> 00:23:57,610 might also ask , um and how does agile 596 00:23:57,610 --> 00:24:00,760 combat in , you know , play into all of 597 00:24:00,760 --> 00:24:02,810 that ? We in North Dakota are very 598 00:24:02,820 --> 00:24:05,020 cognizant of the B- 52 s and the role 599 00:24:05,020 --> 00:24:08,340 they've played exercising obviously . 600 00:24:08,350 --> 00:24:11,100 Um , maybe just talk a little bit about 601 00:24:11,110 --> 00:24:14,600 ace and how that fits in as well . Well , 602 00:24:14,600 --> 00:24:16,822 Senator first , agile combat employment 603 00:24:16,822 --> 00:24:18,933 is very helpful whether or not you're 604 00:24:18,933 --> 00:24:21,044 addressing permanent or or rotational 605 00:24:21,044 --> 00:24:23,240 forces to be able to take a unique 606 00:24:23,250 --> 00:24:25,820 capability and quickly insert it into a 607 00:24:25,820 --> 00:24:28,230 region . And then when when no longer 608 00:24:28,240 --> 00:24:30,351 does it deliver the effect that helps 609 00:24:30,351 --> 00:24:32,518 enhance peace in that region , pull it 610 00:24:32,518 --> 00:24:34,740 out and get it back home where it needs 611 00:24:34,740 --> 00:24:36,907 to be to refit and be ready to respond 612 00:24:36,907 --> 00:24:38,962 globally . It's incredibly important 613 00:24:38,962 --> 00:24:41,570 with respect permanently assigned 614 00:24:41,570 --> 00:24:44,670 versus rotational as we've seen what 615 00:24:44,670 --> 00:24:47,620 has unfolded in Ukraine with respect to 616 00:24:47,620 --> 00:24:49,231 Russia , it's allowed us the 617 00:24:49,231 --> 00:24:51,440 opportunity to take a look at a whole 618 00:24:51,440 --> 00:24:55,130 of government , multi domain force 619 00:24:55,140 --> 00:24:57,440 and and examine what shifts we could 620 00:24:57,440 --> 00:24:59,440 possibly make in the future . And I 621 00:24:59,440 --> 00:25:02,080 contend that we would probably be wise 622 00:25:02,090 --> 00:25:04,550 to examine what has unfolded in Ukraine 623 00:25:04,550 --> 00:25:06,717 and Russia and the periphery nations . 624 00:25:06,717 --> 00:25:09,320 And certainly uh from a NATO 625 00:25:09,320 --> 00:25:12,060 perspective and being a commander with 626 00:25:12,060 --> 00:25:14,220 respect to those NATO forces , those 627 00:25:14,220 --> 00:25:16,430 contributions that those allies and 628 00:25:16,430 --> 00:25:18,960 partners have committed impacts the 629 00:25:18,960 --> 00:25:21,238 appropriate effect that we can deliver . 630 00:25:21,238 --> 00:25:23,182 Which goes all the way back to how 631 00:25:23,182 --> 00:25:25,182 smart we need to be with respect to 632 00:25:25,182 --> 00:25:27,127 making the right decision , giving 633 00:25:27,127 --> 00:25:29,930 global ramifications on permanent 634 00:25:29,940 --> 00:25:32,520 versus rotational . And the answer is 635 00:25:32,520 --> 00:25:35,110 still , I believe it depends . There's 636 00:25:35,110 --> 00:25:37,350 always goodness and badness in both 637 00:25:37,350 --> 00:25:39,572 cases . But I think we need to be smart 638 00:25:39,572 --> 00:25:41,683 about it and re fit just a little bit 639 00:25:41,683 --> 00:25:43,683 and examine what's unfolded here to 640 00:25:43,683 --> 00:25:45,906 make a prudent decision going forward . 641 00:25:45,906 --> 00:25:47,628 Well , said . And you actually 642 00:25:47,628 --> 00:25:49,461 anticipated my next question and 643 00:25:49,461 --> 00:25:51,683 answered , answered it . So thank you . 644 00:25:51,683 --> 00:25:51,100 I'm speaking of whole of government 645 00:25:51,110 --> 00:25:53,600 general Villanova . You probably um , 646 00:25:53,610 --> 00:25:55,332 are as engaged in the whole of 647 00:25:55,332 --> 00:25:57,550 government approach as much or more 648 00:25:57,550 --> 00:25:59,550 importantly probably than anybody . 649 00:25:59,550 --> 00:26:01,661 There are two things that you've said 650 00:26:01,661 --> 00:26:03,439 that . Um , one in your opening 651 00:26:03,439 --> 00:26:05,328 statement and I think it was your 652 00:26:05,328 --> 00:26:07,161 opening statement where you said 653 00:26:07,161 --> 00:26:06,620 something to the effect that I look 654 00:26:06,620 --> 00:26:08,620 forward to working with the navy to 655 00:26:08,620 --> 00:26:11,020 satisfy restrictions in current law ? I 656 00:26:11,020 --> 00:26:13,020 think that was regarding um , the 657 00:26:13,020 --> 00:26:15,350 building of ships . Right . And , and 658 00:26:15,350 --> 00:26:17,800 and could you just elaborate a little 659 00:26:17,800 --> 00:26:21,800 bit on um , satisfied restrictions in 660 00:26:21,800 --> 00:26:23,800 current law . Should we be changing 661 00:26:23,800 --> 00:26:26,022 restrictions . Are you implying that or 662 00:26:26,022 --> 00:26:28,078 are you just saying there's a lot of 663 00:26:28,078 --> 00:26:27,910 bureaucracy that we have to work 664 00:26:27,910 --> 00:26:31,470 through and help me help you . Thanks 665 00:26:31,470 --> 00:26:34,570 Sen . Uh , the authorization is to 666 00:26:34,570 --> 00:26:37,690 purchase up to nine used Sealift ships . 667 00:26:38,240 --> 00:26:41,160 Four ships without a requirement for 668 00:26:41,160 --> 00:26:43,800 new build . But in order to purchase 669 00:26:43,800 --> 00:26:46,270 the 5th ship , uh , the navy has to 670 00:26:46,270 --> 00:26:50,160 submit a plan for 10 new ships 671 00:26:50,160 --> 00:26:54,090 being built sealift or OS . V uh , 672 00:26:54,100 --> 00:26:57,170 utility general utility type ships . So 673 00:26:57,170 --> 00:26:59,100 we could continue to purchase use 674 00:26:59,100 --> 00:27:01,570 number five through number nine . So 675 00:27:01,570 --> 00:27:04,790 while we are given in in 2021 , we have 676 00:27:04,790 --> 00:27:07,520 now purchased two ships and we've been 677 00:27:07,520 --> 00:27:09,910 given the appropriation to purchase 678 00:27:09,910 --> 00:27:12,610 five more use ships . But we'll only 679 00:27:12,610 --> 00:27:15,170 right now be able to purchase two more 680 00:27:15,640 --> 00:27:18,740 until either the law has changed or the 681 00:27:18,740 --> 00:27:20,962 navy submits a plan that's satisfactory 682 00:27:20,962 --> 00:27:23,100 to the committee's understand . So we 683 00:27:23,100 --> 00:27:24,878 need to work on that . You also 684 00:27:24,878 --> 00:27:26,822 referenced in the conversation ? I 685 00:27:26,822 --> 00:27:28,933 don't remember which senator was . It 686 00:27:28,933 --> 00:27:31,044 might have been Hirono . But um , you 687 00:27:31,044 --> 00:27:33,156 you've referenced the term thickening 688 00:27:33,156 --> 00:27:35,211 partners a couple of times I think . 689 00:27:35,211 --> 00:27:37,267 And I'm , what I'm wondering is have 690 00:27:37,267 --> 00:27:39,267 you seen in recent months or recent 691 00:27:39,267 --> 00:27:42,050 years a changing if you will or or 692 00:27:42,060 --> 00:27:45,360 growing cooperation among our partners 693 00:27:45,370 --> 00:27:47,650 with our partners in the pacific 694 00:27:47,660 --> 00:27:50,060 specifically to allow for example 695 00:27:50,060 --> 00:27:52,290 better access to ports and and 696 00:27:52,300 --> 00:27:55,000 navigable Itty that maybe wasn't there 697 00:27:55,010 --> 00:27:58,060 in the not so distant past . Are you 698 00:27:58,060 --> 00:28:00,171 seeing some improvement ? Yes . And I 699 00:28:00,171 --> 00:28:02,282 would say we are seeing improvement . 700 00:28:02,282 --> 00:28:04,504 The fine points of that improvement . I 701 00:28:04,504 --> 00:28:07,360 would leave to Admiral Aquilino . But 702 00:28:07,370 --> 00:28:10,260 as we look to both our military and our 703 00:28:10,260 --> 00:28:12,710 commercial networks as we are 704 00:28:12,720 --> 00:28:15,860 increasing our activities and exercises 705 00:28:16,210 --> 00:28:18,266 and interoperability with our allies 706 00:28:18,266 --> 00:28:20,210 and partners in the pacific we are 707 00:28:20,210 --> 00:28:22,210 seeing an increase . Thank you very 708 00:28:22,210 --> 00:28:24,377 much . Thank you . Mr Chairman . Thank 709 00:28:24,377 --> 00:28:23,820 you . Senator Cramer Senator 710 00:28:23,820 --> 00:28:26,660 Duckworth's please . Thank you Mr 711 00:28:26,660 --> 00:28:28,720 Chairman . And thank you to both 712 00:28:28,720 --> 00:28:30,887 General Van Novo's and general Walters 713 00:28:30,887 --> 00:28:33,109 for joining us . Today . As we near the 714 00:28:33,109 --> 00:28:35,000 milestone of one month into the 715 00:28:35,000 --> 00:28:37,167 invasion of Ukraine , we are hitting a 716 00:28:37,167 --> 00:28:39,000 critical moment in our pledge to 717 00:28:39,000 --> 00:28:41,111 support Ukraine and our NATO allies . 718 00:28:41,340 --> 00:28:43,451 What were once seen as ad hoc efforts 719 00:28:43,451 --> 00:28:46,650 to gather and distribute um aid to the 720 00:28:46,650 --> 00:28:48,706 Ukrainian heroes . Combating Russian 721 00:28:48,706 --> 00:28:50,928 aggression will now become has become a 722 00:28:50,928 --> 00:28:53,250 new normal . What was once an emergent 723 00:28:53,250 --> 00:28:55,660 situation will now test our commitment 724 00:28:55,670 --> 00:28:58,120 and our resilience as the fatigue of 725 00:28:58,120 --> 00:29:00,570 warfare sets in . This new reality will 726 00:29:00,570 --> 00:29:03,570 stress our own logistics networks as we 727 00:29:03,570 --> 00:29:05,292 have to reinforce our delivery 728 00:29:05,292 --> 00:29:07,292 mechanisms into Ukraine in order to 729 00:29:07,292 --> 00:29:09,330 deter Russian interdiction . And it 730 00:29:09,330 --> 00:29:11,990 will challenge our industry partners to 731 00:29:11,990 --> 00:29:13,934 reopen or accelerate manufacturing 732 00:29:13,934 --> 00:29:16,101 lines to incorporate into the next aid 733 00:29:16,101 --> 00:29:18,220 package and to replenish our own 734 00:29:18,220 --> 00:29:20,950 stockpiles . So I'd like to start off 735 00:29:20,960 --> 00:29:23,390 by discussing the status of our inter 736 00:29:23,390 --> 00:29:25,612 theater capabilities which are critical 737 00:29:25,612 --> 00:29:27,779 to the work that we're doing in europe 738 00:29:27,779 --> 00:29:29,834 and will be just as critical if ever 739 00:29:29,834 --> 00:29:32,168 needed for a contingency in the pacific . 740 00:29:32,168 --> 00:29:34,057 During our last meeting , General 741 00:29:34,057 --> 00:29:36,168 Lenovo's , we discussed your plans to 742 00:29:36,168 --> 00:29:38,001 reduce the age of your strategic 743 00:29:38,001 --> 00:29:40,380 maritime assets by purchasing used 744 00:29:40,390 --> 00:29:43,030 replacement ships . This strategy is 745 00:29:43,030 --> 00:29:45,141 clearly proving successful , but with 746 00:29:45,141 --> 00:29:48,260 34 of your 50 assets set to retire , I 747 00:29:48,260 --> 00:29:50,482 am concerned that we're not moving fast 748 00:29:50,482 --> 00:29:52,538 enough . General Lenovo's , what are 749 00:29:52,538 --> 00:29:54,704 the biggest obstacles you face in your 750 00:29:54,704 --> 00:29:56,760 strategy to buy used maritime assets 751 00:29:56,760 --> 00:29:58,760 and what can Congress do to support 752 00:29:58,760 --> 00:30:00,927 your efforts during fiscal year 2023 . 753 00:30:03,340 --> 00:30:06,300 Thank you senator . And as we discussed , 754 00:30:06,300 --> 00:30:09,670 the , the aging ships are costing more 755 00:30:09,680 --> 00:30:12,370 to maintain and even with that more 756 00:30:12,370 --> 00:30:14,592 money , we're not getting the readiness 757 00:30:14,592 --> 00:30:17,070 bang out of that buck . So we have had 758 00:30:17,070 --> 00:30:19,300 to make some prudent and cost effective 759 00:30:19,300 --> 00:30:21,467 decisions to accelerate retirements of 760 00:30:21,467 --> 00:30:24,620 platforms even without a backfill . 761 00:30:25,340 --> 00:30:28,140 I think most importantly , a stable 762 00:30:28,140 --> 00:30:31,720 plan of recapitalization uh , with 763 00:30:31,720 --> 00:30:34,210 used ships to ensure that we get the 764 00:30:34,210 --> 00:30:37,760 most value out of it and also to 765 00:30:37,760 --> 00:30:39,871 stabilize the shipyards because these 766 00:30:39,871 --> 00:30:42,038 ships do go back and get modifications 767 00:30:42,038 --> 00:30:44,350 done as they come into the ready 768 00:30:44,350 --> 00:30:47,340 reserve fleet . So a nice stable 769 00:30:47,340 --> 00:30:51,210 platform for by about for a 770 00:30:51,210 --> 00:30:53,321 year . Would would be very helpful to 771 00:30:53,321 --> 00:30:55,321 close and be able to mitigate those 772 00:30:55,321 --> 00:30:57,350 gaps . But I also wanted to just 773 00:30:57,350 --> 00:31:00,210 reiterate that , you know , our organic 774 00:31:00,210 --> 00:31:01,932 fleet will never be able to do 775 00:31:01,932 --> 00:31:03,710 everything we need to do . So , 776 00:31:03,840 --> 00:31:06,790 maintaining a healthy ready reserve 777 00:31:06,790 --> 00:31:08,860 fleet is good . But I also want to 778 00:31:08,860 --> 00:31:11,250 thank this committee for their work not 779 00:31:11,250 --> 00:31:14,210 only on the continued stipend for the 780 00:31:14,220 --> 00:31:16,820 MSP , but also for the tanker security 781 00:31:16,820 --> 00:31:19,640 program that we just started to provide 782 00:31:19,640 --> 00:31:23,060 us crude , us flagged ships for both 783 00:31:23,060 --> 00:31:25,790 fuel , fuel movement and for our 784 00:31:25,790 --> 00:31:27,790 regular maritime security program . 785 00:31:27,790 --> 00:31:31,380 These are force multipliers for us to 786 00:31:31,380 --> 00:31:33,800 ensure that we can continue to project 787 00:31:33,800 --> 00:31:36,022 and sustain the force into the future . 788 00:31:36,022 --> 00:31:38,990 Thank you . Um On my second question , 789 00:31:38,990 --> 00:31:41,157 I want to turn back to logistics , but 790 00:31:41,157 --> 00:31:43,850 it's in europe . Um I'd like to touch 791 00:31:43,850 --> 00:31:45,683 on issues of lessons learned and 792 00:31:45,683 --> 00:31:47,739 potential obstacles for the future . 793 00:31:47,739 --> 00:31:49,961 And I know we've already had a bit of a 794 00:31:49,961 --> 00:31:52,183 dis discussion on the E . D . I um with 795 00:31:52,183 --> 00:31:54,128 my colleague from Oklahoma Senator 796 00:31:54,128 --> 00:31:57,050 Inhofe . Um uh given that we're nearly 797 00:31:57,050 --> 00:31:59,420 four weeks into this conflict in 798 00:31:59,420 --> 00:32:01,642 Ukraine and a month and a half into our 799 00:32:01,642 --> 00:32:03,642 increased presence and posture , we 800 00:32:03,642 --> 00:32:05,753 must take the opportunity to evaluate 801 00:32:05,753 --> 00:32:07,920 this strategy and look forward to what 802 00:32:07,920 --> 00:32:10,253 logistic challenges maybe in our future . 803 00:32:10,253 --> 00:32:12,476 So , general Walters , I'd like to give 804 00:32:12,476 --> 00:32:12,430 you the opportunity to sort of discuss 805 00:32:12,430 --> 00:32:14,600 what lessons related to logistics 806 00:32:14,600 --> 00:32:16,330 should we be learning from US 807 00:32:16,330 --> 00:32:18,380 operations in europe and what steps 808 00:32:18,380 --> 00:32:20,547 should we be taking during this fiscal 809 00:32:20,547 --> 00:32:22,547 year's budget cycle to plan for the 810 00:32:22,547 --> 00:32:24,436 enduring logistics challenge of a 811 00:32:24,436 --> 00:32:26,658 prolonged war in Ukraine as well as the 812 00:32:26,658 --> 00:32:28,713 recovery that will come after . That 813 00:32:29,740 --> 00:32:31,962 Senators , you will know from from your 814 00:32:31,962 --> 00:32:34,490 history that this takes a constant 815 00:32:34,500 --> 00:32:37,270 scrutiny , constant iterations , 816 00:32:37,280 --> 00:32:39,560 constant willingness to to listen and 817 00:32:39,560 --> 00:32:43,090 process improve . Uh and and we during 818 00:32:43,090 --> 00:32:44,979 the start of this campaign in the 819 00:32:44,979 --> 00:32:47,160 vicinity of 27 February , stood up to 820 00:32:47,160 --> 00:32:49,870 logistic cells that actually iterate on 821 00:32:49,870 --> 00:32:51,700 all these processes . One is um 822 00:32:51,700 --> 00:32:53,422 represented . The other one is 823 00:32:53,422 --> 00:32:55,478 internationally represented . And at 824 00:32:55,478 --> 00:32:57,644 the end of the day , you've got to get 825 00:32:57,644 --> 00:32:59,700 the right stuff in at the right time 826 00:32:59,700 --> 00:33:01,922 and it has to be appropriately defended 827 00:33:01,922 --> 00:33:03,867 so that those individuals that are 828 00:33:03,867 --> 00:33:05,811 responsible for putting in our are 829 00:33:05,811 --> 00:33:07,922 protected . And when it goes into the 830 00:33:07,922 --> 00:33:10,144 actionable area , Ukraine , it's put to 831 00:33:10,144 --> 00:33:12,311 good use and then you have to track it 832 00:33:12,311 --> 00:33:14,367 every second along the way . And and 833 00:33:14,367 --> 00:33:16,478 and we have that data are maintaining 834 00:33:16,478 --> 00:33:18,533 that data and we continue to iterate 835 00:33:18,533 --> 00:33:20,870 the process and prove all the way from 836 00:33:20,870 --> 00:33:23,270 acquiring it in Conus to where it gets 837 00:33:23,270 --> 00:33:25,492 to the operator in Ukraine to make sure 838 00:33:25,492 --> 00:33:27,714 that we're doing the right thing from a 839 00:33:27,714 --> 00:33:29,603 logistics standpoint . And that's 840 00:33:29,603 --> 00:33:31,492 actually what those two cells are 841 00:33:31,492 --> 00:33:33,548 charged to do as well as current day 842 00:33:33,548 --> 00:33:35,714 ops and and at the end of the day , it 843 00:33:35,714 --> 00:33:37,603 takes gigantic elbow grease every 844 00:33:37,603 --> 00:33:39,714 millisecond of the day to get right . 845 00:33:39,714 --> 00:33:41,548 And you have to wake up the next 846 00:33:41,548 --> 00:33:43,603 morning and tell yourself you're not 847 00:33:43,603 --> 00:33:43,570 probably doing it right and be prepared 848 00:33:43,570 --> 00:33:45,681 to iterate one more time . And that's 849 00:33:45,681 --> 00:33:47,792 what those two cells are currently in 850 00:33:47,792 --> 00:33:49,903 the process of doing its duty guard . 851 00:33:49,903 --> 00:33:51,903 Thank you . Thank you Mr Chairman . 852 00:33:51,903 --> 00:33:53,570 Thank you . Senator . Senator 853 00:33:53,570 --> 00:33:55,737 Tuberville , please . Thank you . Good 854 00:33:55,737 --> 00:33:58,850 morning . Thanks to both of your 855 00:33:58,850 --> 00:34:02,360 service . General van August 2017 China . 856 00:34:02,360 --> 00:34:04,582 Put their first military base in Africa 857 00:34:04,582 --> 00:34:06,710 in Djibouti now it looks like they're 858 00:34:06,720 --> 00:34:08,553 possibly going to put one on the 859 00:34:08,553 --> 00:34:11,750 Atlantic side . And uh equatorial 860 00:34:12,140 --> 00:34:14,560 guinea . Uh does that give you any 861 00:34:14,560 --> 00:34:18,150 concerns in transit camp Senator ? It 862 00:34:18,150 --> 00:34:21,730 absolutely does . Uh as they begin to 863 00:34:21,740 --> 00:34:23,950 elbow their way into these countries , 864 00:34:23,960 --> 00:34:26,690 they will begin to affect their 865 00:34:26,700 --> 00:34:28,922 economic decisions and their diplomatic 866 00:34:28,922 --> 00:34:32,400 decisions which could disrupt , disrupt 867 00:34:32,400 --> 00:34:34,730 or delay our ability to access those 868 00:34:34,730 --> 00:34:37,850 same areas . So I am concerned about 869 00:34:37,850 --> 00:34:39,906 their building operations around the 870 00:34:39,906 --> 00:34:41,850 world as they're trying to protect 871 00:34:41,850 --> 00:34:43,961 their growing interests , not only in 872 00:34:43,961 --> 00:34:47,290 South America but in Africa . Thank you . 873 00:34:47,300 --> 00:34:50,960 General Walters off the question here a 874 00:34:50,960 --> 00:34:53,980 little bit . Do we still have afghan 875 00:34:53,980 --> 00:34:55,970 refugees in in your purview ? 876 00:34:57,740 --> 00:35:00,090 So we just closed out the last set that 877 00:35:00,090 --> 00:35:02,350 we're at Camp Bechtel and they're safe 878 00:35:02,350 --> 00:35:04,572 and secured another country right now . 879 00:35:04,572 --> 00:35:06,572 How many do you think you processed 880 00:35:06,572 --> 00:35:08,572 through your venue ? We we actually 881 00:35:08,572 --> 00:35:10,940 processed 70,000 through the four sites 882 00:35:10,940 --> 00:35:14,750 in Europe . Thank you awesome job . 883 00:35:15,440 --> 00:35:17,700 What do you think that what does 884 00:35:17,700 --> 00:35:20,170 Finland and Sweden bring to the stable 885 00:35:20,170 --> 00:35:23,750 in NATO . So the first thing they bring 886 00:35:23,750 --> 00:35:26,180 is forces that are ready and they have 887 00:35:26,180 --> 00:35:28,069 a history of doing some wonderful 888 00:35:28,069 --> 00:35:30,013 things against folks that elect to 889 00:35:30,013 --> 00:35:31,902 violate their sovereignty and and 890 00:35:31,902 --> 00:35:33,958 they're ready . Forces helped helped 891 00:35:33,958 --> 00:35:36,180 lead from the front . Many of the other 892 00:35:36,180 --> 00:35:38,402 national forces that represent the NATO 893 00:35:38,402 --> 00:35:40,402 nations have pretty strong military 894 00:35:40,402 --> 00:35:42,347 considering their size . Yes sir . 895 00:35:42,347 --> 00:35:45,620 Thank you . Why do you think they shot 896 00:35:45,620 --> 00:35:48,590 hypersonic in Ukraine when they didn't 897 00:35:48,590 --> 00:35:52,430 have to . I think it was to demonstrate 898 00:35:52,430 --> 00:35:54,890 the capability and an attempt to put 899 00:35:54,890 --> 00:35:57,420 fear in the hearts of the enemy and I 900 00:35:57,420 --> 00:35:59,850 don't think they were successful . Yeah . 901 00:36:00,530 --> 00:36:04,340 What did it hit or was it 902 00:36:04,340 --> 00:36:06,600 one or two weeks there have been 903 00:36:06,600 --> 00:36:08,790 multiple launches . Most of them have 904 00:36:08,790 --> 00:36:10,790 been directed at military targets . 905 00:36:10,790 --> 00:36:12,890 Still TBD based off the intelligence 906 00:36:12,890 --> 00:36:15,180 returns . But but what I can say is is 907 00:36:15,180 --> 00:36:16,958 most of those strikes have been 908 00:36:16,958 --> 00:36:19,291 designated at specific military targets . 909 00:36:19,830 --> 00:36:22,330 one went one side of the country to the 910 00:36:22,330 --> 00:36:24,720 other . I mean that takes a lot of guts 911 00:36:24,720 --> 00:36:27,960 to do that knowing that I guess they 912 00:36:28,330 --> 00:36:30,850 they knew it was gonna work . You know 913 00:36:30,850 --> 00:36:33,072 when I was over in Ukraine a few months 914 00:36:33,072 --> 00:36:35,294 ago and the generals ever tell me about 915 00:36:35,294 --> 00:36:37,517 the new armor that they were putting on 916 00:36:37,517 --> 00:36:39,572 tanks . Has that been successful for 917 00:36:39,572 --> 00:36:41,683 Russia ? I noticed a lot of tanks are 918 00:36:41,683 --> 00:36:43,960 torn up . Do you have any information 919 00:36:43,960 --> 00:36:46,127 on that ? Have they held up ? You know 920 00:36:46,127 --> 00:36:48,238 the new armor to the javelins and the 921 00:36:48,238 --> 00:36:51,680 and the Stingers , sir . This is pretty 922 00:36:51,680 --> 00:36:53,624 anecdotal . But the feedback we're 923 00:36:53,624 --> 00:36:56,410 getting is if you have a lot of anti 924 00:36:56,410 --> 00:36:59,390 armor , antitank munitions you can slow 925 00:36:59,390 --> 00:37:01,501 down a tank . So even their new armor 926 00:37:01,501 --> 00:37:03,612 has some in their armor , so to speak 927 00:37:03,612 --> 00:37:07,240 with respect to uh multiple projectiles 928 00:37:07,240 --> 00:37:09,650 being launched at him . Have we seen 929 00:37:09,650 --> 00:37:11,940 any new weapons other than hypersonic 930 00:37:12,030 --> 00:37:15,870 used in this war ? No sir . 931 00:37:15,880 --> 00:37:19,500 No , I'm anxious to see how the the 932 00:37:19,510 --> 00:37:21,677 switch plays work . You know , I think 933 00:37:21,677 --> 00:37:24,180 that would that could be a huge benefit 934 00:37:24,180 --> 00:37:26,291 for us down the road and hopefully to 935 00:37:26,291 --> 00:37:30,220 Ukraine . Um let's see a 936 00:37:30,230 --> 00:37:31,286 couple more here . 937 00:37:34,330 --> 00:37:37,540 General Van Ost Alabama is 938 00:37:38,230 --> 00:37:40,830 proud to have been selected as the 939 00:37:40,830 --> 00:37:43,810 permanent home of the US Space Command 940 00:37:44,010 --> 00:37:46,121 in Huntsville . Recently . There have 941 00:37:46,121 --> 00:37:49,040 been comments made that question . If 942 00:37:49,040 --> 00:37:51,040 the command would be able to easily 943 00:37:51,040 --> 00:37:53,151 move from their temporary home , that 944 00:37:53,151 --> 00:37:55,373 obviously would be part of your purview 945 00:37:55,373 --> 00:37:57,540 there . I just want to say that I have 946 00:37:57,540 --> 00:37:59,484 ever confidence in your ability to 947 00:37:59,484 --> 00:38:01,484 guide Transcom through facilitating 948 00:38:01,484 --> 00:38:03,596 this move . Following the I . G . S . 949 00:38:03,596 --> 00:38:05,890 Decision in the near future . If you 950 00:38:05,890 --> 00:38:07,501 can pull off the last minute 951 00:38:07,501 --> 00:38:09,723 Afghanistan evacuation , this should be 952 00:38:09,723 --> 00:38:12,440 a piece of cake . But hopefully we can 953 00:38:12,440 --> 00:38:15,340 get that done . But uh yield my time 954 00:38:15,540 --> 00:38:17,600 and general . Thank you for your 955 00:38:17,600 --> 00:38:19,711 service . You look forward to playing 956 00:38:19,711 --> 00:38:22,650 golf and fishing . Thank you . Thank 957 00:38:22,650 --> 00:38:24,594 you . Senator Tuberville . Senator 958 00:38:24,594 --> 00:38:28,450 Peters please thank you . Mr . Chairman 959 00:38:29,410 --> 00:38:31,860 Colonel Walters . Uh let me first 960 00:38:31,870 --> 00:38:34,770 congratulate you and thank you for your 961 00:38:34,770 --> 00:38:37,360 40 years of service , your leadership 962 00:38:37,360 --> 00:38:39,860 and dedication to the men and women of 963 00:38:39,860 --> 00:38:41,860 our armed forces and our allies and 964 00:38:41,860 --> 00:38:44,710 partners has certainly helped shape the 965 00:38:44,720 --> 00:38:48,030 unprecedented strength and the unity of 966 00:38:48,030 --> 00:38:50,230 NATO against Putin's criminal 967 00:38:50,240 --> 00:38:52,920 aggression . So thank you . Uh in your 968 00:38:52,920 --> 00:38:55,087 posture , statement you highlight this 969 00:38:55,087 --> 00:38:57,253 is uh perhaps the last time you expect 970 00:38:57,253 --> 00:38:59,950 to testify as a Yukon commander and the 971 00:38:59,950 --> 00:39:02,061 and the history has yet to be written 972 00:39:02,061 --> 00:39:04,120 about how the illegal invasion of 973 00:39:04,120 --> 00:39:07,330 Ukraine concludes , we will continue to 974 00:39:07,330 --> 00:39:10,490 count on you to remain steadfast in a 975 00:39:10,500 --> 00:39:12,930 difficult challenge until the time as 976 00:39:12,930 --> 00:39:15,041 you pass the mantle of leadership for 977 00:39:15,041 --> 00:39:17,041 your com commander and NATO Supreme 978 00:39:17,041 --> 00:39:18,930 allied commander , europe General 979 00:39:18,930 --> 00:39:21,620 Motors in November of 2020 at 980 00:39:21,630 --> 00:39:24,060 Trilateral ceasefire agreement was 981 00:39:24,060 --> 00:39:26,440 signed between Armenia Azerbaijan and 982 00:39:26,440 --> 00:39:28,780 Russia to conclude the conflict in 983 00:39:28,780 --> 00:39:32,010 Nagorno Karabakh . And it seems as if 984 00:39:32,020 --> 00:39:34,410 Azerbaijan has taken advantage of the 985 00:39:34,420 --> 00:39:36,840 conflict in Ukraine by launching 986 00:39:36,850 --> 00:39:38,630 unprovoked assaults against the 987 00:39:38,640 --> 00:39:42,570 Armenian villages . Given Russia's poor 988 00:39:42,580 --> 00:39:45,720 military performance in Ukraine , I'm 989 00:39:45,720 --> 00:39:47,831 concerned about their ability to keep 990 00:39:47,831 --> 00:39:50,430 the peace , especially as They may need 991 00:39:50,430 --> 00:39:54,000 to draw on the 2000 Russian troops that 992 00:39:54,000 --> 00:39:56,500 are deployed there . So my question for 993 00:39:56,500 --> 00:39:58,444 you , sir , is what actions are we 994 00:39:58,444 --> 00:40:00,611 taking ? And what actions should we be 995 00:40:00,611 --> 00:40:02,722 taking to promote peace and stability 996 00:40:02,722 --> 00:40:06,480 in the caucuses ? Senator ? What 997 00:40:06,480 --> 00:40:08,591 we what we have to do first is ensure 998 00:40:08,591 --> 00:40:10,424 that through the defense attache 999 00:40:10,424 --> 00:40:12,990 offices and Azerbaijan is get the facts 1000 00:40:12,990 --> 00:40:14,879 with respect to the activities in 1001 00:40:14,879 --> 00:40:16,990 Nagorno Karabakh . And and as you can 1002 00:40:16,990 --> 00:40:19,157 well imagine right now there's lots of 1003 00:40:19,157 --> 00:40:21,268 finger pointing taking place back and 1004 00:40:21,268 --> 00:40:23,434 forth . And and the facts , as we know 1005 00:40:23,434 --> 00:40:25,601 right now is that Russia's involvement 1006 00:40:25,601 --> 00:40:27,712 in imposing good order and discipline 1007 00:40:27,712 --> 00:40:29,768 in that scenario was very little and 1008 00:40:29,768 --> 00:40:31,879 very curious . So we will continue to 1009 00:40:31,879 --> 00:40:34,101 gather the facts and then take the next 1010 00:40:34,101 --> 00:40:36,300 step forward with respect to Russia's 1011 00:40:36,300 --> 00:40:38,880 play in this activity and with respect 1012 00:40:38,890 --> 00:40:41,230 to Nagorno Karabakh's activities of 1013 00:40:41,240 --> 00:40:43,520 their defense force and the Azerbaijan 1014 00:40:43,520 --> 00:40:47,360 force , right general , there's nowhere 1015 00:40:47,370 --> 00:40:49,370 in the world is the power of our 1016 00:40:49,380 --> 00:40:52,680 alliance more evident than NATO . And 1017 00:40:52,680 --> 00:40:54,902 the michigan National Guard is proud to 1018 00:40:54,902 --> 00:40:56,680 play a role in that alliance as 1019 00:40:56,680 --> 00:41:00,380 Latvia's partner for nearly 30 years 1020 00:41:00,390 --> 00:41:02,440 through the National Guards State 1021 00:41:02,440 --> 00:41:04,850 Partnership program . In january 1022 00:41:04,850 --> 00:41:07,070 members of the Latvian National Armed 1023 00:41:07,070 --> 00:41:09,237 Forces trained on air and ground force 1024 00:41:09,237 --> 00:41:11,260 synchronization at joint terminal 1025 00:41:11,260 --> 00:41:13,530 attack controllers in camp Grayling 1026 00:41:13,530 --> 00:41:15,880 michigan . My question for you , sir is 1027 00:41:15,880 --> 00:41:17,991 how valuable is the state partnership 1028 00:41:17,991 --> 00:41:20,390 program to york security cooperation 1029 00:41:20,390 --> 00:41:22,557 initiatives ? And do you consider this 1030 00:41:22,557 --> 00:41:25,500 an area of high return on investment in 1031 00:41:25,500 --> 00:41:28,980 your A . R . Sir ? I would consider it 1032 00:41:28,990 --> 00:41:31,380 an area of very high return on 1033 00:41:31,380 --> 00:41:34,370 investment . The disposition of of the 1034 00:41:34,370 --> 00:41:36,592 force elements in Latvia today are very 1035 00:41:36,592 --> 00:41:39,170 robust that there are lots of US 1036 00:41:39,170 --> 00:41:42,170 entities in Latvia as we speak and 1037 00:41:42,170 --> 00:41:44,003 they're able to shoot , move and 1038 00:41:44,003 --> 00:41:46,114 communicate side by side with love in 1039 00:41:46,114 --> 00:41:48,281 armed forces to a to a far more lethal 1040 00:41:48,281 --> 00:41:50,448 degree than they have in the past as a 1041 00:41:50,448 --> 00:41:52,781 result of the state Partnership program . 1042 00:41:53,410 --> 00:41:55,577 General officers , I I understand that 1043 00:41:55,577 --> 00:41:58,080 one brigade set of the U . S . Army's 1044 00:41:58,090 --> 00:42:00,540 most modern Abrams tank has been 1045 00:42:00,540 --> 00:42:03,130 deployed from the army's preposition 1046 00:42:03,130 --> 00:42:06,320 stock in Germany to Poland to enhance 1047 00:42:06,320 --> 00:42:08,640 NATO's deterrence posture and given the 1048 00:42:08,640 --> 00:42:12,130 use of heavy armored forces by Russia 1049 00:42:12,140 --> 00:42:15,850 in Ukraine uh has continued 1050 00:42:16,030 --> 00:42:18,252 his rapid mobilization of the Abrams is 1051 00:42:18,252 --> 00:42:20,474 the most powerful ground combat vehicle 1052 00:42:20,474 --> 00:42:22,419 that we have important to you as a 1053 00:42:22,419 --> 00:42:26,330 combat commander in in europe . It 1054 00:42:26,330 --> 00:42:28,386 is senator . It's a tremendous force 1055 00:42:28,386 --> 00:42:30,663 multiplier when it comes to deterrence . 1056 00:42:30,900 --> 00:42:33,122 And is the recent decision by Poland to 1057 00:42:33,122 --> 00:42:35,344 upgrade its tanks to the U . S . Army's 1058 00:42:35,344 --> 00:42:37,678 Abrams to replace older Russian designs . 1059 00:42:37,678 --> 00:42:39,844 A significant development for NATO and 1060 00:42:39,844 --> 00:42:42,560 allied nations in europe . Absolutely , 1061 00:42:42,560 --> 00:42:46,170 yes , Sander General Vivian 1062 00:42:46,170 --> 00:42:48,310 knows in your posture statement , you 1063 00:42:48,310 --> 00:42:50,310 highlighted the significance of air 1064 00:42:50,310 --> 00:42:52,254 refueling mission and stressed the 1065 00:42:52,254 --> 00:42:54,477 importance of timely recapitalization . 1066 00:42:54,700 --> 00:42:56,780 I spoke with Secretary Kendall just 1067 00:42:56,790 --> 00:42:59,050 last week and we each agree it is 1068 00:42:59,050 --> 00:43:01,290 critical that Congress provides the air 1069 00:43:01,290 --> 00:43:04,030 force with the right systems needed to 1070 00:43:04,030 --> 00:43:06,720 deliver needed capabilities . And while 1071 00:43:06,720 --> 00:43:09,220 the 2006 Rand analysis of alternatives 1072 00:43:09,220 --> 00:43:11,820 may be somewhat outdated , it's 1073 00:43:11,820 --> 00:43:13,209 certainly outlined a few 1074 00:43:13,209 --> 00:43:16,950 recapitalization options . Uh so my 1075 00:43:16,950 --> 00:43:18,783 question for you ma'am is from a 1076 00:43:18,783 --> 00:43:20,783 capability standpoint , what do you 1077 00:43:20,783 --> 00:43:22,728 think is the best recapitalization 1078 00:43:22,728 --> 00:43:26,140 strategy ? Thanks Senator . As as I 1079 00:43:26,140 --> 00:43:28,320 said that uh error . Fueling is the 1080 00:43:28,320 --> 00:43:30,542 lifeblood of our ability to project and 1081 00:43:30,542 --> 00:43:33,180 employ a force . And if I could also 1082 00:43:33,180 --> 00:43:35,440 mentioned that the we cannot do it 1083 00:43:35,440 --> 00:43:37,162 without the total force . So I 1084 00:43:37,162 --> 00:43:39,370 appreciate their National guard uh 1085 00:43:39,380 --> 00:43:42,470 capacity Uh the best way to to 1086 00:43:42,470 --> 00:43:45,120 recapitalize is to have a stable plan 1087 00:43:45,130 --> 00:43:47,390 that gets after the capabilities we're 1088 00:43:47,390 --> 00:43:50,230 going to need in the future . The KC 46 1089 00:43:50,240 --> 00:43:52,740 is the future of air refueling Because 1090 00:43:52,740 --> 00:43:54,900 it can do multiple things and it is 1091 00:43:54,900 --> 00:43:57,122 connected to the battle both with links 1092 00:43:57,122 --> 00:44:00,240 16 and ability to uh command uh to be 1093 00:44:00,240 --> 00:44:02,296 able to get communications off board 1094 00:44:02,296 --> 00:44:04,184 and long range from that aircraft 1095 00:44:04,184 --> 00:44:06,370 securely . So as we look to develop 1096 00:44:06,380 --> 00:44:08,710 what capabilities we need in the future 1097 00:44:08,720 --> 00:44:11,920 uh in a contestant environment , We'll 1098 00:44:11,920 --> 00:44:14,087 be looking at the lessons from the KC- 1099 00:44:14,087 --> 00:44:16,309 46 . I'll be working with the air force 1100 00:44:16,309 --> 00:44:18,531 to describe those requirements into the 1101 00:44:18,531 --> 00:44:20,753 future . Right , well thank you . Thank 1102 00:44:20,753 --> 00:44:23,380 you Mr Chairman . Well thank you very 1103 00:44:23,380 --> 00:44:26,670 much . Senator Peters . I want to thank 1104 00:44:26,670 --> 00:44:28,750 the both the witnesses . General 1105 00:44:28,750 --> 00:44:31,100 Walters , not only for your testimony 1106 00:44:31,100 --> 00:44:33,750 but for your extraordinary service over 1107 00:44:33,750 --> 00:44:36,940 many many decades . You are in the most 1108 00:44:36,960 --> 00:44:39,016 at this moment . Critical position I 1109 00:44:39,016 --> 00:44:41,370 think in the military . And we're all 1110 00:44:41,370 --> 00:44:43,426 fortunate that you're here there and 1111 00:44:43,426 --> 00:44:45,148 thank you very much and please 1112 00:44:45,148 --> 00:44:47,370 communicate that to the men and women , 1113 00:44:47,370 --> 00:44:50,360 particularly The 82nd Airborne Division . 1114 00:44:50,890 --> 00:44:54,360 Nice yes sir . All 1115 00:44:54,360 --> 00:44:57,360 american and General Van over thank you 1116 00:44:57,360 --> 00:44:59,527 very much for your thoughtful approach 1117 00:44:59,527 --> 00:45:02,590 to these problems and you're very clear 1118 00:45:02,600 --> 00:45:04,860 signals to us that we need to make some 1119 00:45:04,860 --> 00:45:07,860 significant and difficult uh decisions 1120 00:45:07,860 --> 00:45:11,210 with respect to reconfiguring 1121 00:45:11,210 --> 00:45:14,360 our logistics , particularly conflicted 1122 00:45:14,360 --> 00:45:17,020 areas with that in the absence of any 1123 00:45:17,020 --> 00:45:19,190 further my colleagues here . I will 1124 00:45:19,190 --> 00:45:20,000 join the hearing